Knowing that, there are threats to BMCs and details actions organizations can use to harden them. That is why the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) cobbled together a Cybersecurity Information Sheet (CSI).
A BMC differs from the basic input output system (BIOS) and the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI), which have a later role in booting a computer, and management engine (ME), which has different remote management functionality.
BMC firmware is highly privileged, executes outside the scope of operating system (OS) controls, and has access to all resources of the server-class platform on which it resides. It executes the moment power is applied to the server. Therefore, boot to a hypervisor or OS is not necessary as the BMC functions even if the server is shutdown.
BMC Details
Most BMCs provide network-accessible configuration and management, and BMC management solutions administer large numbers of servers without requiring a physical touch. They take the form of a dedicated circuit chip with discrete firmware that must end up maintained separately from automated or OS-hosted patching solutions. Most BMCs do not provide integration with user account management solutions. Administrators must perform updates and all administrative actions affecting BMCs via commands delivered over network connections.
Many organizations fail to take the minimum action to secure and maintain BMCs. Hardened credentials, firmware updates, and network segmentation options are frequently overlooked, leading to a vulnerable BMC. A vulnerable BMC broadens the attack vector by providing malicious actors the opportunity to employ tactics such as establishing a beachhead with pre- boot execution potential. Additionally, a malicious actor could disable security solutions such as the trusted platform module (TPM) or UEFI secure boot, manipulate data on any attached storage media, or propagate implants or disruptive instructions across a network infrastructure. Traditional tools and security features including endpoint detection and response (EDR) software, intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS), anti-malware suites, kernel security enhancements, virtualization capabilities, and TPM attestation are ineffective at mitigating a compromised BMC.
Best Practices
For these reasons, NSA and CISA recommend organizations pay attention to the security of their BMCs and apply the hardening actions detailed in the following section.
These recommended actions align with the cross-sector cybersecurity performance goals (CPGs) CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed. The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. The actions include:
Protect BMC credentials: Change the default BMC credentials as soon as possible. Establish unique user accounts for administrators, if supported. Always use strong passwords compliant with NIST guidelines such as SP 800-63B.
Enforce VLAN separation: Establish a virtual local area network (VLAN) to isolate BMC network connections since many BMC products have a dedicated network port not shared with the OS or virtual machine manager (VMM). Limit the endpoints that may communicate with BMCs in the enterprise infrastructure—commonly referred to as an Administrative VLAN.
Harden configurations: Consult vendor guides and recommendations for hardening BMCs against unauthorized access and persistent threats. UEFI hardening configuration guidance may apply to BMC settings.
Perform routine BMC update checks: BMC updates are delivered separately from most other software and firmware updates. Establish a routine to conduct monthly or quarterly checks for BMC updates according to the system vendor’s recommendations and scheduled patch releases. Combine BMC update installations with routine server maintenance and scheduled downtime when possible.
Monitor BMC integrity: Some BMCs report integrity data to a root of trust (RoT). The RoT could take the form of a TPM, dedicated security chip or coprocessor (multiple trademarked names in use), or a central processing unit (CPU) secure memory enclave. Monitor integrity features for unexpected changes and platform alerts.
Move sensitive workloads to hardened devices: Older server and cloud nodes may lack any BMC integrity monitoring mechanism. The presence of a TPM does not guarantee that BMC integrity data is collected. Place sensitive workloads on hardware designed to audit both the BMC firmware and the platform firmware.
Use firmware scanning tools periodically: Some modern EDR and platform scanning tools support BMC firmware capture. Establish a schedule to collect and inspect BMC firmware for integrity and unexpected changes. Include firmware audits in comprehensive anti-malware scanning tasks.
Do not ignore BMCs: A user may accidentally connect and expose an ignored and disconnected BMC to malicious content. Treat an unused BMC as if it may one day be activated. Apply patches. Harden credentials. Restrict network access. If a BMC cannot be disabled or removed, carry out recommended actions appropriate to the sensitivity of the platform’s data
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