A new widespread, global phishing campaign targeted numerous industries, including the manufacturing and engineering sector.

UNC2529 tailored phishing lures and sophistication code in its malware, which makes it appear like an experienced and well resourced, according to researchers at Mandiant. The phishing campaign, which appeared in December last year, included three new malware families, DOUBLEDRAG, DOUBLEDROP and DOUBLEBACK. Mandiant observed the first wave of the phishing campaign occur on Dec. 2, and a second wave between Dec. 11 and Dec. 18.

Mandiant first observed evidence that 28 organizations were sent phishing emails, though targeting was likely broader than directly observed.

These emails were sent using 26 unique email addresses associated with the domain tigertigerbeads<.>com, and in only a small number of cases did researchers see the same address used across multiple recipient organizations. These phishing emails contained inline links to malicious URLs such as, hxxp://totallyhealth-wealth[.]com/downld-id_mwGdczs, engineered to entice the victim to download a file. UNC2529 employed at least 24 different domains to support this first, of a three-stage process.

Email Patterns
The structure of URLs embedded in these phishing emails had the following patterns, where the string was an alphabetic variable of unknown function.
http:///downld-id_
http:///downld-id-
http:///files-upload_
http:///files-upload-
http:///get_file-id_
http:///get_file-id-
http:///zip_download_
http:///zip_download-

Schneider Bold

The first stage payload downloaded from these URLs consisted of a Zip compressed file containing a corrupt decoy PDF document and a heavily obfuscated JavaScript downloader. Mandiant tracks the downloader as DOUBLEDRAG.

Interestingly, the researchers said, the PDF documents were obtained from public websites, but corrupted by removing bytes to render them unreadable with a standard PDF viewer. It is speculated the victim would then attempt to launch the JavaScript (.js) file, which can be executed natively with Windows Script Host by simply double clicking on the file. All but one of the file name patterns for the ZIP, PDF and JS files were document__client-id_<4 digit number>.extension, such as “document_Ohio_client-id_8902.zip”.

Each of the observed DOUBLEDRAG downloaders used in the first wave attempted to download a second-stage memory-only dropper, which Mandiant tracked as DOUBLEDROP, from either hxxp://p-leh[.]com/update_java.dat or hxxp://clanvisits[.]com/mini.dat.

The downloaded file is a heavily obfuscated PowerShell script that will launch a backdoor into memory. Mandiant tracks this third-stage backdoor as DOUBLEBACK. DOUBLEBACK samples observed during the phishing campaign beaconed to hxxps://klikbets[.]net/admin/client.php and hxxps://lasartoria[.]net/admin/client.php.

Domain Hijack
Prior to the second wave, observed between Dec. 11 and Dec. 18, UNC2529 hijacked a legitimate domain owned by a U.S. heating and cooling services company, modified DNS entries and leveraged that infrastructure to phish at least 22 organizations, five of which were also targeted in the first wave. It is not currently known how the legitimate domain ended up compromised. The threat actor used 20 newly observed domains to host the second-stage payload.

The threat actor made slight modifications to the URL pattern during the second wave.
http:///
http:///dowld_
http:///download_
http:///files_
http:///id_
http:///upld_

Of note, the Mandiant researchers said, the DOUBLEDRAG downloader observed in the first wave ended up replaced with a Microsoft Excel document containing an embedded legacy Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro in Excel 97-Excel 2003 Binary file format (BIFF8). When the file was opened and the macro executed successfully, it would attempt to download a second-stage payload from hxxps://towncentrehotels[.]com/ps1.dat. The core functionality of the DOUBLEDRAG JavaScript file and the BIFF8 macro is to download a file from a hardcoded URL. This Excel file was also found within Zip files, as seen in the first wave, although only one of the observed Zip files included a corresponding corrupt decoy PDF document.

Additional DOUBLEBACK samples were extracted from DOUBLEDROP samples uploaded to a public malware repository, which revealed additional command and control servers (C2), hxxps://barrel1999[.]com/admin4/client.php, hxxps://widestaticsinfo[.]com/admin4/client.php, hxxps://secureinternet20[.]com/admin5/client.php, and hxxps://adsinfocoast[.]com/admin5/client.php, the researchers said. Three of these domains were registered after the observed second wave.

UNC2529 displayed indications of target research based on their selection of sender email addresses and subject lines tailored to their intended victims. For example, UNC2529 used a unique username, masquerading as an account executive for a small California-based electronics manufacturing company, which Mandiant identified through a simple Internet search. The username of the email address was associated with both sender domains, tigertigerbeads<.>com and the compromised HVAC company. Masquerading as the account executive, seven phishing emails targeted the medical industry, high-tech electronics, automotive and military equipment manufacturers, and a cleared defense contractor with subject lines very specific to the products of the California-based electronics manufacturing company.

Another example is a freight/transport company that received a phish with subject, “compton ca to flowery branch ga”, while a firm that recruits and places long-haul truck drivers received a simple, “driver” in the subject line.

A utility company received a phish with subject, “easement to bore to our stairwell area.”

Global Campaign
UNC2529’s phishing campaign was global and had an impact an array of industries. While acknowledging some telemetry bias, in both waves the U.S. was the primary target, while targeting of EMEA and Asia and Australia were evenly dispersed in the first wave,

Although Mandiant has no evidence about the objectives of this threat actor, their broad targeting across industries and geographies is consistent with a targeting calculus most commonly seen among financially motivated groups.

Considerable resources were employed by UNC2529 to conduct their December phishing campaign. Almost 50 domains supported various phases of the effort, targets were researched, and a legitimate third-party domain was compromised. The threat actor made extensive use of obfuscation and fileless malware to complicate detection to deliver a well coded and extensible backdoor. UNC2529 is assessed as capable, professional and well resourced. The identified wide-ranging targets, across geography and industry suggests a financial crime motive.

DOUBLEBACK appears to be an ongoing work in progress and Mandiant anticipates further actions by UNC2529 to compromise victims across all industries worldwide.

Click here for more on the report.

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