By Gregory Hale
A process control network operates every day, and while the system may just keep chugging along, a little-known fact is there are exploitable vulnerabilities hidden – and built in to – all operational technology (OT) operations.
While that may sound a bit like it is fear mongering, it is just a form of situational awareness where if a security professional knows his or her system well enough and employs the right technologies and mitigation strategies, it could alleviate these types of attacks intentional or accidental.
“Things are down there that control engineers are aware of, but can cause significant problems,” said Mark Carrigan, chief operating officer at PAS Global said during at talk at the S4x20 conference in Miami last month and then during a follow up discussion Wednesday. “The bad guys are learning about OT. They are learning about weaknesses they can exploit. They are understanding the process underneath. If they know the DCS, and if you line up those areas of expertise, really bad things can happen. They can change the configuration of OT.”
Carrigan pointed to research conducted at PAS on over 10,000 industrial endpoints under the management of their software. In that sampling, they found over 380,000 vulnerabilities on those devices. The devices were in industries ranging from oil and gas; refining and chemicals; power generation; pulp and paper, and metals, mining and minerals.
From those industries, and of the those vulnerabilities, 99 percent were Microsoft issues or vulnerabilities.
“Those are more weaknesses in the systems and not vulnerabilities,” Carrigan said. “There aer vulnerabilities out there caused by the automation suppliers themselves. If you operate in the industries I mentioned, those vulnerabilities will exist.”
Two Types of Issues
There are two types of issues out in the industry, ubiquitous weaknesses and unique weaknesses.
“Ubiquitous weaknesses are everywhere; they are easy to change , but they could cause real problems,” Carrigan said. “The other is unique weaknesses, which are specific to OT makes and models of equipment.”
One ubiquitous issue is something Carrigan called “code invaders.”
“The vast majority of HMIs out there in the DCS world uses HTML language. HTML is something a potential attacker can understand pretty quickly,” he said. “When you build a graphic you use HTML code. The bottom line is if you understand HTML you can do all kinds of programming. That can allow you to program anything you want in unformatted code that you can pull up a graphic file and jump a few lines of code and you have it placed on a HMI station that already has elevated privileges.”
While that is a built-in issue there is a strategy to solve the potential problem.
“You have to manage the configuration of graphics to ensure the only changes taking place are the ones you want,” Carrigan said. “Most companies don’t consider that a weakness so they are not managing it and locking down the configuration of their graphics.”
Unique to OT
Another issue that is unique to the OT environment is an something Carrigan called “come on baby, light my fire.”
“This is very specific to a particular DCS control system,” Carrigan said. “It is a unique thing, where a design was put in a long time ago to deal with the fact that at the time, computing power was very limited. They wanted to make sure they did not overwhelm the CPU. They did two things, number one is they wanted to spread the load of the CPU and to also make sure the flow indicator data and the solver are all using data that are synced. The sample rate is saying I want to get data at the same rate so when I solve it I have fresh data. The calculation period is how often do I want to solve the problem and tell the controller to move.
“If I have the flow indicator tag and the flow controller tag and I change sample rates where I have the flow controller sampling every half-second and the flow indicator getting data every three seconds, the flow controller is solving faster than the data it gets, so it is going to create control problems. This can create control problems. It can affect production.”
Know the System
The point Carrigan made during his presentation is these are issues “in the system that are there. They are not going to go away. These are essentially characteristics of the system.”
So, there are problems a well-versed attacker could leverage and take advantage of to potentially harm the operations. There is a solution, however.
“The only way you can mitigate it is to manage the configuration,” Carrigan said. “Configuration management has to be a part of the cybersecurity strategy. If you can do that, you may also improve safety and reliability if you better managing configurations.”

