The initial access vector for this case was an IcedID payload delivered via email, said researchers at DFIR Report.
“We have observed IcedID malware being utilized as the initial access by various ransomware groups,” researchers said in a post. “Once the initial IcedID payload was executed, approximately two hours after initial infection, the threat actors appeared to begin hands-on-keyboard activity. Cobalt Strike and RDP were used to move across the network before using WMI and PsExec to deploy the Quantum ransomware. This case exemplified an extremely short Time-to-Ransom (TTR) of 3 hours and 44 minutes.”
In a quick look at the case, the threat actor was able to enter the network when a user endpoint was compromised by an IcedID payload contained within an ISO image. Researchers have high confidence this payload was delivered via email, however they were not able to identify the delivery email.
Malware Executes
The ISO contained a DLL file (IcedID malware) and a LNK shortcut to execute it. The end user after clicking into the ISO file, could see just a single file named “document,” which is a LNK shortcut to a hidden DLL packaged in the ISO. When the user clicks on the LNK file, the IcedID DLL ends up executed, according to the post.
“Upon execution of the IcedID DLL, a battery of discovery tasks were executed using built-in Windows utilities like ipconfig, systeminfo, nltest, net, and chcp. The IcedID malware also created a scheduled task as a means of persistence on the beachhead host.
“Around two hours later, Cobalt Strike was deployed using process hollowing and injection techniques. This marked the start of ‘hands-on-keyboard’ activity by the threat actors. This activity included using AdFind through a batch script called adfind.batto perform discovery of the target organizations active directory structure. The threat actors gathered host based network information by running a batch script named ns.bat, which ran nslookup for each host in the environment.
“The Cobalt Strike process then proceeded to access LSASS memory to extract credentials, which a few minutes later were tested to run remote WMI discovery tasks on a server. After confirming their credentials worked with the WMI actions, the threat actor proceeded to RDP into that server, and attempted to drop and execute a Cobalt Strike DLL beacon on that server. This appeared to fail so the threat actor then opened cmd and proceeded to execute a PowerShell Cobalt Strike Beacon. This Beacon was successful in connecting to the same command and control server observed on the beachhead host.
“For the next hour, the threat actor proceeded to make RDP connections to other servers in the environment. Once the threat actor had a handle on the layout of the domain, they prepared to deploy the ransomware by copying the ransomware (named ttsel.exe) to each host through the C$ share folder. They used two methods of remote execution to detonate the ransomware binary, WMI and PsExec. This ransomware deployment concluded less than four hours from the initial IcedID execution.
Note Says Data Stolen
“While the ransom note indicated the threat actor stole data, we did not observe any overt exfiltration of data; however, it is possible that the threat actors used IcedID or Cobalt Strike to transmit sensitive data.”
“While the term Quantum ransomware is really a rebranding of MountLocker, the speed and the use of network as the attack vector is of special concern,” said Rajiv Pimplasker, chief executive of Dispersive Holdings, Inc. “Network security has become especially vulnerable for most businesses as infrastructure investment has lagged due to COVID-19 and work from home policies. Governments and enterprises should look to urgently bolster security across third party infrastructure, remote access and sensitive partner connections using advanced techniques from the military space like managed attribution and payload dispersal. These make network resources hard to detect and virtually impossible to capture, protecting against even sophisticated bad actors.
“The use of the word Quantum and unprecedented swiftness of the TTR (Time To Ransom) also foreshadows the potentially imminent threat of quantum computing. As per research from the Quantum alliance initiative at the Hudson Institute, in the wrong hands, quantum algorithms could decimate traditional encryption protection across a myriad of industries including financial services and critical infrastructure costing the U.S. economy Trillions in just a single attack. The IP networking world can and should borrow proven principles from the military and RF space such as spread spectrum and frequency hopping to alleviate such concerns and make the environment quantum resistant at multiple levels,” Pimplasker said.
“The most recent Quantum Ransomware attack outlines the absolute imperative for turning on Multi Factor Authentication (MFA) for all systems, internal or external, which allows remote connections such as RDP, SSH, and others,” said Ron Bradley, vice president at Shared Assessments. Additionally, organizations should deploy Privileged Access Management (PAM) solutions whereby the administrators don’t even know the RDP or SSH passwords, rather they must go through the PAM solution to gain access. This allows for greater control including robust alerts, logging, and monitoring.”
Click here for more on the DFIR Report post.

