When installing a mobile messenger like WhatsApp, new users can instantly start texting existing contacts based on the phone numbers stored on their device. For this to happen, however, users must grant the app permission to access and regularly upload their address book to company servers in a process called mobile contact discovery.
Currently deployed contact discovery services severely threaten the privacy of billions of users, according to a study by a team of researchers from the Secure Software Systems Group at the University of Würzburg and the Cryptography and Privacy Engineering Group at Technical University of Darmstadt.
For the extensive study, the researchers queried 10 percent of all U.S. mobile phone numbers for WhatsApp and 100 percent for Signal. Thereby, they were able to gather personal (meta) data commonly stored in the messengers’ user profiles, including profile pictures, nicknames, status texts and the “last online” time.
The analyzed data also found interesting statistics about user behavior.
For example, very few users change the default privacy settings, which for most messengers are not privacy-friendly at all. The researchers found about 50 percent of WhatsApp users in the U.S. have a public profile picture and 90 percent a public “About” text. Interestingly, 40 percent of Signal users, which appears to be more privacy concerned in general, are also using WhatsApp, and every other of those Signal users has a public profile picture on WhatsApp.
Tracking such data over time enables attackers to build accurate behavior models. When the data is matched across social networks and public data sources, third parties can also build detailed profiles, for example to scam users. For Telegram, the researchers found its contact discovery service exposes sensitive information even about owners of phone numbers not registered with the service.
Which information is revealed during contact discovery and can be collected via crawling attacks depends on the service provider and the privacy settings of the user.
WhatsApp and Telegram, for example, transmit the user’s entire address book to their servers. More privacy-concerned messengers like Signal transfer only short cryptographic hash values of phone numbers or rely on trusted hardware. However, the research team shows with new and optimized attack strategies, the low entropy of phone numbers enables attackers to deduce corresponding phone numbers from cryptographic hashes within milliseconds.
Moreover, since there are no noteworthy restrictions for signing up with messaging services, any third party can create a large number of accounts to crawl the user database of a messenger for information by requesting data for random phone numbers.
“We strongly advise all users of messenger apps to revisit their privacy settings. This is currently the most effective protection against our investigated crawling attacks,” said Prof. Alexandra Dmitrienko (University of Würzburg) and Prof. Thomas Schneider (TU Darmstadt).
The research team reported their findings to the respective service providers. As a result, WhatsApp has improved their protection mechanisms such that large-scale attacks can end up detected, and Signal reduced the number of possible queries to complicate crawling. The researchers also proposed other mitigation techniques, including a new contact discovery method to further reduce the efficiency of attacks without negatively impacting usability.

