New analysis gives description of RedCurl’s tactics, tools, and infrastructure as it focuses on corporate espionage, said researchers at Singapore-based a global threat hunting and intelligence company, Group-IB.
RedCurl, discovered by Group-IB Threat Intelligence experts, has been active since at least 2018. Since then, it has conducted 26 targeted attacks on commercial organizations alone, including companies in construction, finance, consulting, retail, banking, insurance, law, and travel. RedCurl does not have a clear geographical link to any region; its victims are in Russia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Norway.
The report “RedCurl. The pentest you didn’t know about” includes details about the group’s kill chain discovered by Group-IB, as well as data researchers collected during incident response engagements related to campaigns.
As part of its activities, the group acted as covertly as possible to minimize the risk of being discovered on the victim’s network. In all campaigns, RedCurl’s main goal was to steal confidential corporate documents such as contracts, financial documents, employee personal records, and records of legal actions and facility construction. This could indicate that RedCurl’s attacks might have been commissioned for the purpose of corporate espionage, researchers said.
Cybersecurity Victim
One of the group’s possible victims was an employee at a cybersecurity company that protects its customers against such very attacks. In total, Group-IB identified 14 organizations that fell victim to RedCurl’s espionage, some on several occasions. Group-IB specialists contacted each of them. Currently, some of the companies affected continue to respond to the incidents.
The earliest known RedCurl attack dates back to May 2018. As with all subsequent campaigns, the initial compromise vector was a well-written phishing email. Researchers performed in-depth intelligence of the victim’s infrastructure: Each email targeted a specific team rather than the organization as a whole. Most often, the attackers posed as HR staff at the targeted organization and sent emails to multiple employees in the same department, which made the victims less vigilant. For example, the employees would receive the same email about annual bonuses.
The spear-phishing email content was always carefully drafted. For instance, the emails displayed the targeted company’s address and logo, while the sender address featured the company’s domain name. Group-IB Threat Intelligence experts highlight RedCurl’s approach resembles social engineering attacks that red teaming specialists usually conduct to test an organization’s ability to combat advanced cyberattacks using techniques and tools from hacker groups’ arsenals.
To deliver the payload, RedCurl used archives, links to which were placed in the email body and led to legitimate cloud storage services. The links ended up disguised so the victim would not suspect that opening the attached document about bonuses from the supposedly official website would deploy a Trojan, controlled by the attacker through the cloud, on the local network. The Trojan-downloader RedCurl.Dropper served as the attackers’ pass to the targeted system that installed and launched other malware modules. Like the group’s other custom tools, the dropper was written in PowerShell.
Main Goal
RedCurl’s main goal is to steal documentation from the victim’s infrastructure and business emails, researchers said. After gaining access to the target network, the cybercriminals scan the list of folders and office documents accessible from the infected computer. Information about them is sent to the cloud, after which a RedCurl operator decides which folders and files should be uploaded. At the same time, all files with the extensions *.jpg, *.pdf, *.doc, *.docx, *.xls, *.xlsx found on network drives are replaced with modified LNK shortcuts. When a user opens one of those files, RedCurl.Dropper then launches. This helps RedCurl infect new machines within the victim organization and propagate across the system.
As part of incident response engagements related to RedCurl’s attacks, Group-IB’s DFIR specialists discovered, after gaining initial access to the victim’s network, the group remains there for two to six months. The RedCurl.Dropper Trojan, like the group’s other tools, does not connect directly to the attackers’ C&C server. Instead, all communication between the victim’s infrastructure and the attackers is ensured through legitimate cloud storages such as Cloudme, koofr.net, pcloud.com, and etc. All commands are passed as PowerShell scripts. This allows RedCurl to remain undetected by traditional security solutions for a long time.
“As an element of unfair competition, corporate espionage is a relatively rare phenomenon in the APT world,” said Rustam Mirkasymov, the head of Malware Dynamic Analysis Team at Group-IB. “For RedCurl, it makes no difference whether to attack a Russian bank or a consulting company in Canada. Such groups focus on corporate espionage and employ various techniques to cover their activity, including the use of legitimate tools that are difficult to detect. The contents of the victim’s documents and records can be much more valuable than the contents of their own wallets. Despite the lack of direct financial damage, which is typical of financially motivated cybercriminal groups, the consequences of espionage can amount to tens of millions of dollars.”

