By Gregory Hale
Ransomware attacks against industrial organizations increased 87 percent over last year, and that is just a hint of the true number, according to a new report.
“We saw 1,693 ransomware attacks in 2024, which means there were much more than that,” said Rob Lee chief executive and co-founder of security provider, Dragos in reference to the Dragos OT/ICS Cybersecurity Year In Review 2025. “Of those 1,693 confirmed ransomware cases, 25 percent involved a full shut down of operations; 75 percent involved a disruption of some degree and that is massively under reported.”
Manufacturing remains the top target for ransomware attacks against industrial organizations; more than 50 percent of all observed ransomware victims were in the manufacturing sector, representing 1,171 attacks, according to the report.
Dragos observed two noteworthy trends within the 2024 ransomware threat landscape:
- Ransomware adversaries using remote tools and services
- Convergence of geo-politics, hacktivism, and ransomware
Ransomware groups know when it comes to operational technology (OT) even brief disruptions can cause significant financial and logistical fallout, putting safety at risk and making manufacturers more likely to pay, according to the report. Other industrial sectors, including energy, transportation, and industrial control system vendors, also remain high on the list as ransomware groups refine their tactics to maximize pressure and impact.
OT a Top Target
That all points to attackers no longer consider OT a niche target. The proliferation of adversaries, who have a greater awareness and understanding of OT and the effectiveness of basic attack techniques, make defending critical infrastructure more challenging than ever.
Skilled adversaries remain hidden within critical infrastructure while hacktivists exploit exposed weak infrastructure.
Conducting the basic security measures continues to be the prime directive for most organizations in the sector. Now more than ever, defenders who can uncover and illuminate hidden threats are usually able to protect against a majority of the attacks.
Organizations with strong incident response capabilities, defensible architectures, secure remote access protocols, and robust network monitoring remain far better positioned to reduce the risk of a successful attack in OT.
While there were plenty of interesting facts in the report, one was the growing relationships between state and non-state threat actors.
“There are state actor groups we track having strong connection to non-state actors involved in hacktivism,” Lee said.
“State actors tend to be more focused in their attacks; they are low frequency, high consequence attacks. They don’t happen as often as IT attacks, but when they do, they are more consequential,” he said.
On the other hand, non-state attacks are more opportunistic, and they hit just about everybody and everything they can.
High Frequency, High Consequence
“There is a proliferation of capabilities from state actors to non-state actors,” Lee said. “When non-state actors that were not capable to conduct an attack before, start getting the knowledge, tooling and infrastructure and capabilities from state actors that can, you will start to see those lower frequency, high consequence attacks start to become high frequency, high consequence attacks. That is something the OT community is not prepared for, and it requires a much different level of defense investment than we are seeing in the OT security space.”
In the report, Dragos said it is seeing a growth of ICS malware. The company defines ICS malware as it being ICS-capable software intentionally designed for adverse effects on OT environments. The definition requires that ICS malware contains three properties:
- The software must be ICS-capable
- The software must end up designed with malicious intent
- The software must have the ability for adverse effects on OT environments
“Continued development of industrial control system malware and a continued focus of adversaries to target these environments at the time they are becoming more digital and at the time they are becoming more connected is driving more societal risk,” Lee said.
While it is easy to become overwhelmed and disillusioned with the enormity of what is at stake and the vast level of complexity revolving around the cybersecurity environment, all is not lost when one just begins and works with the basics.
As the threat landscape continues to evolve, foundational practices like the following SANS ICS 5 Critical Controls provide OT/ICS asset owners with the means to prepare for potential cyber events:
- Incident response plan
- Defensible architecture
- Visibility and monitoring
- Secure remote access
- Risk-based vulnerability management


