Worker participation involving safety seems like a forgone conclusion these days, but what looks good in theory is often not practiced in reality.
Take the disaster at the Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company LLC petroleum refinery where a catastrophic rupture of a heat exchanger in the Catalytic Reformer/Naphtha Hydrotreater (NHT) unit at its petroleum refinery in Anacortes, Washington, left seven workers dead.
A Chemical Safety Board (CSB) investigation found the Tesoro refinery workforce and its union, the United Steelworkers (USW), expressed concerns regarding the NHT unit that were not adequately addressed by Tesoro managers leading up to the April, 2010, incident.
A lack of effective worker participation can lead to an increase in the risk of injury to workers and, in the event of a serious safety incident, can adversely impact the company and members of the public who live near these industrial facilities. That is one reason why the CSB released a safety digest focusing on the absence of participation in process safety incidents.
Recommendations
As a result of its investigative findings, the CSB issued recommendations to employers, unions, industry groups, state governments, and federal agencies aimed at improving worker participation in the following ways:
• Creating or improving opportunities for workers to participate directly in matters involving process safety management and major incidents prevention
• Empowering workers to provide input on how work is performed, whether through safety-related committees, special projects, inspections and audits, hazard analyses, and other specific measures
• Worker training opportunities and information sharing regarding the nature of the hazards present in the workplace, lessons learned from other sites, the outcome of incident investigations, and exposure to both established industry best practices and the results of safety-related research relevant to a company’s or facility’s operations
• Strengthening worker participation requirements in industry standards and state and federal regulations.
Incident Recap
During a 2006 process hazard analysis (PHA) revalidation on the NHT unit at the refinery, workers noted 31 near miss incidents in the NHT unit during the previous five years, according to the CSB report. These near misses were attributed to many factors, including operators being required to perform too many outside tasks and a continual rotation of the field and control room operators. As a result, the PHA team doing the revalidation requested a review of required experience and training for NHT operators to address these concerns; however, the CSB found this PHA action item was closed without resolution, despite the concerns expressed by the Tesoro workers on the PHA team.
Based on these findings, the CSB issued two closely related recommendations. The first was issued to USW Local 12-591 to participate in what the CSB proposed as a new aerial view of heat exchangers damaged from the Tesoro Refinery explosion and fire.
The second, and more comprehensive, recommendation was issued to the Tesoro Anacortes Refinery to implement a refinery-wide safety culture improvement program.
Tesoro informed the CSB in 2016 the refinery developed and implemented a process safety continuous improvement program and a Process Safety Council of three refinery management members and three local USW union representatives to oversee the program. Based upon the substantial actions taken at the Tesoro Anacortes Refinery, the CSB voted to close the recommendation as acceptable in February 2018.


