A new guidance just released from the feds focused on 5G Network Slicing: Security Considerations for Design, Deployment, and Maintenance.
This guidance – created by the Enduring Security Framework (ESF), a public-private cross-sector working group led by the National Security Agency (NSA) and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) – offers recommendations to address some identified threats to 5G standalone network slicing.
This guidance builds upon the 2022 ESF Part 1 guidance entitled Potential Threats to 5G Network Slicing.
This guidance is Part 2 and focuses on addressing some identified threats to 5G SA network slicing, and provides industry recognized practices for the design, deployment, operation, and maintenance of a hardened 5G standalone network slice(s).
A network slice is as an end-to-end logical network that provides specific network capabilities and characteristics for a user. It is a network architecture that allows infrastructure providers to divide their network up into several virtual networks to satisfy different 5G use cases with varying quality of service requirements and was not intended to be a security mechanism to isolate different 5G user sets.
In a world where communications requirements seem to change as soon as specifications are live, the expected high technology adoption of smart households, smart grids, and smart meters will require a large number and high density of Internet of Things devices cellular wireless network connectivity to be efficient and cost-effective. The best way to field such a 5G telecommunication systems is to divide a network into slices – principally, a way to provide similar communication services with similar network characteristics to different vertical industries, according to the guidance.
A network slice provides a virtual network service that connects an application running on user equipment, such as a cell phone or Internet of Things sensor, with applications that may be running on other user equipment or servers connected to a data network.
There are many threat vectors that affect a 5G network slice. Of these, denial of service (DoS) attacks on the signaling plane, misconfiguration attacks, and man-in-the-middle (MitM) Attacks pose significant risks to network slicing. Relative to the commonly known confidentiality, integrity, and availability triad, DoS directly attacks the availability of the system and its functionality, including loss of access to the 5G infrastructure, loss of access to remote data, or compromised communication services.
Zero trust architecture (ZTA) methodology can help harden a 5G deployment; a big part of ZTA can happen by employing authentication, authorization, and audit (AAA) techniques. Proper implementation of authentication and authorization can also mitigate threat vectors stemmed from misconfiguration attacks.
Both misconfiguration attacks and MitM attacks can have a broad range of adverse effects on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Misconfiguration attacks refers to a situation where adversaries take advantage of misconfigured system controls. It might include security features inadvertently turned off or system monitoring services being disabled.
MitM attacks imply tat the adversary secretly relays and possibly alters the communications between two endpoints. Such an attack could be devastating as misinformation and disinformation could result. If ZTA principles end up applied, this could be an effective means to help mitigate these MitM 5G attacks.
Cyber hygiene must ensure cyber impacts due to inherent system vulnerabilities and misconfigurations end up minimized:
- ZTA requires AAA techniques employed within and between all 5G components and between supporting infrastructure connected elements
- Perform cyber risk assessment periodically as new and emerging threats continue to crop up in the operating environment
Click here for more on the NSA, CISA 5G Network Slicing guidance.

