By Gregory Hale
With threat actor capabilities evolving and growing, and increased connectivity via the digital enterprise boosting the attack space, preparation and understanding who is in charge of what will help organizations – or even cities and states – recover from a major cyber onslaught.

To get to those levels of understanding, federally funded non-profit research organization, Mitre, is in the middle of a three-year program to enlighten organizations on what they have to do to recover and remain resilient during a major critical infrastructure attack.

“You don’t need nation state level capabilities to have a major impact with an attack,” said Mark Bristow, director cyber infrastructure protection innovation center (CIPIC) at MITRE, at the inaugural Level Zero OT Cybersecurity 2025 Conference in Atlanta, Georgia. “You never did, really. Moreover, you don’t need those types of capabilities to have impact, especially impact on society.”

“It’s not just China and Russia, but they are the creating threats for our country and for basically the Western world. Both of them have demonstrated and stated capabilities to have direct impact on industrial control system environments and packing into critical infrastructure,” Bristow said. “The thing that’s different is that we now have adversary goals and intentions to drive and create societal panic.

Schneider Bold
Societal Panic

“Colonial Pipeline is actually a great example of this, where there was at no point any actual impact on the industrial control system. The ransomware hit the corporate network. Colonial shut down the pipeline themselves. It wasn’t shut down by the adversary. But the societal panic caused by that ransomware attack had people filling up trash bags of gasoline. People don’t think rationally in these things. And the goal of the adversary is not just to impact our economy, or our ability to respond militarily, but to impact the will of the American people to actually pursue our national security goals. That is more like psychological operations than cyber operations.”

That type of thinking led Mitre to conduct an exercise in December of last year. They ended up with 200 participants across 70 different organizations, mostly focused on asset owner operators and state and local governments and emergency managers.

“We simulated a cyber war, not a cyberattack, which really changes not only what this looks like, but also changes how we respond and, hopefully, recover from such an incident,” Bristow said.

They picked five sectors to emulate: Natural gas pipelines, electric power, rail, IT, and communications. Additionally, they based the exercise on expected cyberattacks against critical infrastructure growing. They also conducted the exercise at the classified level in order to get the participants to actually understand not only the exercise play, but some of the actual intelligence backing behind how some of the things actually drove forward.

Moreover, they also selected five different cities, looking for large metropolitan statistical areas, as well as cities that have significant national security equity.

Issues Between Sectors

“The point of this exercise was really to look at where do we have issues that sit in between sectors? Where do we have challenges with the electric power sector? How do the power sector’s outages or cyber effects impact natural gas? Furthermore, how does natural gas impact rail? How does that impact IT? How do we all have these co-issues? Because a lot of organizations’ emergency management plans come down to, what happens when my company gets attacked, but not how the whole thing gets attacked,” Bristow said.

One of the goals going into the exercise, Bristow said, was to see how a company’s emergency operations help or hurt other people’s emergency operations? Where are those intersections? Where are the blind spots, and then ultimately, how can you to fix those blind spots?

Another series of goals was to “drive was who’s in charge? Anyone know who’s in charge of a cyber war that affects the United States domestically, when there’s no tanks in the United States? The answer is no one,” Bristow said.

“So, what happens since our system is set up that no one is in charge? What happens since no one’s in charge, that means everyone else thinks they’re in charge? And what happens when they start telling each other to do things that are stupid or counter manning each other? What does that happen? How do we prioritize?

Learning to Prioritize

“If we are in a situation that we’ve never really found ourselves in the United States, which is where we don’t have enough electrons to go around, we don’t have enough generation to get to our load, we don’t have enough natural gas to heat everybody’s homes. How do we make choices about who gets that now scarce resource? How do we do it? News flash. We don’t know how to do that either,” Bristow said.

“But this was something that we wanted to push on about how do we actually have these interfaces and how would this actually go down, and then what would actually happen in real life? And I will say, too, as part of the exercise, we had very few federal-level players in the exercise, and that was by design, because the federal government does these exercises in a vacuum all the time,” Bristow said. “But the people that never get to play are the state and local governments, and the asset owner operators.”

After going through the various stages of an attack and various scenarios, asset owner operators and the emergency managers had never even considered they would have to respond to a disaster that was done by cyberattack. It had never crossed their minds with them. They came to the exercise. Despite all the messaging on the one slide and all the things that people have been talking about cybersecurity and the impacts of critical infrastructure, people are not paying attention to this.

Bristow said, “I had one participant say ‘Going into the exercise, we prepared for a cyberattack. Now we’re prepared for a cyber war.’”

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