Collide+Power does not target specific programs but instead the underlying CPU hardware itself. This advance in software-based power side channels echoes the discovery of Meltdown and Spectre — where the underlying hardware provided unforeseen attack possibilities, leaking actual data values, said researchers from Graz University of Technology and CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security.
Thus, knowing its own data, the attacker can determine the exact data values used in other applications, according to research from Andreas Kogler, Jonas Juffinger, Lukas Giner, Martin Schwarzl, Daniel Gruss, and Stefan Mangard from Graz University of Technology, and Lukas Gerlach and Michael Schwarz from CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security.
The researchers presented two attacks belonging to the Collide+Power attack family: The first attack breaks the isolation between CPU hyperthreads, leaking arbitrary data across programs. The second attack breaks the isolation between user programs and the operating system, leaking arbitrary data not just from the operating system but any security domain on the same computer.
The Collide+Power technique can enhance any side-channel signal related to power, such as RAPL (PLATYPUS) or frequency throttling (Hertzbleed). While the leakage rates with current proof-of-concepts are comparably low, future attacks may be faster and indicate the necessity of security patches.
Collide+Power at a high level can end up described in the following three steps:
- The attacker fills the targeted CPU component with attacker-controlled data values. This step can be as simple as moving data to specific memory locations. One of the example components is the CPU cache. In the figure, the attacker fills one cache set with the attacker-controlled data.
- The attacker forces the victim data to replace or overwrite the attacker-controlled data in the targeted CPU component. For the CPU cache, the victim data is replacing an attacker-controlled cache line, implying the data might travel over the busses depending on the cache state and, therefore, the attacker-controlled data collides with the victim secret.
- This collision produces a data-dependent power consumption due to the design and how CPUs end up built. Replacing the attacker-controlled value with the secret value consumes more power if more bits have to be changed. By changing the attacker-controlled values and measuring the power consumption over many thousand iterations of this overwriting process, the attacker can find the exact secret value of the victim.
Click here to read the entire Collide+Power paper.

