By Gregory Hale
It is very simple: Fix known vulnerabilities.
At least that is what the government is telling government agencies as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01, Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities to address vulnerabilities that establishes specific timeframes for federal civilian agencies to remediate vulnerabilities actively exploited by adversaries.
To support this directive, CISA established a catalog of relevant vulnerabilities, which will end up updated regularly, and organizations can sign up for notifications when new vulnerabilities are added.
A binding operational directive is a compulsory direction to federal, executive branch, departments and agencies to safeguard federal information and information systems. Federal agencies are required to comply with DHS-developed directives.
Persistent Threats
The United States faces persistent and increasingly sophisticated malicious cyber campaigns that threaten the public sector, the private sector, and ultimately the American people’s security and privacy, according to the directive. The federal government must improve its efforts to protect against these campaigns by ensuring the security of information technology assets across the federal enterprise. Vulnerabilities that have previously been used to exploit public and private organizations are a frequent attack vector for malicious cyber actors of all types. These vulnerabilities pose significant risk to agencies and the federal enterprise. It is essential to aggressively remediate known exploited vulnerabilities to protect federal information systems and reduce cyber incidents.
“What CISA is doing is great. They are to be applauded,” said Roger Grimes, data drive defense evangelist at KnowBe4. “First, they are culling out the number of patches that people need to be worried about. Each year, over 10,000 vulnerabilities are found that end up getting patched. Last year, it was 18,103 things. But only 2 percent of those exploits ever get exploited in the wild by an attacker. Those are the only ones that we really need to be worried about and need to patch. But which ones? Well, CISA is now maintaining that list. They call it a vulnerability management catalog. But what they put in their log is only actively exploited vulnerabilities. So, you want to know what you really need to patch? There you go.
“Second, they say you have to mitigate the included new and existing 2021 vulnerabilities within two weeks. That solves another long-standing problem, which was how quickly to patch after the patch was released. Most regulations say something general, like ‘apply critical patches in a timely manner.’ CISA is telling you what is critical … it is in their catalog. Second, they are saying it needs to be done within two weeks (subject to change). There you go. They have officially defined ‘timely.’
“Third, they mandated it across the government (with some notable exceptions). It takes all the fuzziness out of patch management. No one can say they did not understand what they needed to do regarding patch management. The U.S. government has now told you. I think any public company that does not follow this advice should be required to pass a ‘reasonable person’ standard and explain why they are not doing what the U.S. government said every organization they control should be doing.”
Slow to Implement Patches
“It’s an unfortunate fact that some government agencies can be among the slowest institutions to implement security patches in a timely manner,” said Chris Clements, vice president of solutions architecture at Cerberus Sentinel. “There are three major things at play here. First, some agencies rely on software only compatible with unsupported underlying systems such as Windows Server 2003 or even Windows XP Embedded. It’s not uncommon for us to identify these legacy, and therefore unpatched and vulnerable systems only to be told they can’t be patched or upgraded as they would break the software package they depend on operationally, and that to migrate to a new solution is outside their immediate budget. This, however, is penny smart and pound foolish. With modern cyberattacks now routinely reaching into the millions of dollars of damages, especially with ransomware, leaving a known vulnerable system online becomes an expensive risk.
“The second factor can be organizational inertia. The standard change review and approval process can delay the implementation of security patches, leaving the organization at risk of significant damage in the meantime. This is not to say, however, that such processes should be abandoned altogether, after all, many vendors release patches that routinely break functionality in some way or another that you want to test out yourself to avoid unexpected outages. Rather, it’s important that the approval process has provisions for acceleration in place to more quickly address the most critical of risks, and that a ready to go test lab and validation testing protocol exists for quickly and efficiently testing out security patches for unforeseen adverse effects.
“The third thing that can cause extended delays in implementing critical patches is lack of insight on what vulnerable systems and applications are present in the environment. Orphaned or forgotten systems that are vulnerable to high severity exploits can blindside even the most otherwise efficiently run organizations. To have visibility into where risk lies, organizations should engage in frequent vulnerability scanning as well as routine penetration testing to identify any systems or applications that may have fallen through the cracks of the normal patch management and software lifecycle processes.”
CISA Catalog
The CISA directive establishes a CISA-managed catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities that carry significant risk to the federal enterprise and establishes requirements for agencies to remediate any such vulnerabilities included in the catalog.
CISA will determine vulnerabilities warranting inclusion in the catalog based on reliable evidence the exploit is being actively used to exploit public or private organizations by a threat actor.
This directive applies to all software and hardware found on federal information systems managed on agency premises or hosted by third parties on an agency’s behalf. These required actions apply to any federal information system, including an information system used or operated by another entity on behalf of an agency, that collects, processes, stores, transmits, disseminates, or otherwise maintains agency information.
Required actions from the binding directive include:
- Within 60 days of issuance, agencies shall review and update agency internal vulnerability management procedures in accordance with this directive. If requested by CISA, agencies will provide a copy of these policies and procedures. At a minimum, agency policies must:
a. Establish a process for ongoing remediation of vulnerabilities CISA identifies, through inclusion in the CISA-managed catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities, as carrying significant risk to the federal enterprise within a timeframe set by CISA pursuant to this directive
b. Assign roles and responsibilities for executing agency actions as required by this directive
c. Define necessary actions required to enable prompt response to actions required by this directive
d. Establish internal validation and enforcement procedures to ensure adherence with this directive
e. Set internal tracking and reporting requirements to evaluate adherence with this Directive and provide reporting to CISA, as needed - Remediate each vulnerability according to the timelines set forth in the CISA-managed vulnerability catalog. The catalog will list exploited vulnerabilities that carry significant risk to the federal enterprise with the requirement to remediate within 6 months for vulnerabilities with a Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID assigned prior to 2021 and within two weeks for all other vulnerabilities.
- Report on the status of vulnerabilities listed in the repository. In line with requirements for the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Federal Dashboard deployment and OMB annual FISMA memorandum requirements, agencies are expected to automate data exchange and report their respective Directive implementation status through the CDM Federal Dashboard. Initially agencies may submit quarterly reports through CyberScope submissions or report through the CDM Federal Dashboard. Starting October 1, 2022, agencies that have not migrated reporting to the CDM Federal Dashboard will be required to update their status through CyberScope bi-weekly.

