By Gregory Hale
In an effort to prepare critical organizations for anticipated Russian cyber activity and mitigate potential fallout which may come in cyber-physical attacks, the federal government may be missing some of the nuances of protecting the OT environment.

To that end, a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) released Tuesday warning organizations of Russian state-sponsored cyber threats and help the cybersecurity community reduce the risk presented by these threats.

This CSA, developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and National Security Agency (NSA), provides an overview of Russian state-sponsored cyber operations; commonly observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); detection actions; incident response guidance; and mitigations.

Given Russian advanced persistent threat (APT) attackers demonstrated capability to maintain persistent, long-term access in compromised enterprise and cloud environments, CISA, the FBI, and NSA encourage all critical infrastructure organizations to:

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Implement robust log collection and retention. Without a centralized log collection and monitoring capability, organizations have limited ability to investigate incidents or detect the threat actor behavior described in this advisory.

Look for behavioral evidence or network and host-based artifacts from known Russian state-sponsored TTPs. To detect password spray activity, review authentication logs for system and application login failures of valid accounts. Look for multiple, failed authentication attempts across multiple accounts.

Organizations with OT/ICS systems: Take note of unexpected equipment behavior; for example, unexpected reboots of digital controllers and other OT hardware and software. Also, record delays or disruptions in communication with field equipment or other OT devices. Determine if system parts or components are lagging or unresponsive.

“This CISA alert is clearly prompted by the diplomatic talks between Biden and Putin. Leveraging cyber operations is a textbook Russian strategy during geopolitical negotiations, as it gives the country plausible deniability and levels the playing field with more economically and militaristically powerful countries,” said Josh Lospinoso, chief executive of OT security company for transportation, Shift5, and former U.S. Cyber Command officer. “CISA’s strategy with this alert is to prepare critical organizations for anticipated Russian cyber activity and hopefully mitigate potential fallout, which will likely take the form of espionage or cyber-physical attacks. Russian threat groups in particular are known for persistence and stealth, as opposed to other geopolitical cyber adversaries like Iran, China and North Korea. Well-resourced Russian APTs will aim to find a way into business-critical networks and exercise the long-term patience of nation-state players.

“CISA Director Jen Easterly intimately understands the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of nation-state actors – she has been at the front lines of fighting Russian adversaries in cyberspace throughout her career, especially as part of NSA’s Tailored Access Operations – and that is informing this CISA alert. The callout of NSA and FBI as co-authors leads me to wonder what TTPs and CVEs have been omitted, whether that omission is due to the United States’ own TTPs or a desire not to tip our hand about our own intelligence gathering activities against Russian APTs,” Lospinoso said.

The Feds recommend organizations apply the best practices for identity and access management, protective controls and architecture, and vulnerability and configuration management.

For identity and access management:

  • Require multi-factor authentication for all users, without exception.
  • Require accounts to have strong passwords and do not allow passwords to be used across multiple accounts or stored on a system to which an adversary may have access.
  • Secure credentials. Russian state-sponsored APT actors have demonstrated their ability to maintain persistence using compromised credentials.
  • Set a strong password policy for service accounts.
  • Audit Domain Controllers to log successful Kerberos TGS requests and ensure the events are monitored for anomalous activity.

For protective controls and architecture:

  • Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity that may indicate lateral movement by a threat actor or malware. Use network monitoring tools and host-based logs and monitoring tools, such as an endpoint detection and response (EDR) tool. EDR tools are useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host.
  • Enable strong spam filters.
  • As a longer-term effort, critical infrastructure organizations should implement network segmentation to separate network segments based on role and functionality. Network segmentation can help prevent lateral movement by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks.
  • Appropriately implement network segmentation between IT and OT networks. Network segmentation limits the ability of adversaries to pivot to the OT network even if the IT network is compromised. Define a demilitarized zone that eliminates unregulated communication between the IT and OT networks.
  • Organize OT assets into logical zones by taking into account criticality, consequence, and operational necessity. Define acceptable communication conduits between the zones and deploy security controls to filter network traffic and monitor communications between zones.
  • Prohibit ICS protocols from traversing the IT network.

For vulnerability and configuration management:

  • Update software, including operating systems, applications, and firmware on IT network assets, in a timely manner. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities.
  • Use industry recommended antivirus programs.
  • Implement rigorous configuration management programs. Ensure the programs can track and mitigate emerging threats. Review system configurations for misconfigurations and security weaknesses.
  • Disable all unnecessary ports and protocols.
  • Ensure OT hardware is in read-only mode.

“This CISA alert certainly has general advice on best practices to reduce cybersecurity risk, but it missed a critical point in the vulnerability and configuration management section,” said Eric Byres, CTO at aDolus Technology Inc. “CISA says to update software and use a centralized patch management system, but they fail to mention the critical importance of validation or authentication before installing those patches. There is no point updating a vulnerability with a malware-infested, counterfeit patch. Operators of critical infrastructure need to verify that the patch they’ve got in hand is safe to install and did indeed come from their vendor (and not a Russian agency).”

“To assist with the triaging and prioritization of patches, asset owners should be using resources like SBoMs and VEX documents — these types of documents help vendors share with their customers what vulnerabilities are present and actually exploitable (because most of them aren’t),” said Ron Brash, vice president of technical research at aDolus. “aDolus worked with several major ICS vendors to produce the first real-world VEX documents in response to the Log4j vulnerability. This kind of effort highlights the advantage of intelligent vulnerability response vs. blanket knee-jerk patch everything statements.”

Historically, Russian state-sponsored APT attackers have used common but effective tactics — including spearphishing, brute force, and exploiting known vulnerabilities against accounts and networks with weak security — to gain initial access to target networks. Vulnerabilities Russian state-sponsored APT actors exploit include:

  1. CVE-2018-13379 FortiGate VPNs
  2. CVE-2019-1653 Cisco router
  3. CVE-2019-2725 Oracle WebLogic Server
  4. CVE-2019-7609 Kibana
  5. CVE-2019-9670 Zimbra software
  6. CVE-2019-10149 Exim Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
  7. CVE-2019-11510 Pulse Secure
  8. CVE-2019-19781 Citrix
  9. CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange
  10. CVE-2020-4006 VMWare (note: this was a zero-day at time.)
  11. CVE-2020-5902 F5 Big-IP
  12. CVE-2020-14882 Oracle WebLogic
  13. CVE-2021-26855 Microsoft Exchange (Note: this vulnerability is frequently observed used in conjunction with CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065)

These attackers have also demonstrated sophisticated tradecraft and cyber capabilities by compromising third-party infrastructure, compromising third-party software, or developing and deploying custom malware. The actors have also demonstrated the ability to maintain persistent, undetected, long-term access in compromised environments, including cloud environments, by using legitimate credentials.

Click here for additional information on the advisory.

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