By Gregory Hale
SolarWinds, the software monitoring provider that suffered a huge supply chain attack in 2019 for which the company learned about later on the next year, agreed to pay $26 million to settle a class action lawsuit from shareholders, the company said in a SEC filing.

Back in 2019, hackers suspected to be Russian, compromised the automated build environment for the SolarWinds’ Orion monitoring software, and in the spring of 2020 the company pushed out malicious Orion updates to 18,000 SolarWinds customers.

While the company did a fine job of dealing with and fixing the aftermath of the attack, shareholders said were not happy and decided to file a class action suit in January 2021 saying the impact of the breach and the disclosure had a serious effect on the share price.

In the SEC filing the company said:

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Agreement Details
“On October 28, 2022, SolarWinds entered into a binding settlement term sheet with respect to the previously disclosed consolidated putative class action lawsuit. The settlement is subject to certain conditions, including the filing of a Stipulation of Settlement, notice to potential class members and final court approval. The settlement, if approved, would require the Company to pay $26 million to fund claims submitted by class members, the legal fees of plaintiffs’ counsel and the costs of administering the settlement. The proposed settlement resolves all claims asserted against the Company and the other named defendants in connection with the class action litigation and would contain provisions that the settlement does not constitute an admission, concession, or finding of any fault, liability, or wrongdoing of any kind by the Company or any defendant. There can be no assurance that the final settlement agreement will be executed or that such agreement will be approved by the court.

“The settlement sum was authorized and approved by the Company’s insurers, and if the settlement agreement is approved by the court, the Company expects that the settlement payment will be funded entirely by applicable directors’ and officers’ liability insurance.”

The filing went on to say the SEC is investigating the incident.

“Also on October 28, 2022, the enforcement staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) provided the Company with a “Wells Notice” relating to its investigation into the previously disclosed cyberattack on the Company’s Orion Software Platform and internal systems. The Wells Notice states that the SEC staff has made a preliminary determination to recommend that the SEC file an enforcement action against the Company alleging violations of certain provisions of the U.S. federal securities laws with respect to its cybersecurity disclosures and public statements, as well as its internal controls and disclosure controls and procedures. A Wells Notice is neither a formal charge of wrongdoing nor a final determination that the recipient has violated any law. The Company maintains that its disclosures, public statements, controls and procedures were appropriate and will submit a response to the SEC staff’s position. If the SEC were to authorize an action against the Company, it could seek an order enjoining the Company from engaging in future violations of provisions of the federal securities laws subject to the action, imposing civil monetary penalties and providing for other equitable relief within the SEC’s authority. The results of the Wells Notice process and any corresponding enforcement action and the costs, timing and other potential consequences of responding and complying therewith are unknown at this time,” the filing said.

Attack Timeline
This past April, Tim Brown, CISO at SolarWinds gave a talk on the attack at the S4X22 cybersecurity conference.

“The threat actor made it into our environment starting in September 2019. They came and did a test run in November. That test run did nothing. They came back March with 2,500 lines of code. They code stayed the same from March to June.”

In the first days after the incident, Brown said they learned as much as they could as fast as they could and were ready to communicate.

“Since we were a public company, we had to produce a 10-K which would give as much information as we knew at the time,” he said. “Sunday we were all in the office, by 2:30 a.m. Monday morning we were able to issue our 10-K. What did we know at that point in time? We knew the threat actor mission-centric and very focused on what they were doing. We had information on the threat actor from FireEye and Mandiant at the time. We knew the code was pretty novel, we knew the code was well written, we knew the code size. We knew the insertion point.” They also knew the attackers conducted a well-crafted, sophisticated campaign. They also attacked the build environment to then attacked specific, targeted customers.

There were other details they were able to place in the document. There were still plenty of unknowns, but at least they were ready to be as transparent as possible to keep the masses informed.

Law Enforcement Notified
Brown also said the day after the attack they were in contact with the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). They also retained several third parties to help with the investigation. One thing they were able to quickly understand, he said, was this highly sophisticated attack was not in the source code but somewhere in the supply chain.

Through a quick investigation, the company understood three builds of the software produced between March 2020 and June 2020 suffered from the attack.

They also had a good idea on the number of potentially affected customers, but as it turned out, it would be months before the final number was understood, Brown said.

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