That all comes to mind after the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued an advisory after it conducted a SILENTSHIELD red team assessment against a Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) organization.
During SILENTSHIELD assessments, the red team first performs a no-notice, long-term simulation of nation-state cyber operations. The team mimics the techniques, tradecraft, and behaviors of sophisticated threat actors and measures the potential dwell time actors have on a network, providing a realistic assessment of the organization’s security posture.
Then, the team works directly with the organization’s network defenders, system administrators, and other technical staff to address strengths and weaknesses found during the assessment. The team’s goal is to assist the organization with refining their detection, response, and hunt capabilities – particularly hunting unknown threats.
Red Team Details
In coordination with the assessed organization, CISA releasing the advisory that gave details on the red team’s activity and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); associated network defense activity; and lessons learned to provide network defenders with recommendations for improving their organization’s detection capabilities and cyber posture.
During the first phase, the SILENTSHIELD team gained initial access by exploiting a known vulnerability in an unpatched web server in the victim’s Solaris enclave.
In a bit a good news, the team fully compromised the enclave, but they were unable to move into the Windows portion of the network due to a lack of credentials.
However, in a parallel effort, the team gained access to the Windows network through phishing. They then discovered unsecured administrator credentials, allowing them to pivot freely throughout the Windows environment, which resulted in full domain compromise and access to tier zero assets.
The team then identified the organization had trust relationships with multiple external partner organizations and was able to exploit and pivot to an external organization. The red team remained undetected by network defenders throughout the first phase.
The red team’s findings underscored the importance of defense-in-depth and using diversified layers of protection.
The organization was only able to fully understand the extent of the red team’s compromise by running full diagnostics from all data sources. This involved analyzing host-based logs, internal network logs, external (egress) network logs, and authentication logs.
Red Team Findings
The red team’s findings also demonstrated the value of using tool-agnostic and behavior-based indicators of compromise (IoCs) and of applying an “allowlist” approach to network behavior and systems, rather than a “denylist” approach, which predominantly results in an unmanageable amount of noise.
The red team’s findings illuminated the following lessons learned for network defenders about how to reduce and respond to risk:
- The assessed organization had insufficient controls to prevent and detect malicious activity
- The organization did not effectively or efficiently collect, retain, and analyze logs
- Bureaucratic processes and decentralized teams hindered the organization’s network defenders
- A “known-bad” detection approach hampered detection of alternate TTPs
To reduce risk of similar malicious cyber activity, CISA encourages organizations to apply the recommendations including:
Apply defense-in-depth principles by using multiple layers of security to ensure comprehensive analysis and detection of possible intrusions.
Use robust network segmentation to impede lateral movement across the network.
Establish baselines of network traffic, application execution, and account authentication. Use these baselines to enforce an “allowlist” philosophy rather than denying known-bad IOCs. Ensure monitoring and detection tools and procedures are primarily behavior-based, rather than IoC-centric.
Click here for more information on the CISA red team advisory.

