By Gregory Hale
There have been six major cyber-physical attacks that have hit the industry over the past 13 years and if manufacturers are on top of their game they can – and should – learn lessons from these attacks.

“This industry has changed a mighty lot in the past 13 years,” said Eric Knapp during a Tuesday session entitled “The Cyber-Physical Six” at the 2023 Honeywell User Group in Orlando, Florida. “A cyber-physical attack is a cyberattack that is able to produce a specific physical impact, which is not the physical impact you want to happen. I am not talking about a hack into a process control network that stops things. I am talking about a targeted attack initiated by a cyber incident.”

The six attacks were Stuxnet in 2010; Black energy in 2015 against Ukraine power grid; Industroyer in 2016 against the Ukraine power grid; Triton (or Trisis) in 2017 an attack on safety system for a refinery; Industroyer 2 in 2022 and Incontroller in 2022.

Stuxnet Comes Alive
The first attack was Stuxnet 2010, and it was “Malware of unprecedented complexity. The most sophisticated, scariest most complex most capable malware known to mankind,” Knapp said.

Schneider Bold

Black energy hit in 2015 against Ukraine and attack this was a targeted attack against the Ukrainian power grid. One year later Industroyer again was an attack on the Ukraine power grid.

“It is interesting when these attacks happened,” Knapp said. “These attacks always happen on holidays and weekends and that is deliberate because they know staffing will be low and everyone’s minds will be elsewhere.”

In 2017, there was the Triton (or Trisis) which focused on taking control of a safety system.

In 2022, there was Industroyer version 2 and Incontroller, which was an exceptionally rare and dangerous cyberattack capability built to manipulate and destroy industrial processes.

“Two phases that occur in all cyber physical attacks. One is you have to reach the process control system and the second phase is you have to do something to the process control system,” Knapp said.

“The first half is the cyber part where you have to breach the network; you have to get in there somehow,” he said. “The second part is the physical attack. How do you get the process control network to do what you want to do.”

“Stuxnet was light years ahead of malware at the time,” Knapp said. “The malware was intelligent, and it was polymorphic. It was designed to spread and look for its target.”

The target was the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran and its mission was to go after, find and destroy the centrifuges that operated in the facility.

Attack on Ukraine
Black Energy was an attack on electric distribution in Ukraine in 2015. It was less about malware; it was the use of real user credentials to use legitimate VPN to get access to the HMI to turn the power off, he said.

One year later was Industroyer that went after the Ukrainian power grid. It was a modular framework which learned from Black Energy.

Triton/Trisis attack the second phase was nothing really unique, but what was interesting is they targeted the safety instrumented system.

“This shows a maturity on the side of the adversary,” Knapp said. “OT cybersecurity has changed a lot on the good guy side, but also on the adversary side. They are learning. If I am and adversary and want a physical outcome to be destructive. I am going to try to get rid of that control, which is the safety system.”

Industroyer 2 came out in 2022. This attack is less capable than Industroyer, but it is “bulletized.” This uses just one protocol, and it is configurable, and it is packaged into a single entity.

“What happened here is the adversary learned,” Knapp said. “They developed a modular framework, and they can communicate with, and they could get into are real targeted environment to figure out how their target works and then can develop an attack. Once they know what that target looks like, they can package it up into a little pill and it is easier to distribute and harder to detect.”

This was a variant of industroyer that operates as a single executable used against Ukraine in 2022.

Modular Framework
Incontroller/Pipedream is another modular framework, and it is pretty scary, Knapp said. This is the only of the six that has not resulted in a real incident. Other organizations found it before it actually deployed.

This was a modular attack that was incredibly flexible and incredibly configurable, he said.

“Here is the good news: In order for an adversary to produce a specific physical outcome in a cyber-physical attack, they need to know everything about the control system they are attacking,” Knapp said. “When we see modular frameworks like Industroyer once they have the information, they can develop the attack in advance. If you can keep the plans away from the adversary, they can’t do they attack.”

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