This attack group proceeded to move through the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and into the network to fully compromise the organization’s domain and several sensitive business system (SBS) targets. The organization discovered evidence of the attacker’s initial activity but failed to act promptly regarding the malicious network traffic through its DMZ or challenge much of the attacker’s presence in the organization’s Windows environment.
The attacker was then able to compromise the domain and sensitive business systems (SBSs) of the organization as it lacked sufficient controls to detect and respond to their activities. These findings are real, but were a part of a a red team assessment (RTA) conducted by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) at the request of a critical infrastructure organization.
During RTAs, CISA’s red team simulates real-world malicious cyber operations to assess an organization’s cybersecurity detection and response capabilities. In coordination with the assessed organization, CISA released the findings of the “attack.”
Lessons Learned
Lessons learned for network defenders and software manufacturers in this attack scenario showed how to respond to and reduce risk:
- The assessed organization had insufficient technical controls to prevent and detect malicious activity. The organization relied too heavily on host-based endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions and did not implement sufficient network layer protections.
- The organization’s staff require continuous training, support, and resources to implement secure software configurations and detect malicious activity. Staff need to continuously enhance their technical competency, gain additional institutional knowledge of their systems, and ensure they have sufficient resources from management to have the conditions to succeed in protecting their networks.
- Leadership from the organization minimized the business risk of known attack vectors for the organization. Leadership deprioritized the treatment of a vulnerability their own cybersecurity team identified, and in their risk-based decision-making, miscalculated the potential impact and likelihood of its exploitation.
To reduce risk of similar malicious cyber activity, CISA encourages critical infrastructure organizations to ensure security processes and procedures are up to date, effective, and enable timely detection and mitigation of malicious activity.
In the attack, the red team operated without prior knowledge of the organization’s technology assets and began the assessment by conducting open source research on the target organization to gain information about its network, defensive tools, and employees.
First Attempt: Spearphishing
The red team designed spearphishing campaigns tailored to employees most likely to communicate with external parties. The phishing attempts were ultimately unsuccessful – targets ran the payloads, but their execution did not result in the red team gaining access into the network.
After the failed spearphishing campaigns, the red team continued external reconnaissance of the network and discovered a web shell left from a previous Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP). The red team used this for initial access and immediately reported it to the organization’s trusted agents (TAs).
The red team leveraged that access to escalate privileges on the host, discover credential material on a misconfigured Network File System (NFS) share, and move from a DMZ to the internal network.
With access to the internal network, the red team gained further access to several SBSs.
The red team leveraged a certificate for client authentication they discovered on the NFS share to compromise a system configured for Unconstrained Delegation. This allowed the red team to acquire a ticket granting ticket (TGT) for a domain controller, used to further compromise the domain. The red team leveraged this level of access to exploit SBS targets provided by the organization’s TAs.
The assessed organization detected much of the red team’s activity in their Linux infrastructure after CISA alerted them via other channels to the vulnerability the red team used for initial access.
Once given an official notification of a vulnerability, the organization’s network defenders began mitigating the vulnerability. Network defenders removed the site hosting the web shell from the public internet but did not take the server itself offline.
Incident Affirmed
A week later, network defenders officially declared an incident once they determined the web shell ended up used to breach the internal network. For several weeks, network defenders terminated much of the red team’s access until the team maintained implants on only four hosts.
Network defenders successfully delayed the red team from accessing many SBSs that required additional positioning, forcing the red team to spend time refortifying their access in the network. Despite these actions, the red team was still able to access a subset of SBSs.
Eventually, the red team and TAs decided the network defenders would stand down to allow the red team to continue its operations in a monitoring mode. In monitoring mode, network defenders would report what they observed of the red team’s access, but not continue to block and terminate it.
Click here for more information on the red team operation.

