The group exhibited new tradecraft – meaning the techniques, methods, and technologies used in espionage – in its efforts to conduct cyber-enabled information operations into mid-2024 using a myriad of cover personas, according to a cybersecurity advisory (CSA) issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Department of Treasury, and Israel National Cyber Directorate.
ASA has also undertaken a project to harvest content from IP cameras and used online resources related to artificial intelligence.
Since 2023, the group has exhibited new trickery including the use of fictitious hosting resellers to provision operational server infrastructure to its own actors as well as to an actor in Lebanon involved in website hosting. Recently released reporting from Microsoft indicates this group demonstrated interest in election-related websites and media outlets, suggesting preparations for future influence operations.
Leveraging Online Resources
This joint CSA provides the threat group’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), including its leveraging of online resources related to artificial intelligence, and indicators of compromise (IoCs).
FBI previously reported in a Private Industry Notification (PIN) Emennet Pasargad, has been conducting hack-and-leak operations against organizations primarily in Israel. FBI assesses the goal of these operations is to undermine public confidence in the security of the victim’s network and data, as well as embarrass victim companies and targeted countries.
These hack-and-leak campaigns involve a combination of hacking/theft of data and information operations that impact victims through financial losses and reputational damage. Similar to the Emennet campaign that targeted the 2020 U.S. Presidential election, FBI judges the group’s recent campaigns include a mix of computer intrusion activity and exaggerated or fictitious claims of access to victim networks or stolen data to enhance the psychological effects of their operations.
FBI acquired information indicating since mid-2023, ASA used several cover hosting providers for infrastructure management and obfuscation.
Cover Providers
These two providers are “Server-Speed” (server-speed[.]com) and “VPS-Agent” (vps-agent[.]net8). Whereas actors typically procure virtual infrastructure from hosting resellers, ASA set up its own resellers and procured server space from Europe- based providers, including the Lithuania-based company BAcloud and Stark Industries Solutions/PQ Hosting (located in the United Kingdom and Moldova, respectively).
ASA then leverages these cover resellers to provision operational servers to its own cyber actors for malicious cyber activities. FBI also observed ASA using these cover resellers to provide technical support to identified Lebanon-based individuals, including with hosting for HAMAS-affiliated or themed websites.
FBI assesses the website alqassam[.]ps – a website associated with the military wing of HAMAS – was supported by ASA and its contacts in Lebanon. ASA has also provided hosting support for Lebanon-based actors operating the website almaq.org.
Click here for more on the joint CSA.

