By Gregory Hale
It just didn’t have to be that way. Two people, a husband and wife, died in a deadly chemical release while their two children waited in a vehicle for mom and dad to take them home. Fatalities that after you look at the findings were very avoidable.
A worker and his wife perished in an October 26, 2019 hydrogen sulfide release at the Aghorn Operating Inc. waterflood station in Odessa, Texas. The release fatally injured the employee who was working at the facility that evening, as well as his spouse who attempted to locate him at the facility after he did not return home. Hydrogen sulfide is a colorless, flammable, and toxic gas that is present in the Texas area’s oil and gas reservoirs.
As a result of the incident, the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) started an investigation and on Tuesday adopted its final report.
The Aghorn Operating waterflood station is used as part of a process to extract oil from underground reservoirs in West Texas. During extraction, oil comes out of the ground with water in it. The water is removed from the oil, but it can contain some residual oil and other contaminants such as the toxic hydrogen sulfide. At the Aghorn waterflood station, pumps, in a building called the “pump house,” are used to pressurize and inject the water back into the oilfield. The injected water adds pressure to the reservoir allowing a larger quantity of oil to be extracted.
Station’s Alarm
On the night of the incident, the waterflood station’s control system activated an oil level alarm on a pump. An Aghorn worker drove to the waterflood station and attempted to isolate the pump from the process by closing two valves. The CSB found, however, the worker failed to isolate the pump from energy sources, called a lockout/tagout, before performing the work. At some point while the worker was in the vicinity of the pump, the pump automatically turned on, and water containing hydrogen sulfide escaped into the pump house. The pumper was overcome and fatally injured by the toxic gas.
After the incident, the CSB found a plunger on the pump shattered, which had allowed the release to occur. Due to the limitations of the available evidence, the CSB was unable to determine whether the pump failure and toxic release happened before the pumper arrived at the facility, or when the pump automatically turned on while the pumper was closing valves.
A couple of hours passed, and when the pumper did not return home, his spouse drove with their two children to the station to check on him. She located him on the floor of the pump house and was also overcome and fatally injured by the toxic hydrogen sulfide gas. The children remained in the car and were not injured.
Warning for Future
“Due to the pervasive nature of hydrogen sulfide in the oil bearing reservoirs in Odessa, Texas, and many locations across the Permian basin workers and friends alike may be desensitized to the odor,” said CSB Chairman Katherine Lemos. “Over 85 percent of the natural gas produced in the Permian basin is in the concentration of hydrogen sulfide and is immediately dangerous to life or health. Our review of this event is not just about the unfortunate loss of two lives, it is about the nearly 5,000 facilities in Texas alone that produce hydrogen sulfide as a byproduct of the water process that requires our careful consideration.”
Among the myriad findings in the report were the worker was not wearing his personal hydrogen sulfide detection device upon entering the facility, and there was no evidence that Aghorn management required the use of these devices.
In addition, Aghorn did not maintain or properly configure its waterflood station facility hydrogen sulfide detection and alarm system. Without the alarm panel receiving signals from the detectors, neither the beacon warning light nor the phone system alerted the worker to the dangerous atmosphere.
Also, the CSB was unable to confirm whether the pump house exhaust fans were operational at the time of the incident. Aghorn did not have sufficient fixtures or facilities to ventilate the pump house and there is no evidence of Aghorn’s assessment of the facility design to ensure proper ventilation.
Aghorn did not comply with OSHA regulations requiring equipment be isolated from energy sources prior to performing work on it. The company had no formal comprehensive lockout/tagout program.
Aghorn lacked operational, training, testing and maintenance procedures and records. Comprehensive safety management practices include risk identification, assessment, mitigation and monitoring of design, procedures, maintenances and training.
Water Release Timeline
In another finding, CSB was unable to determine whether the pump failure and loss of containment of the produced water occurred before the worker arrived at the facility or occurred when the pump energized while he was closing valves to isolate the pump.
In one more issue, there was deficient site security. Aghorn had an informal policy, saying when an Aghorn employee is working at the facility, the access gates are normally left unlocked. The problem is, the unlocked gates allowed the pumper’s spouse to drive directly to the waterflood station and enter the pump house, where she was also fatally injured.
It is one thing to report on the findings of the investigation, but CSB also made recommendations to Aghorn, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Railroad Commission of Texas, which oversees the waterflood stations.
To Aghorn, the CSB recommendations include:
- Mandate the use of personal hydrogen sulfide detection devices
- Develop a site-specific, formalized and comprehensive Lockout/Tagout program for each facility
- Commission an independent and comprehensive analysis of each facility to examine ventilation and mitigation systems
- Develop and demonstrate the use of a safety management program that includes a focus on protecting workers and non-employees from hydrogen sulfide
- Ensure hydrogen sulfide detection and alarm systems are properly maintained and configured, and develop site-specific detection and alarm programs and associated procedures
- Ensure the hydrogen sulfide detection and alarm system designs employ multiple layers of alerts unique to hydrogen sulfide
- Develop and implement a formal, written, site-specific security program to prevent unknown and unplanned entrance of those not employed by Aghorn
CSB’s OSHA recommendation is to issue a safety information product that addresses the requirements for protecting workers from hazardous air contaminants and from hazardous energy. A recommendation to the Railroad Commission of Texas is to develop and send a Notice to Operators to all oil and gas operators that fall under its jurisdiction that describes the safety issues described in the CSB’s report.
“This is a call to action for all companies large and small to step up to the plate to prioritize the safety of the workers and the community,” Lemos said.


