APT40 – aka BRONZE MOHAWK, FEVERDREAM, G0065, Gadolinium, GreenCrash, Hellsing, Kryptonite Panda, Leviathan, MUDCARP, Periscope, Temp.Periscope, and Temp.Jumper – is located in Haikou, Hainan Province, People’s Republic of China (PRC), and has been active since at least 2009, according to a joint advisory from Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).
APT40 targeted governmental organizations, companies, and universities in a wide range of industries – including biomedical, robotics, and maritime research – across the United States, Canada, Europe, the Middle East, and the South China Sea area, as well as industries included in China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
On top of that, on Friday the Department of Justice (DoJ) unsealed an indictment against four APT40 cyber actors for their illicit computer network exploitation (CNE) activities via front company Hainan Xiandun Technology Development Company (Hainan Xiandun).
Hainan Xiandun employee Wu Shurong cooperated with and carried out orders from PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS) Hainan State Security Department (HSSD) intelligence officers Ding Xiaoyang, Zhu Yunmin, and Cheng Qingmin to conduct CNE.
Wu’s CNE activities resulted in the theft of trade secrets, intellectual property, and other high-value information from companies and organizations in the United States and abroad, as well as from multiple foreign governments. These MSS-affiliated actors targeted victims in the following industries: academia, aerospace/aviation, biomedical, defense industrial base, education, government, healthcare, manufacturing, maritime, research institutes, and transportation (rail and shipping).
The Joint Cybersecurity Advisory used the MITRE ATT&CK framework, version 9.
APT40 used a variety of tactics and techniques and a large library of custom and open-source malware, much of which is shared with multiple other suspected Chinese groups, to establish initial access via user and administrator credentials, enable lateral movement once inside the network, and locate high value assets in order to exfiltrate data.
Proper network defense-in-depth and adherence to information security best practices can assist in mitigating the threat and reducing the risk. The following guidance may assist organizations in developing network defense procedures.
Patch and vulnerability management:
- Install vendor-provided and verified patches on all systems for critical vulnerabilities, prioritizing timely patching of internet-connected servers and software processing Internet data, such as web browsers, browser plugins, and document readers.
- Ensure proper migrating steps or compensating controls are implemented for vulnerabilities that cannot be patched in a timely manner.
- Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
- Routinely audit configuration and patch management programs to ensure the ability to track and mitigate emerging threats. Implementing a rigorous configuration and patch management program will hamper sophisticated cyber threat actors’ operations and protect resources and information systems.
- Review the articles in the References section for more information on Chinese APT exploitation of common vulnerabilities.
Protect credentials:
- Strengthen credential requirements, regularly change passwords, and implement multi-factor authentication to protect individual accounts, particularly for webmail and VPN access and for accounts that access critical systems. Do not reuse passwords for multiple accounts.
- Audit all remote authentications from trusted networks or service providers.
- Detect mismatches by correlating credentials used within internal networks with those employed on external-facing systems.
- Log use of system administrator commands such as net, ipconfig, and ping.
- Enforce principle of least privilege.
Network hygiene and monitoring:
- Actively scan and monitor Internet-accessible applications for unauthorized access, modification, and anomalous activities.
- Actively monitor server disk use and audit for significant changes.
- Log Domain Name Service (DNS) queries and consider blocking all outbound DNS requests that do not originate from approved DNS servers.
- Monitor DNS queries for C2 over DNS.
- Develop and monitor the network and system baselines to allow for the identification of anomalous activity. Audit logs for suspicious behavior.
- Identify and suspend access of users exhibiting unusual activity.
- Use allowlist or baseline comparison to monitor Windows event logs and network traffic to detect when a user maps a privileged administrative share on a Windows system.
- Leverage multi-sourced threat-reputation services for files, DNS, URLs, IP addresses, and email addresses.
- Network device management interfaces – such as Telnet, Secure Shell (SSH), Winbox, and HTTP – should be turned off for wide area network (WAN) interfaces and secured with strong passwords and encryption when enabled.When possible, segment critical information on air-gapped systems. Use strict access control measures for critical data.
Click here for more information on the joint advisory.

