The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued the order to Arizona Public Service Co. (APS), which operates the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station in Tonopah, AZ.
The violations involved the company’s failure to perform a written evaluation for a change to a dry cask storage system used for spent nuclear fuel and obtain a license amendment for the way they performed accident calculations and adequately analyze the consequences of a hypothetical accident involving a cask tip over on the independent spent fuel storage installation pad.
The violations of NRC requirements ended up described in a July 6 NRC inspection report.
Company officials requested the alternative dispute resolution process with the NRC to discuss corrective actions. The process uses a neutral mediator with no decision-making authority to assist the NRC and its licensees in reaching an agreement.
Following a Sept. 16 meeting with company officials, the NRC issued the confirmatory order documenting actions the company has agreed to take.
During the alternative dispute resolution session, APS and the NRC reached a preliminary settlement agreement. The elements of the agreement include the following:
APS acknowledged it: Failed to perform a written evaluation for a change to the dry cask storage system and obtain a license amendment for a change in methodology for performing tip-over calculations; and failed to adequately analyze the consequences of a hypothetical spent fuel cask tip over accident on the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) pad.
Corrective actions already implemented by APS included:
- Prior to loading fuel in the first cask at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (Palo Verde), APS directed NAC to perform a new tip-over analysis of the Palo Verde plant specific vertical concrete cask on the Palo Verde ISFSI pad using the NAC final safety analysis report (FSAR) described method of evaluation, LS-DYNA.
- On February 28, APS revised 10 CFR 72.48 screening 72.48 S-20-001 to no longer accept the linear scaling method originally done for the tip-over analysis. The revision of the screening was done to review and accept the tip-over analysis using the NAC FSAR-described method of evaluation, LS-DYNA.
- On February 28, APS revised the Palo Verde ISFSI10CFR72.212 Evaluation Report for the MAGNASTOR System to incorporate the revised 10 CFR 72.48 screening that accepted the tip-over analysis using the NAC FSAR-described method of evaluation, LS-DYNA.
- APS completed a Level 1 Root Cause Analysis approved by the Palo Verde Corrective Action Review Board. The root cause analysis addressed the failure to identify a change in a required methodology resulting in APS not complying with 10 CFR 72.48(c)(2)(viii) and 10 CFR 72.146(a).
- As part of the root cause analysis, APS performed a review of the tip-over analysis for the UMS dry cask system, used at Palo Verde prior to MAGNASTOR, and confirmed the UMS tip-over analysis was performed using LS-DYNA as required by the NAC FSAR.
- As part of the root cause analysis, APS performed an extent of condition review of the 10 CFR 72.48 and 10 CFR 50.59 screenings and evaluations performed over the last 5 years. Of the over 600 screenings and evaluations reviewed, APS identified three items of interest that required additional evaluation and were entered into the APS corrective action program.

