The crew began fighting the 3:52 a.m. fire on December 1, 2024 and contacted the local fire department, who rushed to the scene and extinguished the fire. While there were no injuries in the blaze, the crane cabin on the Deep Energy sustained significant damage estimated at $1.8 million.
The timeline to the fire started November 30 after workers erected scaffolding around the forward section of the knuckle boom crane tower to enable scheduled examination and maintenance of the crane boom, according to the NTSB report.
On December 1 at 3:52 a.m., the fire alarm panel on the bridge sounded, indicating a smoke detector within the knuckle boom crane cabin activated. The senior chief mate, who was on duty, contacted the rigging superintendent (also on duty) and directed him to investigate.
Climb to Fire
The rigging superintendent proceeded to the crane cabin, which required him to climb about 84 feet up the crane tower. At 4:01 a.m., the rigging superintendent accessed the crane cabin platform and confirmed there was a fire within the crane cabin, on the starboard side by the entrance. He informed the senior chief mate of the fire and then retrieved the carbon dioxide fire extinguisher from inside the crane cabin. He emptied the extinguisher on the fire but was unable to extinguish it. The senior chief mate directed him to get down from the crane platform.
Following confirmation of the fire, the senior chief mate notified the master and sounded the general alarm. The master then proceeded to the bridge to muster the vessel’s two fire teams according to the vessel’s fire response plan.
As the fire teams were mustering, the main fire pump started, and the master directed the senior chief mate to inform the U.S. Coast Guard. The crew in the engine control room notified the master on the bridge they secured all electrical power to the crane and associated equipment.
Crane cabin shown on fire after the fire broke the glass and before the arrival of the Mobile Fire Department.
Source: Via Coast Guard
At 4:08 a.m., after seeing the fire within the crane cabin break the glass of the structure and grow in intensity, the master directed the senior chief mate to again contact the Coast Guard and inform them the vessel required assistance from the local fire department.
The master directed Fire Team 1 to use the vessel’s fire hoses to apply water on the crane cabin from the main deck. The water was unable to reach the crane cabin from that position, and they moved to reposition themselves.
Repositioned Hoses
Meanwhile, Fire Team 2 deployed additional fire hoses. At 4:16 a.m., Fire Team 1 reported to the master they had repositioned themselves on the lay tower and were able to apply water onto the fire. In addition, two members of Fire Team 1 began to proceed up the crane tower to stage on the crane platform and attack the fire with additional carbon dioxide extinguishers.
At 4:20 a.m., two fire trucks from the Mobile Fire Department, including a ladder truck, arrived at the dock. The fire department chief and the vessel’s chief engineer met on the dock. They developed a plan to remove all personnel from the crane tower and the main deck so the fire monitor on the ladder truck could direct a high volume of water onto the crane cabin.
Before firefighters applied water from the ladder truck, Fire Team 2 confirmed all electrical power to the area was off and all personnel had departed from the aft section of the vessel. At 4:37 a.m., the ladder truck started to direct water onto the crane cabin and continued to apply water until the flames were no longer visible.
To confirm the fire was out, two members from each of the vessel’s fire teams and two Mobile Fire Department firefighters proceeded up the crane tower. The fire department used thermal vision googles to ensure there were no hot spots that could reignite.
At 5 a.m., the fire was out.
Probable Cause
A post casualty investigation by the NTSB identified a fire pattern on the bulkhead on the starboard side of the crane cabin behind a compact refrigerator, indicating this location was the likely origin of the fire.
A failure of the refrigerator’s hermetically sealed compressor or an electrical fault could be the cause of the fire. Additionally, there were two 110-volt electrical receptacles in the crane cabin, including the receptacle the refrigerator plugged into. A 15-amp breaker protected the receptacle.
If there had been an electrical fault – such as a loose, broken, or frayed wire, or broken receptacle hardware – within the receptacle, it could have created excessive resistance heating, which could have led to the ignition of nearby combustibles.
However, because workers opened the vessel’s breakers as part of the response to the fire, it is unknown whether this breaker tripped. Due to the extent of the fire damage to the refrigerator and elsewhere within the crane cabin, the exact ignition source and cause of the fire could not end up determined.
Click here for more on the NTSB report.