The vulnerabilities could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to exhaust process memory of an affected device.
These vulnerabilities are the result of insufficient queue management for Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) packets. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by sending crafted IGMP traffic to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause memory exhaustion, resulting in instability of other processes. These processes may include, but are not limited to, interior and exterior routing protocols.
The vulnerabilities affect any Cisco device running any release of Cisco IOS XR Software if an active interface is configured under multicast routing.
A user can tell when a device is experiencing memory exhaustion based on exploitation of these vulnerabilities, the following messages may be in the system logs:
- RP/0/RSP1/CPU0:Aug 28 03:46:10.375 UTC: raw_ip[399]: %PKT_INFRA-PQMON-6-QUEUE_DROP : Taildrop on XIPC queue 1 owned by igmp (jid=1175)
- RP/0/RSP0/CPU0:Aug 28 03:46:10.380 UTC: raw_ip[399]: %PKT_INFRA-PQMON-6-QUEUE_DROP : Taildrop on XIPC queue 1 owned by igmp (jid=1175)
- RP/0/RSP0/CPU0:Aug 28 03:49:22.850 UTC: dumper[61]: %OS-DUMPER-7-DUMP_REQUEST : Dump request for process pkg/bin/igmp
- RP/0/RSP0/CPU0:Aug 28 03:49:22.851 UTC: dumper[61]: %OS-DUMPER-7-DUMP_ATTRIBUTE : Dump request with attribute 7 for process pkg/bin/igmp
- |RP/0/RSP0/CPU0:Aug 28 03:49:22.851 UTC: dumper[61]: %OS-DUMPER-4-SIGSEGV : Thread 9 received SIGSEGV – Segmentation Fault
Although there are no workarounds, there are multiple mitigations available to customers depending on their needs.
As a first line of defense, it is recommended users implement a rate limiter. This will require them to understand their current rate of IGMP traffic and set a rate lower than the current average rate. In configuration mode, the customer can enter the lpts pifib hardware police flow igmp rate command as follows:
RP/0/0/CPU0:router(config)# lpts pifib hardware police flow igmp rate
This command will not remove the exploit vector. However, the command will reduce the traffic rate and increase the time necessary for successful exploitation. The user can use this time to perform recovery actions.
As a second line of defense, a user may implement an access control entry (ACE) to an existing interface access control list (ACL). Alternatively, the customer can create a new ACL for a specific interface that denies DVMRP traffic inbound on that interface. The following creates an ACL and denies DVMRP traffic:
RP/0/0/CPU0:router(config)# ipv4 access-list deny igmp any any dvmrp

