To that end, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released a Flash report detailing indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with attacks, using LockBit 2.0, a Ransomware-as-a-Service that employs a wide variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures, creating significant challenges for defense and mitigation.
LockBit 2.0 ransomware compromises victim networks through a variety of techniques, including purchased access, unpatched vulnerabilities, insider access, and Zero Day exploits, according to the report.
Ransomware Updated
In July last year, LockBit 2.0 released an update which featured the automatic encryption of devices across Windows domains by abusing Active Directory group policies. In August, LockBit 2.0 began to advertise for insiders to establish initial access into potential victim networks, while promising a portion of the proceeds from a successful attack. LockBit 2.0 also developed a Linux-based malware which takes advantage of vulnerabilities within VMWare ESXi virtual machines.
LockBit 2.0 is best described as a heavily obfuscated ransomware application leveraging bitwise operations to decode strings and load required modules to evade detection, according to the report. Upon launch, LockBit 2.0 decodes the necessary strings and code to import the required modules followed by determining if the process has administrative privileges. If privileges are not sufficient, it attempts to escalate to the required privileges. Lockbit 2.0 then determines the system and user language settings and only targets those not matching a set list of languages that are Eastern European. If an Eastern European language is detected, the program exits without infection, according to the report.
As infection begins, Lockbit 2.0 deletes log files and shadow copies residing on disk, according to the report. Lockbit 2.0 enumerates system information to include hostname, host configuration, domain information, local drive configuration, remote shares, and mounted external storage devices. Lockbit 2.0 attempts to encrypt any data saved to any local or remote device but skips files associated with core system functions. Once completed, Lockbit 2.0 deletes itself from disk and creates persistence at startup.
Prior to encryption, Lockbit affiliates primarily use the Stealbit application obtained directly from the Lockbit panel to exfiltrate specific file types, according to the report. The desired file types can be configured by the affiliate to tailor the attack to the victim. The affiliate configures the application to target a desired file path and, upon execution, the tool copies the files to an attacker-controlled server using http. Due to the nature of the affiliate model, some attackers use other commercially available tools such as rclone and MEGAsync to achieve the same results. Lockbit 2.0 actors often use publicly available file sharing services including, privatlab[.]net, anonfiles[.]com, sendspace[.]com, fex[.]net, transfer[.]sh, and send.exploit[.]in. While some of these applications and services can support legitimate purposes, they can also be used by attackers to aid in system compromise or exploration of an enterprise.
Mitigations
FBI recommends network defenders apply the following mitigations to reduce the risk of compromise by LockBit 2.0 ransomware:
- Require all accounts with password logins to have strong, unique passwords. Passwords should not be reused across multiple accounts or stored on the system where an adversary may have access.
- Require multi-factor authentication for all services to the extent possible.
- Keep all operating systems and software up to date. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities.
- Remove unnecessary access to administrative shares, especially ADMIN$ and C$.
- Use a host-based firewall to only allow connections to administrative shares via server message block (SMB) from a limited set of administrator machines.
- Enable protected files in the Windows Operating System to prevent unauthorized changes to critical files.
In attack scenarios, attackers use system and network discovery techniques for network and system visibility and mapping.
To limit an attacker from learning the organization’s enterprise environment, limit common system and network discovery techniques by taking the following actions:
- Segment networks to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement.
- Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool.
- Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin level and higher. When the account is needed, individual users submit their requests through an automated process that enables access to a system, but only for a set timeframe to support task completion.
- Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions. Privilege escalation and lateral movement often depend on software utilities that run from the command line.
- Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration.
- Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure.
Click here for the entire FBI Flash Alert.

