By Gregory Hale
With all the talk about protecting critical infrastructure from cyber intruders and all types of digital attacks, nothing can protect against a brute force attack like a heavily armed attacker with a rifle, which is why organizations need to ensure physical security is a part of an entire security profile.

That is exactly what happened when a gunman or gunmen struck two Duke Energy power substations in North Carolina’s Moore County Saturday causing damage that has taken days to repair and leaving tens of thousands of people without electricity, authorities said.

Since the Saturday attack, police discovered nearly two dozen shell casings from a high-powered rifle. As a result of the incident officials declared a state of emergency that included a curfew and county schools ended up closed for most of the week. Right now, officials said most power will return to about the 30,000 remaining county residents by Wednesday night.

“The foundation for any security program is the existence of rigorous, validated and verified physical security controls,” said Joel Langill, founder and managing member of the Industrial Control System Cyber Security Institute LLC. “Without physical security, cybersecurity is moot.”

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Remembering Metcalf
There was a similar substation shoot out back on April 16, 2013, when an attack was carried out on Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s Metcalf transmission substation in Coyote, California, near the border of San Jose. The attack, in which gunmen fired on 17 electrical transformers, resulted in more than $15 million worth of equipment damage, but it had little impact on the station’s electrical power supply.

Seventeen transformers were seriously damaged, requiring over $15 million worth of repairs. To avert a black-out, energy grid officials were forced to reroute power from nearby Silicon Valley-based power plants.

The incident at PG&E Metcalf Transmission Substation brought fear and attention to the vulnerabilities of physical attacks against the electric grid. After that incident, new rules were placed to ensure the better physical security of substations.

“Utilities started to cut vegetation around substations to allow better visibility around their perimeters and to prevent a hiding area for potential attackers,” said Dewan Chowdhury, chief executive and founder of security provider, malcrawler. “Higher bandwidth was added to substations to accommodate more resource-intensive security cameras that provide better visibility into the perimeter of the substations.

“During that incident, many argued that the amount of capital spent on protecting the grid from cyberattacks was taken away from the funds needed to protect the grid from physical attacks. I recall the Department of Energy and FERC telling utilities that the 2013 incident should not be justified to divest cybersecurity investment.”

There have been other physical security incidents that caused damage to industrial facilities.

Workers continue piecing together a substation in Moore County, NC, after a gunman or gunmen shot out two Duke Energy substations.
Source: CNN screencapture


Another Physical Incident
“This particular incident reminds me of an event that happened when I worked at an oil refinery in Deer Park, Texas,” Langill said. “The adjacent facility had a rail car start to polymerize. Acting swiftly, the plant personnel isolated the car that was going to explode by placing it in an isolated area and creating physical barriers to protect nearby ground assets. No one thought to look up and notice that they placed the car under the high-voltage power lines that supply power to the dozens of facilities along the Houston Ship Channel. The explosion caused a shock wave to propagate bidirectionally up and down the Ship Channel resulting in our plant and many others to detach from the grid due to severe electrical disturbances. Was there anything we could have done differently at the refinery? No. Could a similar attack be performed again today? Yes.

In the end, protection needs to occur from a cyber standpoint, but also from a physical perspective because that is where we have seen true damage.

After the Metcalf attack in 2013, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) issued a report entitled, “NERC Standards for Bulk Power Physical Security: Is the Grid More Secure?” The report talked about how utilities across the country had to reevaluate and restructure their physical security programs.

In the report, researchers said there are two fundamental approaches to reducing the risk of a successful physical attack on the electric grid. The first approach is to prevent attacks by monitoring critical facilities to identify would-be attackers before they attempt an attack, preventing attacker access to critical assets, and otherwise hardening facilities to make them more physically secure to protect against attack and equipment failure. The second approach is to make the broader power system more “resilient” to a successful attack on particular assets through an enhanced ability to manage loads, reroute power flows, and access other sources of generation to reduce the potential of blackouts even if critical assets are disabled. Initiatives such as the spare transformer program administered by the Edison Electric Institute (EEI, the electric utility trade association), and a proposed federal Strategic Transformer Reserve, which can accelerate replacement of critical transformers if they are damaged, may contribute to the power grid’s ability to sustain a terrorist attack without widespread grid failure. Thus, while hardening is aimed more at reducing the likelihood of a successful attack, resilience aims at reducing potential consequence; doing either reduces overall security risk.

Hardening and Resiliency Not Exclusive
Measures to harden critical facilities and measures to increase system resilience are not exclusive of one another, the report said. In fact, they can be complementary in reducing overall security risk. However, they may involve different approaches to power grid operation and design, and they may involve different, competing types of investment such as transformer shielding versus transmission network sensors.

In the end, complete protection against a physical attack on a substation such as the North Carolina incident, does not seem like it would be feasible.

“Here’s a dirty little secret that most cybersecurity companies don’t want to admit to their utility customers. It is much easier and more effective to physically attack an electrical substation than perform a cyberattack against it,” Chowdhury said. “We have seen multiple physical attacks against the electrical substation, leading to reliability issues. A shotgun is much more effective and easier to attack a transformer than a keyboard.

“The Hollywood-style scenario has made the cybersecurity industry like ambulance chasing lawyers toward utilities. They have been spending millions to whisper in the ears of board members and C-level executives to drive the fear of cyberattacks against the utility space constantly. When we look at the metrics for the past decade of incidents that have caused reliability issues on the grid, we cannot pinpoint a single cyberattack. Squirrels and snakes have done more damage to American power companies than a hacker,” Chowdhury said.

Yes, the cyber side of security is vital and important and relatively new endeavor in the grand scheme of security, but manufacturers and critical infrastructure organizations need to understand and learn to protect against age-old armed physical attacks, especially in this age of violent confrontations.

Physical Risk Greater Than Cyber
“I firmly believe that the risk associated with a well-coordinated physical attack, where a group of 50-100 people target critical substations, is greater than the risk from a cyberattack,” said Mark Carrigan, senior vice president of process safety & OT cybersecurity at Hexagon. “One person with a rifle could drive to several transformers that are located close to each other and take them out. The transformers located in substations have a long lead time from order to delivery (6-9 months, even up to 18+ months). Knocking out 50 critical transformers at the same time could lead to long term power interruptions for a lot of people.”

“The recent incident in North Carolina continues to demonstrate that physical attacks against power grid components are a real threat and have caused disruption,” Chowdhury said. “Realistically, there are too many physical assets on the field to protect. At a minimum, the company should focus on protecting the key components that protect the grid’s reliability, e.g., focusing on transmission substations and major distribution substations.”

“Unfortunately, I do not believe that we can prevent all attacks whether physical or cyber, and that policies and procedures must be in place alongside a rigorous security program to continually evaluate the risk in terms of the likelihood and impact of similar attacks,” Langill said. “In this case, advanced surveillance systems could be deployed to detect and alarm when unauthorized entities approach critical assets. Again, this may not be practical for all assets, but an existing risk assessment should have a prioritized list of high valued assets that require enhanced security measures. Situations like this are possible because of the failure to prioritize assets. Organizations want to treat everything as ‘high’ or ‘critical’ when in fact, if everything is the same criticality then they are all just average.”

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