By Gregory Hale
Significant risk remains with Log4J and security professionals cannot become complacent because it is an “endemic vulnerability,” according to a new federal security review board.

The Log4j vulnerability first came to light in December 2021. In essence, Log 4J is a reusable building block, while useful for creating software at scale, also create dependencies and risks not often understood.

When there is a vulnerability in a software building block integrated into other software packages, it means every organization that uses those packages is at risk, according to the first report ever issued by the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Cyber Safety Review Board’s (CSRB).

It also means system owners may not know where vulnerable software lives within their environments. When such a vulnerability is also easy for an attacker to exploit and gain broad control over a compromised system, it can create a once-in-a-generation security event.

Schneider Bold

Apache Log4j is an open source Java-based logging framework that collects and manages information about system activity. Log4j is simple to use, free to download, and effective in its intended function, making it popular among Java developers, who have embedded it into thousands of other software packages. Log4j version 2, the primary topic of this report, was initially released in 2012. In 2013, prior to the general availability release in 2014 and through a standard process, the Log4j team accepted a community-submitted feature intended to ease data storage and retrieval called “JNDI [Java Naming and Directory InterfaceTM] Lookup plugin support.” This addition ended up integrated into thousands of applications in which Log4j is used.

Vulnerability Went Public
On November 24, 2021, a security engineer from the Alibaba Cloud Security team, within the People’s Republic of China (PRC), reported a vulnerability in the JNDI feature to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF), a non-profit corporation that provides support for the Log4j project. While ASF was working to understand the issue and devise a fix, another party disclosed the vulnerability before ASF made an upgrade available to the general public.

Such a disclosure of a significant vulnerability in any widely used piece of software immediately triggers a race between defense and offense: a race to apply upgrades before threat actors exploit vulnerable systems. The Log4j vulnerability was no exception.

Defenders faced a particularly challenging situation; the vulnerability had an impact on virtually every networked organization and the severity of the threat required fast action. The fact there is no comprehensive “customer list” for Log4j, or even a list of where it is integrated as a sub-system, hindered defenders.

Enterprises and vendors scrambled to discover where they used Log4j. The pace, pressure, and publicity compounded the defensive challenges: security researchers quickly found additional vulnerabilities in Log4j, contributing to confusion and “patching fatigue”; defenders struggled to distinguish vulnerability scanning by bona fide researchers from threat actors; and responders found it difficult to find authoritative sources of information on how to address the issues. This culminated in one of the most intensive cybersecurity community responses in history.

The CSRB found organizations that responded most effectively to the Log4j event understood their use of Log4j and had technical resources and mature processes to manage assets, assess risk, and mobilize their organization and key partners to action. However, few organizations were able to execute this kind of response, or the speed required during this incident, causing delays in their assessment of the risk and in their management of it. When ASF made upgrades for Log4j available, deploying them was itself a risk decision, forcing a tradeoff between possible operational disruption and timeliness, completeness, and compensating controls.

Log4J Not Over
While it has been quiet for some time, Log4j is not over, the CSRB said Log4j is an “endemic vulnerability” and that vulnerable instances of Log4j will remain in systems for years to come, perhaps a decade or longer. Significant risk remains.

“Log4J shined a light on long-standing problems in our software supply chain,” said Chris Clymer, director and CISO, Inversion6. “IT systems have become incredibly complex, with layers and layers of components put together by layers and layers of integrators and developers. All of which is often compiled and built in ways where it is extremely difficult to know what components are included in a system your business relies upon.

“This CSRB report is filled with great recommendations, and helps to reinforce that the Log4J issue has not gone away, and that there are likely numerous similar problems out there still unidentified. I agree that short of regulations requiring organizations to do things like maintain a Software Bill of Materials, organizations are unlikely to prioritize investing the significant time and money into these efforts. Many would like to … but the costs to really address these problems will be high. Without regulatory cover, it is difficult to explain to stockholders why you’re making these investments…especially if you’re the first one making that shift.”

In the report CSRB made 19 recommendations for government and industry.

First is to address continued risks of Log4j: Continued vigilance in addressing Log4j vulnerabilities for the long term.

1. Organizations should be prepared to address Log4j vulnerabilities for years to come.
2. Organizations should continue to report (and escalate) observations of Log4j exploitation.
3. CISA should expand its capability to develop, coordinate, and publish authoritative cyber risk information.
4. Federal and state regulators should drive implementation of CISA guidance through their own regulatory authorities.

Drive existing best practices for security hygiene: Adopt industry-accepted practices and standards for vulnerability management and security hygiene.

5. Organizations should invest in capabilities to identify vulnerable systems.
6. Develop the capacity to maintain an accurate information technology (IT) asset and application inventory.
7. Organizations should have a documented vulnerability response program.
8. Organizations should have a documented vulnerability disclosure and handling process.
9. Software developers and maintainers should implement secure software practices.

Build a better software ecosystem: Drive a transformation in the software ecosystem to move to a proactive model of vulnerability management.

10. Open source software developers should participate in community-based security initiatives.
11. Invest in training software developers in secure software development.
12. Improve Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) tooling and adoptability.
13. Increase investments in open source software security.
14. Pilot open source software maintenance support for critical services.

Investments in the future: Pursue cultural and technological shifts necessary to solve the nation’s digital security for the long run.

15. Explore a baseline requirement for software transparency for federal government vendors.
16. Examine the efficacy of a Cyber Safety Reporting System (CSRS).
17. Explore the feasibility of establishing a Software Security Risk Assessment Center of Excellence (SSRACE).
18. Study the incentive structures required to build secure software.
19. Establish a government-coordinated working group to improve identification of software with known vulnerabilities.

Click here to view the full report.

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