Misconfigured network edge devices are becoming a primary initial access vector for Russian state-sponsored campaign, according to Amazon Threat Intelligence.

While vulnerability exploitation activity declined, researchers said the new tactical adaptation enables the same operational outcomes, credential harvesting, and lateral movement into victim organizations’ online services and infrastructure. It also cuts down on a threat actor’s exposure and resource expenditure.

Having said that, headed into 2026, organizations need to prioritize securing their network edge devices and monitor for credential replay attacks to defend against this persistent threat.

Based on infrastructure overlaps with known Sandworm (also known as APT44 and Seashell Blizzard) operations observed in Amazon’s telemetry and consistent targeting patterns, the researchers assess with high confidence this activity cluster comes back to Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). The campaign demonstrates sustained focus on Western critical infrastructure, particularly the energy sector, with operations spanning 2021 through today.

Amazon Threat Intelligence observed sustained targeting of global infrastructure between 2021-2025, with particular focus on the energy sector. The campaign demonstrates a clear evolution in tactics.

Schneider Bold

Targeting likely misconfigured customer devices with exposed management interfaces achieves the strategic objective of persistent access to critical infrastructure networks and credential harvesting.

Operational Shift

The threat actor’s shift in operational tempo represents a concerning evolution. While customer misconfiguration targeting has been going on since 2022, the actor maintained sustained focus on this activity in 2025 while reducing investment in zero-day and N-day exploitation.

The actor accomplishes this while significantly reducing the risk of exposing their operations through more detectable vulnerability exploitation activity.

Amazon’s telemetry reveals coordinated operations against customer network edge devices hosted on AWS. Network connection analysis shows actor-controlled IP addresses establishing persistent connections to compromised EC2 instances operating customers’ network appliance software. Analysis revealed persistent connections consistent with interactive access and data retrieval across multiple affected instances.

Beyond direct victim infrastructure compromise, researchers observed systematic credential replay attacks against victim organizations’ online services. In observed instances, the actor compromised customer network edge devices hosted on AWS, then subsequently attempted authentication using credentials associated with the victim organization’s domain against their online services.

While these specific attempts were unsuccessful, the pattern of device compromise followed by authentication attempts using victim credentials supports researchers’ assessment the actor harvests credentials from compromised customer network infrastructure for replay against target organizations’ online services.

Click here for more on Amazon’s analysis.

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