The UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), and New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) agree with this attribution and the details provided in this advisory.
To that end, the NCSC previously detailed how SVR cyber actors have targeted governmental, think tank, healthcare, and energy targets for intelligence gain. SVR actors are now expanding their targeting to include aviation, education, law enforcement, local and state councils, government financial departments, and military organizations.
Amongst other things, SVR actors were a part of the supply chain compromise of SolarWinds software.
In an effort to keep up with what its potential victims are doing, as organizations continue to modernize their systems and move to cloud-based infrastructure, the SVR adapted to these changes.
They have to move beyond their traditional means of initial access, such as exploiting software vulnerabilities in an on-premises network, and instead target cloud services themselves.
To access the majority of the victims’ cloud hosted network, actors must first successfully authenticate to the cloud provider. Denying initial access to the cloud environment can prohibit SVR from successfully compromising their target. In contrast, in an on-premises system, more of the network is typically exposed to threat actors.
Previous SVR campaigns reveal the actors successfully used brute forcing and password spraying to access service accounts. This type of account typically ends up used to run and manage applications and services. There is no human user behind them so they cannot end up easily protected with multi-factor authentication (MFA), making these accounts more susceptible to a successful compromise. Service accounts are often also highly privileged depending on which applications and services they’re responsible for managing. Gaining access to these accounts provides threat actors with privileged initial access to a network, to launch further operations, according to the advisory.
SVR campaigns have also targeted dormant accounts belonging to users who no longer work at a victim organization but whose accounts remain on the system.
Following an enforced password reset for all users during an incident, SVR actors have also logged into inactive accounts and followed instructions to reset the password. This has allowed the actor to regain access following incident response eviction activities.
SVR is a sophisticated actor capable of carrying out a global supply chain compromise such as the 2020 SolarWinds, however the guidance in this advisory shows a strong baseline of cyber security fundamentals can help defend from such actors.
Click here for more information on the advisory.

