It is important MOVEit Transfer user take immediate action in order to help protect the environment, Progress officials said.
In terms of the vulnerability, which has a CVE pending, in the Progress MOVEit Transfer before 2021.0.6 (13.0.6), 2021.1.4 (13.1.4), 2022.0.4 (14.0.4), 2022.1.5 (14.1.5), 2023.0.1 (15.0.1), there is a SQL injection vulnerability that could allow an un-authenticated attacker to gain unauthorized access to MOVEit Transfer’s database.
Depending on the database engine being used (MySQL, Microsoft SQL Server, or Azure SQL), an attacker may be able to infer information about the structure and contents of the database in addition to executing SQL statements that alter or delete database elements.
The vulnerability affects all MOVEit Transfer versions.
To help prevent successful exploitation of the SQLi vulnerability, users should apply the following mitigation measures:
1. Disable all HTTP and HTTPs traffic to your MOVEit Transfer environment. Users should modify firewall rules to deny HTTP and HTTPs traffic to MOVEit Transfer on ports 80 and 443 until a patch releases.
2. Review, Delete and Reset
Delete Unauthorized Files and User Accounts
— Delete any instances of the human2.aspx and .cmdline script files
— On the MOVEit Transfer server, look for any new files created in the C:\MOVEitTransfer\wwwroot\ directory
— On the MOVEit Transfer server, look for new files created in the C:\Windows\TEMP\[random]\ directory with a file extension of [.]cmdline
— Remove any unauthorized user accounts
— Review logs for unexpected downloads of files from unknown IPs or large numbers of files downloaded
— If applicable, review Azure logs for unauthorized access to Azure Blob Storage Keys and consider rotating any potentially affected keys
Reset Credentials
Reset service account credentials for affected systems and MOVEit Service Account
3. Apply the Patch
Patches for all supported MOVEit Transfer versions are available below. Click here for the supported versions.
“We know that ransomware groups have found massive success by double extorting victims: Encrypting files within a targeted organization, stealing sensitive files and threatening to publish them on the dark web if the organization doesn’t pay up,” said Satnam Narang, senior staff research engineer at Tenable. “However, we’ve also noticed a trend over the last few years, as groups have either pivoted away from or were created without file encryption, focusing solely on data theft and extortion. Since late 2020, file transfer appliances and solutions from Accellion to GoAnywhere have become a valuable target for cybercriminals, specifically ransomware groups like Clop who have managed to breach hundreds of organizations that rely on these solutions to transfer sensitive data. While we don’t know the specifics around the group behind the zero day attacks involving MOVEit, it underscores a worrisome trend of threat actors targeting file transfer solutions. Organizations that use MOVEit software should assume compromise and engage in incident response to determine the potential impact, if any.”
“The vulnerability being exploited in MOVEit’s software allows for remote code execution (RCE) in a potentially privileged context by allowing a remote threat actor to write a C# web shell into the directory c:\MOVEit Transfer\wwwroot\, enabling them to remotely access the exploited system and execute commands on it,” said Dan Mayer, threat researcher at Stairwell. “As of right now, this has been abused for siphoning data from compromised organizations, but can also be a foothold into these organizations from which threat actors can pivot and accomplish other actions on objectives. The motives of the actors already exploiting this vulnerability are currently unclear. Stealing data from file repositories is the bread and butter of data extortion actors, but state-sponsored actors such as Chinese threat actors have also been observed mass-exploiting web server vulnerabilities by installing web shells.”

