By Gregory Hale
Russia is at war with Ukraine and that has immediate and vital concerns for the citizens of those two nations, and while the physical aspect of war is truly in effect on the battleground, the cyber component has, and will, come into play.
With that in mind, if companies and security professionals have not already snapped to attention and made sure they took all necessary precautions to avoid being a victim in this needless and senseless war, then they had better start getting activated because global critical infrastructure cyber disruption could be an end goal in the battle.
“Many industries are currently worried about the impact of asymmetric warfare, e.g., cyber warfare bleeding into their world from the Russian invasion of Ukraine,” said Dewan Chowdhury, chief executive and founder of security provider malcrawler. “The alarm bells have been ringing for a while now about potential cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure, but these types of attacks are not new. We have seen the industry being targeted by criminal syndicates and nation-states using tactics like ransomware, DDOS, and the exfiltration of sensitive data. The rule is always to be vigilant. Never let your guard down. Any geopolitical move can now result in asymmetric warfare, including cyber-attacks that can bleed into private industry.”
Targeting Critical Services
“The Russian cyberattacks are targeting critical ‘services’ through a range of vectors,” said Joel Langill, founder and managing member of the Industrial Control System Cyber Security Institute LLC. “What is most interesting is that they are not dropping a lot of Zero Days, but using tried and true exploit methods and tactics revealing those targets being compromised have a relatively low security posture deployed within their current infrastructure.
“This is not that different from what I have seen in doing security assessments against government and public-sector systems responsible for providing critical ‘services.’ CISA is not really helping matters by pushing outdated recommendations that really are not addressing the root cause. Attacks are working by using less sophisticated methods because of a basic failure to deploy ‘least privilege’ architectures.”
One of the fears coming out of this conflict is the potential for an increase in ransomware attacks.
“Russia has multiple options at its disposal to initiate cyber warfare against the U.S. and its western allies,” said Eric Byres, chief technology officer at software bill of materials provider, aDolus. “Any attack could seriously impact our critical infrastructures.
“The simplest action at (Russian President Vladimir) Putin’s disposal is to take the muzzle off the ransomware actors operating out of Russia. The last few months have been suspiciously quiet in terms of ransomware activity, and I suspect that was deliberate. Moscow could now subtly message the ransomware community that it is open season and then sit back to watch the chaos. This strategy also has the advantage of deniability: It is hard to prove a ransomware attack has been sanctioned by the Russian government.
Active Attack Approach
“Moscow could also take a more active approach in cyberattacks like we’ve seen in Georgia, Ukraine, and the world in general. Both Russia and its ransomware-proxies have become proficient in both software supply chain attacks and OT-focused attacks. These are likely to be the next wave of a coordinated Russian cyber/military offensive.
“Any country or company with commercial or political connections to Ukraine needs to be prepared for Russian cyber aggression using the software supply chain,” Byres said.
In terms of protections, end users need to do what they can to stay aware.
“Both Russia and the United States are cyber superpowers,” said Andrew Ginter, vice president industrial security at Waterfall Security Solutions. “Each has the ability to bring about disastrous consequences. How far will they go when each knows the other can retaliate in kind? I don’t know.
“What I do know is that the preferred attack method is targeted, remote control attacks. And these groups each have the ability to pivot attacks through firewalls.
“Another big question – will someone try to pull a Stuxnet or a NotPetya? Both were powerful attacks that once they were set free, propagated automatically and indiscriminately,” Ginter said. “A lot of big businesses all over the world have connections into Ukrainian and Russian businesses.”
“The war is a proxy war right now,” Chowdhury said. “America and Russia do not want the risk of direct interaction for any potential conflict. I don’t foresee the Russians performing any sabotage attacks on U.S. systems knowing the full consequence of Washington. If the war becomes a direct confrontation between the U.S. and Russia, the risk level increases with direct cyberattacks on industry.
Doing Business in Ukraine
“The highest risk based on the current political situation is any company that does business in Ukraine and has computer assets physically in Ukraine. This group should be on the highest alert. Companies that have physical assets in Ukraine must consider what would happen if the Russians were to have access to their computers physically. It would be an important time to consider sanitizing data, decommissioning equipment, relocating computing services to protect your data.
“There have been reports of wiper malware targeting Ukrainian businesses and government agencies. This type of devastating attack brings complete havoc to an organization. We witnessed this in many Middle East oil and gas companies infected with malware that wiped out data from computers to servers. North Koreans did the same to Sony a few years ago. One type of attack that a company should fear is wiper-type malware that deletes all data from the computer and network share.
“For any organization that currently has no plan to deal with potential cyber attacks, I would highly recommend the first thing to do is back up your data,” Chowdhury said. “And for an organization to perform a tabletop exercise of a cyberattack based on wiper malware or ransomware. This will allow your organization to quickly determine areas that need to be addressed and work on those issues immediately.”
In talking about accepting the least privilege security model, Langill said one problem is with the way most interpret least privilege at the user level.
“Consider a user that is authorized to perform administrative actions. This person is a likely target, because of the systemic failure to secure the architecture from anyone, anything, anytime that does not have reason for access. This means deploying least privilege against all 7 layers of the OSI Model. (In the OSI model, the communications between a computing system are split into seven different abstraction layers: Physical, data link, network, transport, session, presentation, and application.) I have not yet found a single architecture that deploys intra-network access control – or microsegmentation.
“Even though two client workstations do not have any reason to communicate, they are left open on the network to communicate, with the only security control being deployed (when it is in fact deployed) on the workstation at the application layer.
Evolving Strategies
“For some unknown reason, the U.S. and in particular NIST and DHS/CISA have failed to acknowledge some of the vital concepts introduced in the Australian Cyber Security Centre’s security control recommendations. Originally released at the 35 Strategies to Mitigate Targeted Attacks (those attacks that are the MOST difficult to prevent), it has continued to evolve and is still the world’s premier guidance. But since we were talking about least privilege, the Aussies are the only group to first embrace whitelisting Internet traffic (a least privilege implementation) and also whitelisting all host-based outbound network traffic (another core least privilege implementation and example of microsegmentation). This means that if a host is compromised, it has limited ability to act as a pivot point and allow unrestricted lateral movement of the adversary on the network.
“Many believe you need vulnerabilities measured by a CVE to exploit a host. But what we are doing today is exploiting the ‘capability’ of a system or asset. In other words, how the system is architected and configured in the absence of specific software vulnerabilities. (Think about a firewall that is breached … not because of a vulnerability in the firmware, but in the misconfiguration of the rules deployed within the firewall. A human vulnerability.).
“Thinking along these lines, one needs to deploy ‘essential defense-in-depth’ that means in the event of the failure of a primary security control, there are one or more secondary controls that can prevent the breach,” Langill said. “A sort of ‘cyber fault tolerance,’ just like the way we implement safety systems in industry.
Companies right now are at a crossroads of trying to figure out what they can do to ward off an attack and stay operating.
Focus on Systems
“At the moment most of our clients are focusing on what they can actually impact which is their own systems and technologies,” said Rick Kaun, vice president solutions at Verve Industrial Protection.
“We are seeing a significant increase though in interest for two areas largely ignored to date:
“Host based detections and monitoring – as you know passive packet capture has been all the rage for a few years now but it really only shows transactions or communications. It can infer/detect actions being directed at an endpoint but if malware or virus is sent all the activities local on that device are contained within that device. So, turning logging and/or building host-based detections and algorithms is gaining traction.
“Remediation – So many people grab passive (because it is easy) and think they have insight into inventory, vulnerabilities, patches, etc. If you use passive for what it was engineered to do, you will get alerts. An alert means something is already happening. So now what? Remediations, backup/restoration, incident response – all come into play. How secure/robust are they?” Kaun said.
In terms of the types of attacks to prepare for Byres and Langill agree supply chain assaults could be an issue.
Supply Chain Protections
“The West has to double down on protecting its software supply chain because that is now Russia’s favorite cyber-attack playbook,” Byres said. “Protection begins with corporate executives and government agencies getting clear visibility starting from the direct suppliers at the top of the chain to all the 3rd, 4th, and 5th-party suppliers buried deep in our nation’s critical software.
“The only defense against supply chain attacks is for companies to have a global view of their software supply chain. In other words, they must be able to see – in real-time – not only who they buy software from but also what 3rd and 4th-party developers have software embedded inside the products they use,” Byres said. “And they need to be able to locate high-risk software components in minutes. The Software Bills of Materials (SBoMs) being mandated by the U.S. Government were the first step. Now companies need platforms that convert the mountains of data inside SBoMs into actionable business intelligence. These capabilities will make the difference between an extended critical system outage (like we saw at Colonial Pipeline) and a rapid and successful defense.”
“Supply Chain will always be the target because so many have done very little to truly map out their true supply chain dependencies.,” Langill said. “For example, last week there was talk about Russia taking out GPS satellites. The media focused on the loss of directional data, but many do not realize that without a functioning GPS infrastructure, cellular communications will not work. This is a far more widespread and ‘deadly’ consequence than someone having to use a paper map to get to their cottage in the woods.”

