By Gregory Hale
Safety professionals for years worked in their own cocoon knowing with air gapped systems, there was no way in the world anyone could break in and compromise their safety system. No way.
With the growth of the Internet and organizations becoming increasingly more digital and connected, the safety of the cocoon dissipated and now safety systems face cybersecurity issues just like any other system in the manufacturing enterprise.
“We need to understand without security, there is no guarantee of safety,” said Patrick O’Brien, safety and cybersecurity engineer at exida LLC during a session at the virtual Spring 21 + 17th GCPS joint AIChE and CCPS meeting Tuesday. “There is no way to understand and be sure that our safety systems are going to work, and act as intended.”
He pointed to the Triton attack back in August 2017 when a Saudi Arabian petrochemical facility ended up taken over by an attack group where they had control over the distributed control system and the safety system.
Triton Event
In the Triton event, a Saudi Arabian refinery suffered a shutdown of its facility and the controllers of a targeted Schneider Electric Triconex safety system failed safe.
During an initial investigation after the August incident, security professionals noticed there were some suspicious things going on and that is when they found the Triton malware. The safety instrumented system (SIS) engineering workstation was compromised and had the Triton malware deployed on it. The distributed control system (DCS) was also compromised. The attacker had the ability to manipulate the DCS while reprogramming the SIS controllers.
“Not only did (Triton) provide a roadmap for future attacks, it demonstrated how attackers were able to overcome a physical lock and key system to updating a controller,” O’Brien said. “It is really important to understand, there is really no way of totally eliminating the risk. Fortunately, the attackers only modified one of the redundant safety controllers and because of that, the system entered a failsafe state. But if the attackers updated both of the controllers at the same time it is possible that could have triggered an explosion.”
Safety systems have been immune to attacks for years just because of the nature of their systems, but that has changed.
“There are a number of things that have changed on the exposure side,” O’Brien said. “In 2019, over 60 percent of companies experienced a cybersecurity incident, which shows it is not just a concern for large companies, but there are many different companies that can experience these types of attacks.
“We also saw the number of remote desktop protocol ports that gain access to industrial control systems increase. In 2020, the number of these ports facing the Internet rose over 50 percent which really does drive an indication there are more facilities vulnerable to remote compromise than they were previously. We can also look and see around 70 percent of industrial control systems require some type of remote access, so considering common remote access vulnerabilities and weak security features such as weak passwords, we are really seeing a growing exposure,” O’Brien said.
Cyber-Safety Impact
On the impact side, it is very important to understand cyberattacks can not only have a financial effect on an organization, but can create safety hazards as well.
“From a cybersecurity side, cyber hazards could be caused by human error or attackers intentionally trying to do damage in the system,” O’Brien said. “When you look at cases when there is intentional sabotage, it is important to know attackers can bypass layers of protection leading to a significant likelihood of common cause failure. It is also important to realize databases are not as mature for cybersecurity information threats or countermeasures, so we don’t have the same amount of confidence and certainty that we do for traditional quantitative concepts for safety.”
In a typical network architecture, once an attacker gains access to the network, if it is a flat network, they can immediately compromise multiple areas such as the operator workstation to get rid of the alarm layer, the process control system to trigger the initiating event or the safety system to prevent the protection layers from working normally.
“That scenario provides challenges to traditional process safety strategy. It introduces significant risk that is not adequately evaluated in typical risk assessment techniques,” O’Brien said.
Understanding security issues effect safety as much as any other area of the manufacturing enterprise is important.
Once the user understands that, the first thing to do is to understand your cybersecurity risk.
Understand Attack Surface
“Part of that is to understand the attack surface and what are the vulnerabilities and weaknesses in your system that can be reachable and exploitable by threat agents,” O’Brien said. “There are a number of different ways these attackers can gain access whether it is through network connected devices starting in the IT system and then connecting to the industrial control system. It could be based on software hardware vulnerabilities based on applications or devices, or they can use social engineering to compromise people or access accounts to connect to the system. When looking at a cybersecurity risk assessment we need to look at all these areas. We can take the lead from traditional risk assessment activities like process hazard analysis and specialize it to look at cybersecurity.”
The first step, he said, is to identify the threats and potential threat likelihood. Instead of using traditional HazOp guidelines, operators should use guidelines to define cybersecurity.
The next step is to understand the worst case consequence from that compromise and this is the area where we can rely on what was previous identified as safety consequences and use that as a starting point.
Lastly, we can evaluate what protections are in place to know whether or not we are meeting our risk.

