By Gregory Hale
If it hasn’t already, ransomware is one word that should send a shiver down the spine of any industry executive or security professional these days.
Just look at the Olympus attack last week or the assaults on Colonial Pipeline or global meat producer JBS to name a few. In some cases, companies paid millions of dollars to regain control of their systems, and in other cases, they did not.
But either way, the amount of time, energy and money companies spend to recover from an attack continues to grow.
“A lot of the ransomware groups that are operating, they operate as ransomware as a service,” said Satnam Narang, staff research engineer for security response at Tenable. “They don’t actually do the attacks themselves. They build the malware, or ransomware, and manage the infrastructure and they handle the conversations with the victims and negotiate ransomware payments. (Ransomware groups) rely on affiliates who are well-versed at going out and infecting victim organizations. The affiliates bring back victims to the ransomware as a service group who then does all the administrative things. Once the ransomware is paid, they give the bulk of the payments of the ransom received to the affiliates. Sometimes the affiliates may get guidance from ransomware groups. They may say we only want to get victims that are making over $100 million a year in profit. Some ransomware groups forbid affiliates to go after critical infrastructure in certain environments like manufacturing. What is boils down to is affiliates are looking for soft targets.”
Affiliates Find Victim
So, the ransomware as a service groups are supplying the attack software, and the affiliates are finding the victims.
In the Colonial Pipeline incident, as an example, an affiliate went out and got them and then they brought in the ransomware as a service organization to handle the rest. In the end, they were supposed to share the profits.
“Affiliates are responsible to find out how to get into the victim,” Narang said. “Sometimes, the ransomware as a service group can give guidance. But at the end of the day, the affiliate is figuring out the way to get in by brute force, unpatched vulnerabilities, or spear phishing to name a few. There are multiple ways for affiliates to get in.”
Narang also said sometimes affiliates get in by paying brokers, who are already in systems, for access.
These access brokers have already gained access to an organization and they sell access to attackers to the unwitting victim. The affiliate will pay thousands of dollars to the access broker to gain access then the affiliate goes back to the ransomware as a service provider to attack, Narang said. This way there is a win-win-win for all the bad guys in the attack chain.
Ransomware Getting Stronger
While ransomware has been around the industry for a long time, it just seems to be gaining more momentum as the year goes on.
“I feel very confident in we don’t know how prevalent ransomware really is in the industry,” Narang said. “It has definitely gotten worse. It used to be they were asking for $200, $300 to $500 in an attack. What really changed the landscape is the idea of double extortion. Not only are they encrypting systems, they are exfiltrating data from the organizations and they threatening to leak that information publicly. It is not just double extortion, there are other tactics organizations are using when they realize a victim may not want to pay because they are saying go ahead and publish that information and we will deal with that fallout. So, attackers are also performing distributed denial of service attacks on victim’s websites which is where they are providing up to date attack information for their customers. That means attackers are taking away that avenue of communications. In addition, some of the attackers are contacting the victim’s customers saying you should talk to the company to ensure you data does not get out there.
“There is no telling what lengths these groups will go to to get these ransom payments.”
In an ironic twist, oftentimes if the victim decides the pay the ransom, they have to trust the attacker to the point of paying them millions of dollars and maybe they will get the decryption key.
“Trust is built into their process,” Narang said. “If you are a victim of a ransomware attack the bad guys will give you a sample file to decrypt the file. It is an olive branch to the victim to show good faith in that you can trust they will come through with the decryption key.
“It is hard to trust anybody that has infected your organization, encrypted your files, stolen your files and threatened to leak your files. It is hard to put your trust in the ransomware group, but it really depends on your options like if you don’t have back up. We don’t think you should pay the ransom because it really emboldens them. At the end of the day, it is the organization’s decision whether or not they choose to pay the ransom. They are placing a level of trust on the cyber criminals who have done a lot of damage to them. It is really a Catch-22.”
Best Practices
Narang offered some best practices for users to employ to help stave off a ransomware attack:
- Employ good cyber hygiene by identifying vulnerable assets in your environments
- End point security
- Gateway security
- Awareness training
- Make sure your organization has an incident response plan in place
- Employ backups offsite someplace
- Regularly review your user accounts in the organization
- Hardening access directory
Stealing from the old security axiom, Narang said, “For ransomware, it is not a matter of if, but when.”

