By Gregory Hale
After a final report in the October 26, 2019 death of a worker and his wife from a hydrogen sulfide release at the Aghorn Operating Inc. waterflood station in Odessa, Texas, nine recommendations ended up issued to help the industry learn from this tragic incident.

A worker and his wife perished in an October 26, 2019 hydrogen sulfide release at the Aghorn Operating Inc. waterflood station in Odessa, Texas. The release fatally injured the employee who was working at the facility that evening, as well as his spouse who attempted to locate him at the facility when he did not return home. Hydrogen sulfide is a colorless, flammable, and toxic gas that is present in the Texas area’s oil and gas reservoirs.

As a result of the incident, the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) started an investigation and earlier this month adopted its final report and made seven final recommendations.

The seven recommendations include:

Schneider Bold
  1. For all waterflood stations where the potential exists to expose workers or non-employees to H2S concentrations at or above 10 ppm, mandate the use of personal H2S detection devices as an integral part of every employee or visitor personal protective equipment (PPE) kit prior to entering the vicinity of the facility. Ensure detector use is in accordance with manufacturer specifications.
  2. For all Aghorn facilities, develop a site-specific, formalized and comprehensive Lockout/Tagout program, to include policies, procedures, and training, to protect workers from energized equipment hazards, such as exposure to H2S. Ensure the program meets the requirements outlined in 29 CFR 1910.147 and includes energy control procedures, training, and periodic inspections.
  3. For all waterflood stations where the potential exists to expose workers to H2S concentrations at or above 10 ppm, commission an independent and comprehensive analysis of each facility design vis-à-vis ventilation and mitigation systems to ensure that, in the event of an accidental release, workers are protected from exposure to toxic gas levels.
  4. For all waterflood stations where the potential exists to expose workers or non-employees to H2S concentrations at or above 10 ppm, develop and demonstrate the use of a safety management program that includes a focus on protecting workers and non-employees from H2S. This program should include risk identification, assessment, mitigation, and monitoring of design, procedures, maintenance and training related to H2S. This program must be in compliance with 29 CFR 1910.1000 – Air Contaminants and 29 CFR 1910.147 – The Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout).
  5. For all waterflood stations where the potential exists to expose workers to H2S concentrations at or above 10 ppm, ensure the H2S detection and alarm systems are properly maintained and configured, and develop site-specific detection and alarm programs and associated procedures based on manufacturer specifications, current codes, standards, and industry good practice guidance. The program must address installation, calibration, inspection, maintenance, training and routine operations.
  6. Pump house that emitted deadly H2S gas that left a husband and wife dead.

  7. For all waterflood stations where the potential exists to expose workers or non-employees within the perimeter of the facility to H2S concentrations at or above 10 ppm, ensure the H2S detection and alarm system designs employ multiple layers of alerts unique to H2S, such as with the use of both audible and visual mediums, so workers and non-employees within the perimeter of the facility would be alerted to a significant release. The system design must meet manufacturer specifications, current codes, standards, and industry good practice guidance.
  8. For all waterflood stations where the potential exists to expose non-employees to H2S concentrations at or above 10 ppm, develop and implement a formal, written, site-specific security program to prevent unknown and unplanned entrance of those not employed by Aghorn, starting with a requirement for employees to lock access gates upon entering and departing the facility.

The OSHA recommendation included: Issue a safety information product (such as a safety bulletin or safety alert) that addresses the requirements for protecting workers from hazardous air contaminants and from hazardous energy.

For the Texas Railroad Commission, CSB recommended: Develop and send a Notice to Operators to all oil and gas operators that fall under the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission of Texas that describes the safety issues described in this report, including: 1. Non-use of Personal H2S Detector 2. Non-performance of Lockout/Tagout 3. Confinement of H2S Inside Pump House 4. Lack of Safety Management Program 5. Nonfunctioning H2S Detection and Alarm System 6. Deficient Site Security.

Incident Timeline
In piecing together a timeline, the CSB established quite a few facts and came to some conclusion regarding the incident.

The Aghorn Operating waterflood station is used as part of a process to extract oil from underground reservoirs in West Texas. During extraction, oil comes out of the ground with water in it. The water is removed from the oil, but it can contain some residual oil and other contaminants such as the toxic hydrogen sulfide. At the Aghorn waterflood station, pumps, in a building called the “pump house,” are used to pressurize and inject the water back into the oilfield. The injected water adds pressure to the reservoir allowing a larger quantity of oil to be extracted.

In the report the CSB found on the night of the incident, the waterflood station’s control system activated an oil level alarm on a pump. An Aghorn worker drove to the waterflood station and attempted to isolate the pump from the process by closing two valves. The CSB found, however, the worker failed to isolate the pump from energy sources, called a lockout/tagout, before performing the work. At some point while the worker was in the vicinity of the pump, the pump automatically turned on, and water containing hydrogen sulfide escaped into the pump house. The pumper was overcome and fatally injured by the toxic gas.

After the incident, the CSB found a plunger on the pump shattered, which had allowed the release to occur. Due to the limitations of the available evidence, the CSB was unable to determine whether the pump failure and toxic release happened before the pumper arrived at the facility, or when the pump automatically turned on while the pumper was closing valves.

A couple of hours passed, and when the pumper did not return home, his spouse drove with their two children to the station to check on him. She located him on the floor of the pump house and was also overcome and fatally injured by the toxic hydrogen sulfide gas. The children remained in the car and were not injured.

No Detection Device
Among the myriad findings in the report were the worker was not wearing his personal hydrogen sulfide detection device upon entering the facility, and there was no evidence that Aghorn management required the use of these devices.

In addition, Aghorn did not maintain or properly configure its waterflood station facility hydrogen sulfide detection and alarm system. Without the alarm panel receiving signals from the detectors, neither the beacon warning light nor the phone system alerted the worker to the dangerous atmosphere.

Also, the CSB was unable to confirm whether the pump house exhaust fans were operational at the time of the incident. Aghorn did not have sufficient fixtures or facilities to ventilate the pump house and there is no evidence of Aghorn’s assessment of the facility design to ensure proper ventilation.

Aghorn did not comply with OSHA regulations requiring equipment be isolated from energy sources prior to performing work on it. The company had no formal comprehensive lockout/tagout program.

Safety management Practices Lacking
Aghorn lacked operational, training, testing and maintenance procedures and records. Comprehensive safety management practices include risk identification, assessment, mitigation and monitoring of design, procedures, maintenances and training.

In another finding, CSB was unable to determine whether the pump failure and loss of containment of the produced water occurred before the worker arrived at the facility or occurred when the pump energized while he was closing valves to isolate the pump.

In one more issue, there was deficient site security. Aghorn had an informal policy, saying when an Aghorn employee is working at the facility, the access gates are normally left unlocked. The problem is, the unlocked gates allowed the pumper’s spouse to drive directly to the waterflood station and enter the pump house, where she was also fatally injured.

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