By Gregory Hale
It is very simple, an issue arises on the plant floor, you just jump on the nearby computer and quickly take care of whatever the problem was because under the daily stress, working conditions, schedules, and deadlines, you need to get the job done.
In a normal working situation, that works. But what happens in a cyber attack scenario when a threat actor gets in the network and is able to “jump on the closest computer” and take over. That is where an identity and access management (IAM) plan comes into play.
“It is important to stress that this problem is not new to most major ICS vendors. In many industry sectors, it is unacceptable to log off a Windows operator station at shift change,” said Joel Langill, founder and managing member of the Industrial Control System Cyber Security Institute LLC. “We have known this for decades and have compensated quite well with application-based authentication and more important ‘authorization’ to provide operational, administrative, and engineering actions on the ICS and its connected devices. I believe that this remains a very strong solution because it effectively separates the IAM functions between IT and OT platforms creating a form of defense-in-depth.”
IT Focused, Not OT
“The problem with most IAM solutions and associated best practices is they tend to be 100 percent IT focused. In an OT setting, this would translate into IAM that only covers the traditional Windows infrastructure like Active Directory,” Langill said. “However, we all realize the greatest risk lies at those devices that reside on (Purdue) Level 1 networks with little support for common IAM solutions. It may be possible to add a password to a controller and its associated configuration and logic, but in many cases, this is a single authenticator for all users accessing the device. There is no real identity management in this case, and little ability for forensic data following a breach. I do want to be careful here and give some credit to advances in ICS technologies. RADIUS and LDAP have been around for quite some time and provide a solid foundation. However, they make up only a portion of a complete IAM solution.”
To that end, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the National Security Agency (NSA), as part of the Enduring Security Framework (ESF), released Identity and Access Management Recommended Best Practices Guide for Administrators.
These recommended best practices provide system administrators with actionable recommendations to better secure their systems from threats to Identity and Access Management (IAM).
IAM – a framework of business processes, policies, and technologies that facilitate the management of digital identities – ensures users only gain access to data when they have the appropriate credentials.
The federal guidance provides recommended best practices and mitigations to counter threats to IAM related to: Identity governance; environmental hardening; identity federation/single sign-on; multi-factor authentication, and IAM auditing and monitoring.
Long Standing Issue
“Identity and access management has been a long-standing issue in the OT cybersecurity space, and there has indeed been significant progress over the years,” said Dewan Chowdhury chief executive at security provider, malcrawler. “As OT operators become more security-aware and adopt best practices, the overall IAM landscape has improved. There is an increasing trend of organizations implementing role-based access control (RBAC) and the principle of least privilege, which limits access to only what is necessary for each worker.”
“The sense I have is more IAM is deployed on industrial sites than historically, but more in very large sites than smaller ones, and there are a lot more smaller ones than larger ones,” said Andrew Ginter, vice president industrial security at Waterfall Security Solutions. “IAM protects against the least sophisticated threat actors – like IT and ICS insiders. These people are not security gurus with tools that can scan for vulnerabilities and exploit them at will – these are people with passwords and permissions and occasional malicious intent. IAM also reduces to some degree errors and omissions – honest mistakes – because with IAM more people have permission to do less that is dangerous.”
“In most industrial and operational environments, there are often little to no access controls deployed,” said Rees Machtemes, director of industrial security at Waterfall Security Solutions. “When and if they are deployed, they are often simple and shared amongst operators and technicians.
“Most of the time, you can walk up to any controller or panel and change settings. So physical security becomes essential as a form of access. IAM also provides the mechanism that actions, decisions and changes made by employees can be tracked and audited in event management systems and operational logs. This would mostly be through computers with HMIs, operations centers, or remote access into control systems where IAM is part of the VPN/login.
“In my experience working in operations and working with many people that do, there is a culture of bypassing, openly sharing credentials, ignoring, and purposeful weakly implementing IAM systems and methods. This is because operations are tasked with getting it done, amongst shift workers, under stressful working conditions, schedules, and deadlines. This was at big and small companies. The last time I worked at a place that did this was four years ago,” Machtemes said. “I doubt it’s changed.”
Right Direction
While IAM was fairly poor in the past, with the advances in increased connectivity across the manufacturing enterprise, things are moving in the right direction.
“I would say things have improved,” said Pete Lund, vice president of products – OT Security at OPSWAT. “The main driver of the improvement was the shift to remote work during COVID and nearly all companies have some strategy to implement some form of zero trust. Unfortunately, this is still a challenge in legacy OT environments due to things like common credentials, weak passwords and legacy equipment that cannot support multi-factor authentication. Overall, I believe the shift (made during COVID) has actually made customers and the industry more secure. It has forced people to think about secure and scalable ways to do remote access.”
“The sudden shift to remote work due to the pandemic presented new challenges for administrators,” Chowdhury said. “The need to facilitate work-from-home arrangements meant granting more access to remote workers, which expanded the attack surface and introduced new risks. Administrators have had to balance the need for productivity and accessibility with security. Many organizations have adopted multi-factor authentication, VPNs, and Zero Trust models to minimize these risks, but it’s an ongoing process.
“We saw a tremendous amount of effort to enhancing IAM, especially during the COVID period as we saw organizations utilize support contracts to support and troubleshoot their OT devices remotely. Initially, this was more of a temporary measure, but as OT operators saw the benefit of having remote support (faster and cheaper), they have started architecting their environment to support enhanced IAM,” Chowdhury said.
“The remote worker problem brings with it a different set of problems … most have translated into increased risk to connected systems,” Langill said. “When a worker interacts with a system within the confines of a business facility, there are a great deal of security controls that exist to fortify the perimeter from external threats, along with additional controls to address IAM and further restrict access within the architecture. When the worker moves to a remote ‘home’ location, there are few if any real security controls in place to protect that home perimeter and any devices that are connected to the private network(s). Of course, most organizations utilize an IAM solution for their remote workforce. However, how many people separate home networks based on asset criticality and value? This results in a potential entry vector that could allow further penetration into sensitive corporate networks. All it takes to understand the possibility here is to look at the details of the SQL Slammer worm at the idled Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station in Ohio. Our good friend Stuxnet also demonstrated how easy it was to laterally move across networks … even those that have been secured against best practices at that time.
Government Interaction
While the government’s help in pointing out best practices is appreciated, the industry experts don’t want the feds to muddy the cybersecurity waters.
“Identity and access management is improving and trends like zero trust are here to stay,” Lund said. “The main challenge is still getting legacy critical infrastructure to adapt and adopt modern security into aging environments.
“As for my advice to the government, I suggest they avoid creating new standards and instead focus on incentivizing or enforcing the adoption of existing best practices such as NIST CSF,” Lund said. “The abundance of special bulletins, directives, and guidelines only serve to confuse already overwhelmed teams. The government should instead use a carrot and stick approach, using incentives to drive adoption of best practices and applying fines or audits as a deterrent for non-compliance.”
“IAM is ‘an’ answer, but not ‘the’ answer for ICS/OT,” Langill said. “I just saw that CISA/NSA are chasing the ‘threat of the day’ and not really describing a solution. Again, my work on government systems in defense and intelligence shows that they should take a look at their own infrastructure before they attempt to make recommendations to others.”
As OT and IT come more united, IAM needs to become as strong as possible.
“The growing interconnectedness of IT and OT systems also presents unique challenges,” Chowdhury said. “As these systems converge, it becomes even more crucial to implement robust IAM strategies in the OT environment. While the IAM landscape has seen improvements, much work still needs to be done. The rapid shift to remote work and the increasing convergence of IT and OT systems requires continued attention and investment in IAM best practices.
“IAM remains a critical concern in the industry. While there has been progress, it’s essential to recognize that cybersecurity is a continuous, evolving journey for any industry,” Chowdhury said. “Threat actors adapt and employ new techniques, making it crucial for organizations to stay vigilant and proactive in their IAM efforts.”

