By Gregory Hale
Advanced persistent threat (APT) attackers are able to gain full system access to multiple industrial control system (ICS)/supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) devices using custom-made tools.
These custom-made tools targeting ICS/SCADA devices allows them to scan, compromise, and control affected devices once they have established initial access to the operational technology (OT) network.
Additionally, the actors can compromise Windows-based engineering workstations, which may be present in information technology (IT) or OT environments, using an exploit that compromises an ASRock motherboard driver with known vulnerabilities. By compromising and maintaining full system access to ICS/SCADA devices, APT actors could elevate privileges, move laterally within an OT environment, and disrupt critical devices or functions.
The devices attacker are able to get into include:
- Schneider Electric MODICON and MODICON Nano PLCs, including (but may not be limited to) TM251, TM241, M258, M238, LMC058, and LMC078
- OMRON Sysmac NJ and NX PLCs, including (but may not be limited to) NEX NX1P2, NX-SL3300, NX-ECC203, NJ501-1300, S8VK, and R88D-1SN10F-ECT
- OPC Unified Architecture (OPC UA) servers.
To that end, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Department of Energy (DoE), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) giving more details.
The APT actors’ tools have a modular architecture and enable cyber actors to conduct highly automated exploits against targeted devices. The tools have a virtual console with a command interface that mirrors the interface of the targeted ICS/SCADA device. Modules interact with targeted devices, enabling operations by lower-skilled cyber actors to emulate higher-skilled actor capabilities.
The APT actors can leverage the modules to scan for targeted devices, conduct reconnaissance on device details, upload malicious configuration/code to the targeted device, back up or restore device contents, and modify device parameters.
In addition, the APT actors can use a tool that installs and exploits a known-vulnerable ASRock-signed motherboard driver, AsrDrv103.sys, exploiting CVE-2020-15368 to execute malicious code in the Windows kernel. Successful deployment of this tool can allow APT actors to move laterally within an IT or OT environment and disrupt critical devices or functions.
The APT actors’ tool for Schneider Electric devices has modules that interact via normal management protocols and Modbus (TCP 502). Modules may allow attackers to:
- Run a rapid scan that identifies all Schneider PLCs on the local network via User Datagram Protocol (UDP) multicast with a destination port of 27127 (Note: UDP 27127 is a standard discovery scan used by engineering workstations to discover PLCs and may not be indicative of malicious activity)
- Brute-force Schneider Electric PLC passwords using CODESYS and other available device protocols via UDP port 1740 against defaults or a dictionary word list (Note: this capability may work against other CODESYS-based devices depending on individual design and function, and this report will be updated as more information becomes available)
- Conduct a denial-of-service attack to prevent network communications from reaching the PLC
- Sever connections, requiring users to re-authenticate to the PLC, likely to facilitate capture of credentials
- Conduct a ‘packet of death’ attack to crash the PLC until a power cycle and configuration recovery is conducted
- Send custom Modbus commands (Note: this capability may work against Modbus other than in Schneider Electric PLCs)
“This is a classic case of why we need better supply chain transparency and analytics if we want to secure our critical infrastructure from nation states,” said Eric Byres, CISA ICS advisor and chief technology officer of ICS software cybersecurity firm aDolus Technology. “Many of the underlying issues aren’t in the software Schneider’s engineers created, it is in the 3rd-party code supplied by a German company called CODESYS Group. They provide CODESYS Runtime, a framework designed for executing industrial control system software. According to information that used to be CODESYS website in 2019 (now removed), the CODESYS Runtime product has been used in over 350 devices from dozens of different OT vendors, and is widely used in the energy sector, industrial manufacturing, and Internet of Things (IoT) systems. So the industrial customer believes they have Schneider software and thus look for the vulnerabilities assigned to Schneider products in the National Vulnerability Database. They won’t find a thing – the vulnerabilities are all listed as CODESYS issues – for example CVE-2022-22519 doesn’t mention a single product that is affected.”
The APT actors’ tool for OMRON devices has modules that can interact by:
- Scanning for OMRON using (Factory Interface Network Service (FINS) protocol
- Parsing the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) response from OMRON devices
- Retrieving the media access control (MAC) address of the device
- Polling for specific devices connected to the PLC
- Backing up/restoring arbitrary files to/from the PLC
- Loading a custom malicious agent on OMRON PLCs for additional attacker-directed capability
Additionally, the OMRON modules can upload an agent that allows a cyber actor to connect and initiate commands—such as file manipulation, packet captures, and code execution—via HTTP and/or Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS).
The APT actors’ tool for OPC UA has modules with basic functionality to identify OPC UA servers and to connect to an OPC UA server using default or previously compromised credentials. The client can read the OPC UA structure from the server and potentially write tag values available via OPC UA.
“This CISA Alert is also hinting that this is just the tip of the iceberg,” Byres said. “There are thousands of industrial facilities across the nation who believe they have dodged a bullet because they don’t use Schneider or OMRON products. They haven’t dodged anything – they are just sitting ducks to these nation-state attackers.”
Click here for more details on the advisory.

