There is evidence of a post-compromise advanced persistent threat (APT) activity in the cloud environment, federal officials said.

An APT actor is using compromised applications in a victim’s Microsoft 365 (M365)/Azure environment and using additional credentials and Application Programming Interface (API) access to cloud resources of private and public sector organizations, according to an advisory by the Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). This activity CISA discovered is in addition to what had been previously detailed in AA20-352A.

In response, CISA released AA21-008A: Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments to describe this malicious APT activity.

The APT actor is utilizing additional credentials and Application Programming Interface (API) access to cloud resources of private and public sector organizations, according to the CISA advisory. These tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) feature three key components:

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  • Compromising or bypassing federated identity solutions
  • Using forged authentication tokens to move laterally to Microsoft cloud environments
  • Using privileged access to a victim’s cloud environment to establish difficult-to-detect persistence mechanisms for Application Programming Interface (API)-based access

The advisory describes these TTPs and offers an overview of, and guidance on, available open-source tools — including a CISA-developed tool, Sparrow — for network defenders to analyze their Microsoft Azure Active Directory (AD), Office 365 (O365), and M365 environments to detect potentially malicious activity.

Network defenders can use these tools to help detect and remediate malicious APT actor activity as part of the ongoing supply chain compromise.

CISA has observed the APT actor gaining Initial Access to victims’ enterprise networks via compromised SolarWinds Orion products (e.g., Solorigate, Supernova), according to the advisory. However, CISA is investigating instances in which the threat actor may have obtained initial access by Password Guessing, Password Spraying, and/or exploiting inappropriately secured administrative or service credentials (Unsecured Credentials) instead of utilizing the compromised SolarWinds Orion products.

CISA observed this threat actor moving from user context to administrator rights for Privilege Escalation within a compromised network and using native Windows tools and techniques, such as Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), to enumerate the Microsoft Active Directory Federated Services (ADFS) certificate-signing capability, according to the advisory. This enumeration allows threat actors to forge authentication tokens (OAuth) to issue claims to service providers — without having those claims checked against the identity provider — and then to move laterally to Microsoft Cloud environments (Lateral Movement).

The threat actor has also used on-premises access to manipulate and bypass identity controls and multi-factor authentication. This activity demonstrates how sophisticated adversaries can use credentials from one portion of an organization to move laterally (Lateral Movement) through trust boundaries, evade defenses and detection (Defense Evasion), and steal sensitive data (Collection).

This level of compromise is challenging to remediate and requires a rigorous multi-disciplinary effort to regain administrative control before recovering.

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