Posts Tagged ‘DOD’
Friday, April 4, 2014 @ 04:04 PM gHale
Outside cyber attacks gain the most publicity, but internal incidents are just as worrisome, just ask the Defense Department (DoD).
What concerns DoD officials the most is careless or poorly trained insiders as a source of threats, one survey found, according to a survey by SolarWinds, an IT management software provider.
In the survey, which addressed cyber security threats and preparedness across the federal government, 41 percent of DoD respondents named insider data leakage/theft as a threat, not far below the 48 percent who identified external hacking.
And although those responses may have come with the disclosures of Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning in mind, it seems inept co-workers, rather than intentional leakers, are the biggest concern.
Fifty-three percent of DoD respondents cited careless/untrained insiders as a source of security threats, more than foreign governments (48 percent), terrorists (31 percent) or the general hacking community (35 percent). Malicious insiders were at 26 percent of respondents.
SolarWinds conducted the online survey earlier this year of 200 IT and IT security professionals in the federal government, 40 percent of whom worked in the military. The results showed similarities in the concerns of civilian and military agencies, as well as some notable differences.
Overall, the respondents were pretty confident in their IT defenses, with 94 percent rating their cyber security readiness as good or excellent (though more good, at 50 percent, than excellent, at 44 percent).
External hacking was the most common threat in the overall survey, with 50 percent of the respondents naming it, followed by malware (46 percent), social engineering (37 percent) and spam (36 percent), with similar results coming from civilian and Defense agencies.
Differences cropped up in a few areas, though. Only 21 percent of civilian respondents cited insider data leakage/theft as a threat, compared with DoD’s 41 percent. And twice as many civilian respondents (25 percent to 12 percent) named mobile device theft as a threat, perhaps reflecting the fact that DoD has to date eschewed the bring your own device trend. DoD respondents showed more concerned than their civilian counterparts about physical security attacks, 25 percent to 13 percent.
Click here to review the survey.
Wednesday, October 2, 2013 @ 10:10 AM gHale
Seventeen Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) graduate students earned cyber security scholarships from the National Science Foundation, the Department of Homeland Security’s CyberCorps Scholarship for Service (SFS) Program and the Department of Defense’s Information Assurance Scholarship Program (IASP).
The SFS awards went to nine students in CMU’s Information Networking Institute (INI) and six students at CMU’s Heinz College. The IASP awards went to two INI students.
Both programs share a common goal and that is to increase and strengthen the amount of federal information assurance professionals that protect the nation’s critical infrastructures and national defense.
“As future federal employees, the SFS and IASP scholars delve into challenging engineering and information assurance coursework and engage in interdisciplinary cyber security research. In addition to the emphasis on the technologies and strategies related to cyber defense and cyber offense, CMU’s cyber security curricula explore risk management, economics and policy issues related to reducing vulnerability and securing our national information infrastructure,” said Dena Haritos Tsamitis, INI director and director of education, training and outreach for CyLab. She is also the principal investigator of the grants.
Increased global cyber attacks make the training and retention of cyber security experts a priority of the U.S. government. The National Security Agency (NSA) and the United States Cyber Command designated Carnegie Mellon as a National Center of Academic Excellence (CAE) in cyber operations for 2013-2018. The National Security Agency designated the university as a CAE in Information Assurance Education and a CAE in research.
More than 160 students in the SFS program have graduated from CMU in the past decade. One student in the IASP graduated from the INI in 2012.
Both programs provide full-tuition scholarships and stipends to scholars in exchange for working for the federal government after graduation.
Monday, April 29, 2013 @ 04:04 PM gHale
A policy through which federal departments offered prosecutorial immunity to companies that helped the U.S. military monitor Internet traffic on private networks of defense contractors expanded by Executive Order to include other critical infrastructure industries, according to the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC).
EPIC said the pilot-version of the program run with the Departments of Justice (DoJ), Defense (DoD), and Homeland Security (DHS) came to light in June 2011 after The Washington Post published a report detailing the implementation of a new program by National Security Administration that let them monitor traffic flowing from some defense contractors through certain Internet service providers. At the time, The Washington Post quoted Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn III saying the program was to help thwart attacks against defense firms and the government hoped to expand the program moving forward.
The documents obtained in the a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, EPIC said, reveal the DoD advised private industry organizations on the ways in which they circumvent federal wiretap laws in order to aid the DoD and DHS in their surveillance of private Internet networks belonging to defense contractors.
EPIC, digital rights group the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and others fear the program’s expansion would apply to the broad swath of organizations that potentially fall under the vague category of critical infrastructure.
The government has not yet named the program, but EPIC said the NSA has partnered with AT&T, Verizon, and CenturyLink in order to keep tabs on the Internet traffic flowing into and out of some 15 defense contractors, including Lockheed Martin, CSC, SAIC, and Northrop Grumman.
For its part, the NSA said it is not directly monitoring these networks, but is rather filtering their traffic in order to detect the presence of suspicious packets based on a number of malicious code signatures the agency has developed.
EPIC issued a FOIA request in July 2011 requesting the following information: “All contracts and communications with Lockheed Martin, CSC, SAIC, Northrop Grumman, or any other defense contractors regarding the new NSA pilot program; All contracts and communications with AT&T, Verizon, and CenturyLink or any other ISPs regarding the new NSA pilot program; All analyses, legal memoranda, and related records regarding the new NSA pilot program; Any memoranda of understanding between NSA and DHS or any other government agencies or corporations regarding the new NSA pilot program; Any Privacy Impact Assessment performed as part of the development of the new NSA pilot program.”
The government failed to provide any of this information. So, EPIC filed a FOIA lawsuit on March 1, 2012 and eventually gained access to thousands of pages of previously unreleased documents, which they have posted on their website.
Wednesday, January 30, 2013 @ 05:01 PM gHale
Cyber threats are real and abundant and the government is keenly aware it needs to lock in security policies and procedures.
Just look at what is going on. The Senate keeps pushing for legislation to improve information-sharing on threats and attacks. President Barack Obama is looking to issue an executive order on cyber security and the Department of Defense (DoD) is looking for a massive increase in the number of trained cyber security professionals to defend the country’s private and public networks.
Security professionals working on these assignments right now is difficult to narrow down as quite a few work in agencies that don’t discuss their operations. Also, some work in dual-tasked positions and don’t focus on just one assignment. However, officials from the Department of Defense have been pushing for more funding to hire more trained security professionals.
Now, that push seems to be paying dividends. The Pentagon’s goal is to increase the number of security professionals from fewer than 1,000 to 5,000 in the next few years. Those personnel will comprise military and civilian security professionals, and the goal will be to defend the country’s critical infrastructure as well as government and military networks.
This all comes just a few days after Janet Napolitano, secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, warned a nation-level incident of the scale of 9/11 could occur sometime soon as a result of a cyber attack. Napolitano is not the first to warn about the possibility of such an attack, but is rather the latest in a long line of government officials, presidential advisers and security experts to raise that specter. Security researchers also have warned in recent years about serious vulnerabilities in the SCADA and ICS systems that run much of the network infrastructure in utilities, financial systems and other critical areas.
In October, DHS officials warned SCADA system operators about an increase in the level of malicious activity targeting those systems.
“Asset owners should not assume that their control systems are secure or that they are not operating with an Internet accessible configuration. Instead, asset owners should thoroughly audit their networks for Internet facing devices, weak authentication methods, and component vulnerabilities,” the alert said.
The new plan from the Pentagon contemplates the creation of several separate groups of cyber security personnel, each with a different set of responsibilities. One group will defend networks used by critical infrastructure entities like utilities. Another team will be responsible for defensive and offensive military operations in cyberspace, and the third group will work on fortifying the DoD’s networks.
All of the groups will report up to the U.S. Cyber Command, a relatively new arm of the military headed by Gen. Keith Alexander, the director of the National Security Agency.
Friday, November 9, 2012 @ 09:11 AM gHale
A new program is starting up to implement automated monitoring of a set of critical security controls in government IT security this year, to provide a standardized cyber security baseline for agencies.
The effort, launched by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), will include a set of technical specifications developed in cooperation with industry that would enable the automation of the controls in off-the-shelf products. There also would be a governmentwide dashboard to provide visibility into each agency’s status on the controls and help establish priorities for improvement during the current fiscal year.
DHS unveiled the plans in conjunction with the release Nov. 5 of the latest version of the top 20 Critical Controls for Effective Cyber Defense and the news of a new international organization to oversee development of the consensus controls and promote their use in government and industry.
DHS, along with the National Security Agency, the Defense Department, the Defense Information Systems Agency and the DoD Cyber Crime Center, are among the members of the Consortium for Cybersecurity Action, which will maintain and update the list.
The critical controls, formerly the Consensus Audit Guidelines, are a set of security requirements developed in cooperation by government and private sector experts and published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the SANS Institute. Growing adoption of the controls in both government and industry has created the need for a more formal organization to house and maintain them, said former NSA official Tony Sager, who will lead the effort.
“It had to be a little more standardized,” said Sager, who retired as chief operating officer of the NSA’s Information Assurance Directorate in June. “If major organizations are going to make IT policy and spending decisions based on it, they have to know it will be there in two or five years.”
The critical controls are a reflection of the 80/20 rule at work in cyber security: Twenty percent of the effort produces 80 percent of the results. The controls are an effort to identify the 80 percent payoff that can prevent or mitigate the bulk of the attacks against IT systems today. By automating the application and monitoring of these basic security functions, resources and manpower could be free to address remaining more sophisticated challenges that require greater attention.
Development of the critical controls began in 2008 under the auspices of the CSIS in cooperation with other groups including NSA, US-CERT, DoD, Energy Department Nuclear Laboratories and the State Department. Their use at the State Department has gained attention as a way to measure and reduce meaningful vulnerabilities in widespread IT systems. The new consortium will have no power to require use of the control list, and its authority will come from the combined weight of its members.
Such a system does not provide complete security, but advocates said it helps focus security investment in the most needed areas and frees needed resources for more complex threats. By updating the list regularly to reflect changes in the threat landscape, the consortium will try to ensure that priorities remain properly focused.
The DHS program for implementing an initial set of five critical controls has been funded for fiscal 2013, which began Oct. 1. Capabilities will expand to other controls if funding is available. The department expects to issue a request for proposals that would provide a blanket purchase agreement for off-the-shelf automated monitoring tools for the initial set of controls:
• Hardware asset management
• Software asset management
• Configuration management
• Vulnerability management
• Network access control management
Monday, September 17, 2012 @ 04:09 PM gHale
U.S. power grids and other civilian infrastructure are not prepared for electromagnetic pulses (EMP) that could result from weapons or violent space weather, according to a congressional subcommittee hearing last week.
There are serious flaws in the nation’s infrastructure that could allow for EMP events to shut down power and communications for extended periods of time, said panelists at the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies, headed by Chairman Dan Lungren R-CA.
“Our civilian grid, which the Defense Department relies upon for 99 percent of its electricity needs, is vulnerable to these kinds of dangers,” Rep. Trent Franks, R-AZ, testified during the hearing. Franks, one of the leaders of the Congressional EMP Caucus, sponsored legislation in 2011 to protect U.S. infrastructure in the event of an attack by an EMP weapon.
Michael Aimone, a director of business enterprise integration at Defense, said the Pentagon had pursued a “two-track approach” to mitigate the impact an EMP attack could have on Defense facilities. He said his plan relied on in-house capabilities to maintain power and electronics and a means to communicate and coordinate with outside partners.
“DoD recently adopted an explicit mission assurance strategy, which is focused on ensuring operational continuity in an all-hazard threat environment,” Aimone said.
EMP disruptions and attacks can come from different types of events, including high-altitude or low-altitude nuclear weapons detonations, locally based radio frequency weapons, and solar weather. One of the largest impacts from an EMP-based disruption was in Quebec in 1989, when nearly 6 million people lost power because of a geomagnetic storm.
Brandon Wales, of the Homeland Security Department’s National Protection and Programs Directorate, said DHS was working with federal agencies on contingency plans for an EMP event. He said Federal Emergency Management Agency was establishing lines of communication with key agencies in case an EMP event occurs, and that Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano had commissioned a report in 2011 to study the impact of space-based EMP attacks.
“DHS has pursued a deeper understanding of the EMP threat, as well as its potential impacts, effective mitigation strategies, and a greater level of public awareness and readiness in cooperation with other federal agencies and private equipment and system owners and operators through various communications channels,” Wales said.
Common standards for power grid equipment are a major issue, said Joseph McClelland, director of the Office of Electric Reliability at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. He said current standards to protect infrastructure and equipment do not address the many levels within the power grid and should undergo an update.
“Protecting the electric generation, transmission and distribution systems from severe damage due to an EMP-related event would involve vulnerability assessments at every level of electric infrastructure,” McClelland said.
Wednesday, April 11, 2012 @ 05:04 PM gHale
By Richard Sale
The Stuxnet virus that damaged Iran’s nuclear program was implanted by an Israeli proxy — an Iranian, who used a corrupt “memory stick.32,” former and serving U.S. intelligence officials said.
In the continuing battle to hold off the Iranian nuclear program, Iranian proxies have also been active in assassinating Iran’s nuclear scientists, these sources said.
Cyber Warning: Duqu’s Back
Duqu Still at Work
Duqu Report: Code is Old School
Stuxnet, Duqu Link Grows Stronger
Stuxnet to Duqu: The Waiting Begins
Duqu and Rumors of War
A New and Frightening Stuxnet
These sources, who requested anonymity because of their close proximity to investigations, said a saboteur at the Natanz nuclear facility, probably a member of an Iranian dissident group, used a memory stick to infect the machines there. They said using a person on the ground would greatly increase the probability of computer infection, as opposed to passively waiting for the software to spread through the computer facility. “Iranian double agents” would have helped to target the most vulnerable spots in the system,” one source said. In October 2010, Iran’s intelligence minister, Heydar Moslehi said an unspecified number of “nuclear spies” were arrested in connection with Stuxnet.33 virus.
Former and senior U.S. officials believe nuclear spies belonged to the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK), which Israel uses to do targeted killings of Iranian nationals, they said. “The MEK is being used as the assassination arm of Israel’s Mossad intelligence service,” said Vince Cannistraro, former head of the CIA’s Counterterrorism. He said the MEK is in charge of executing “the motor attacks on Iranian targets chosen by Israel. They go to Israel for training, and Israel pays them.” Other former agency officials confirmed this.
As ISSSource reported, Stuxnet was a comprehensive U.S.-Israeli program designed to disrupt Iran’s nuclear technology. This joint program first surfaced in 2009 and worked in concert with an earlier U.S. effort that consistently sabotaged Iran’s purchasing network abroad.
But the United States never indulged in targeting killings of Iran scientists, and former senior U.S. officials said the U.S. public remained unaware of a separate Israeli program, independent of the United States, that has for ten years been assassinating key Iranian nuclear scientists and sabotaging key Iranian facilities using a proxy group of Iranian dissidents. These dissidents have a functioning, effective network inside Iran and they have access to officials in the nuclear program.
The MEK has a shadowy and unsavory history. Founded in the 1970s, the group was stridently anti-shah and allied itself with the dictatorship of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein from which it received most of its supplies. Performing security for Saddam, the MEK assisted Saddam in the slaughter of his domestic opponents and the massacre of Iraqi Shias and Kurds in the 1991 uprising.
As the military wing of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the MEK targeted Iranian officials and government facilities in Iran and abroad. In the 1970s, the group also attacked and killed Americans. According to one former senior CIA official who spoke on background to ISSSource, the MEK is particularly violent. In France, they conducted killings in Paris, including six or seven U.S. Army sergeants.” He added the French “were terrified of them.”
In 2003, the United States listed the NCRI as a terrorist organization and closed its Washington office. U.S. forces in Iraq captured the MEK’s weapons and turned the MEK over for investigation of terrorist acts. Since then, the group has been picking off Iranian nuclear scientists one by one.
When ISSSource asked Paul Pillar, a 28-year CIA veteran whether Israel was killing secondary or tertiary scientists instead of its major ones, he replied, “Israel kills any Iranians it can.” Since 2007, five Iranian nuclear scientists have been killed in Iranian territory, many victims dying from magnetic bombs that terrorists had attached to the exterior of their cars.
The damage caused by the MEK is not confined to killing individuals. On Oct. 12, 2011, just before Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was to arrive in Lebanon, a huge blast destroyed an underground site near the town of Khorramabad in western Iran that housed most of Iran’s Shehab-3 medium-range missiles capable of reaching Israel and Iraq. A far right wing Israeli website, Debka, reported Iran suffered a “devastating blow” to its nuclear program. The blast killed 18 and wounded several more.
Former and serving U.S. officials both fingered the MEK as the killers. One such official said “computer manipulations,” caused the blast. They said the spies inside Iran had the access, the contacts, the positions and technical skill to do the job. “Given the seriousness of the impact on Iran’s (nuclear) program, we believe it took a human agent to spread the virus,” said one former U.S. intelligence source.
Meanwhile, going back to Stuxnet, once the memory stick was infected, the virus was able to infiltrate the network and take over the system. U.S. officials said they believe the infection commenced when the user simply clicked on the associated icon in Windows. Several reports pointed out this was a direct application of one of the zero-day vulnerabilities Stuxnet leveraged.
Building and deploying Stuxnet required extremely detailed intelligence about the systems it was supposed to compromise, and has made reprogramming highly specific installations on legacy systems more complex, not less. According to reports, the Stuxnet mystery was unveiled in June 2010, when a small company called VirusBlokAda in Minsk, the capital of Belarus was emailed by a dealer in Tehran about an irritating problem some of his clients were having with their computers.
The company analyst saw the computers were constantly turning off and restarting. At first the analyst thought it was just a problem with the hardware. But when they said several computers were affected, not just one, VirusBlokAda understood it was a problem with the software the computers were running.
U.S. officials confirmed Stuxnet takes advantage of zero-day vulnerabilities. This type of virus had been previously undetected, and remained unidentified by anti-virus software. According to public reports, early versions of Stuxnet used certificates by Realtek Semiconductor systems – later versions used certificates from JMicron Technology Corp. The use of these certificates gives the worm the appearance of legitimate software to Microsoft Windows.
In a report, Symantec said yes, Stuxnet was “splattered” far and wide, but it only executed its damaging payload where it was supposed to. The virus was so efficient that it could deliver its payload only to the designated target, and would not damage adjacent machines. Another expert, a former CIA official, likened it to a flu virus that only makes one family sick. Stuxnet was designed for sabotage, not crime.
It is interesting to note Stuxnet was not the first virus used by the U.S. military intelligence to try and disable opponents. In the 1980s, the United States had considerable success at planting viruses inside Soviet military-industrial structure that could be activated in time of war, a process still continuing with China. “We put in bugs inside the Soviet computers to feed back satellite information that had been ‘leeched’ off hard drives, in the Soviet Defense Ministry and others,” said a former U.S. intelligence official.
In December 1991, just before Desert Storm, the CIA and the British Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) had experimented with all sorts of viruses to inject into Iraq’s computers. In December, CIA operatives, working in Jordan, infiltrated bugs into hardware smuggled across the border and into Baghdad.
Once in place, NSA and GCHQ believed the virus would spread like a virulent cancer through the Iraqi Command and Control system, infecting every computer system it came across. But before the virus had reached its target, the air war began. U.S. planes destroyed Saddam’s command and control network, including the buildings where the infected computer hardware had been so successfully inserted. As a result, one of the most successful intelligence operations of the war was buried beneath the rubble. “The intelligence people were very pissed — all that work for nothing,” said a former senior DoD official.
Richard Sale was United Press International’s Intelligence Correspondent for 10 years and the Middle East Times, a publication of UPI. He is the author of Clinton’s Secret Wars and Traitors.