This indiscriminate targeting of vulnerable networks, which started in 2021, led to the compromise of organizations across more than 70 countries, including organizations in China. Ghost actors, located in China, conduct these widespread attacks for financial gain. Affected victims include critical infrastructure, schools and universities, healthcare, government networks, religious institutions, technology and manufacturing companies, and numerous small- and medium-sized businesses.
Ghost actors rotate their ransomware executable payloads, switch file extensions for encrypted files, modify ransom note text, and use numerous ransom email addresses, which has led to variable attribution of this group over time.
Names associated with this group include Ghost, Cring, Crypt3r, Phantom, Strike, Hello, Wickrme, HsHarada, and Rapture. Samples of ransomware files Ghost used during attacks are: Cring.exe, Ghost.exe, ElysiumO.exe, and Locker.exe.
Use Publicly Available Code
Ghost actors use publicly available code to exploit Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) and gain access to Internet facing servers. Ghost actors exploit known vulnerabilities and target networks where users have no applied available patches.
Their methodology includes leveraging vulnerabilities in Fortinet FortiOS appliances (CVE-2018-13379), servers running Adobe ColdFusion (CVE-2010-2861 and CVE-2009-3960), Microsoft SharePoint (CVE-2019-0604), and Microsoft Exchange (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207 – commonly referred to as the ProxyShell attack chain).
Ghost actors upload a web shell to a compromised server and leveraging Windows Command Prompt and/or PowerShell to download and execute Cobalt Strike Beacon malware that is then implanted on victim systems. Despite Ghost actors’ malicious implementation, Cobalt Strike is a commercially available adversary simulation tool often used for the purposes of testing an organization’s security controls.
Ghost actors often rely on built in Cobalt Strike functions to steal process tokens running under the SYSTEM user context to impersonate the SYSTEM user, often for the purpose of running Beacon a second time with elevated privileges.
Ghost actors use multiple open-source tools in an attempt at privilege escalation through exploitation such as “SharpZeroLogon,” “SharpGPPPass,” “BadPotato,” and “GodPotato.” These privilege escalation tools would not generally end up used by individuals with legitimate access and credentials.
Ghost actors use the built in Cobalt Strike function “hashdump” or Mimikatz to collect passwords and/or password hashes to aid them with unauthorized logins and privilege escalation or to pivot to other victim devices.
Report Offers Surprises
“The joint release has a few new surprises,” said Roger Grimes, data-driven defense evangelist at KnowBe4. “One is that the ransomware groups move from initial compromise to deployment of ransomware very quickly, often on the same day. This is quite different from traditional ransomware groups that may have days, weeks, or even months from the initial access gained to the deployment of the ransomware. Second, the frequent use of Cobalt Strike. I see the use of Cobalt Strike by ransomware groups fairly common. If you’re not looking for and detecting Cobalt Strike instances, you’re just asking for trouble.
“Last, unpatched software and firmware (and zero-days) are involved in at least a third of successful compromises. Every organization has a patching process, but most don’t get it perfect and if one-third of all successful compromises involved finding and exploiting vulnerable software and firmware, it really should be a primary focus for all organizations. You can’t just make it one of the many things you do out of hundreds of things you do. It has to be something you focus on and dedicate significant resources to (as you also need to do to mitigate social engineering). Because if you don’t, you’ll miss something and become the next ransomware victim,” Grimes said.
FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC recommend organizations implement the mitigations below:
- Maintain regular system backups
- Patch known vulnerabilities
- Segment networks to restrict lateral movement from initial infected devices
- Require phishing-resistant MFA
- Train users to recognize phishing attempts
- Monitor for unauthorized use of PowerShell.
- Implement allowlisting
- Identify, alert on, and investigate abnormal network activity
- Limit exposure of services by disabling unused ports
- Enhance email security
Click here for more on the Ghost ransomware guidance.

