The attack group, called AeroBlade, is using the tried and true method of spear-phishing as a delivery mechanism, according to a report from the BlackBerry Threat Research and Intelligence team.
A weaponized document goes out via an email attachment, containing an embedded remote template injection technique and a malicious VBA macro code, to deliver the next stage to the final payload execution.
Evidence suggests the attacker’s network infrastructure and weaponization became operational around September 2022. BlackBerry assessed with medium to high confidence the offensive phase of the attack occurred in July 2023. The attacker improved its toolset during that time, making it stealthier, while the network infrastructure remained the same, the researchers said.
Given the final payload functionality and the subject of the attack, BlackBerry assesses with medium to high confidence the goal of this attack was commercial cyber espionage.
Researchers uncovered the two campaigns or phases. The first attack occurred in September 2022, and based on the technical analysis, the researchers concluded this was a “testing” stage. The second attack occurred in July 2023.
The researchers said there are similarities between both campaigns:
- Both lure documents were named “[redacted].docx”
- The final payload is a reverse shell
- The command-and-control (C2) server IP address is the same
Researchers also said there are some interesting differences between the two campaigns:
- The final payload of the 2023 attack is stealthier and uses more obfuscation and anti-analysis techniques
- The 2023 campaign’s final payload includes an option to list directories from infected victims.
During an attack, a malicious Microsoft Word document called [redacted].docx is delivered via email spear-phishing, which, when executed manually by the user, employs a remote template injection to download a second stage file called “[redacted].dotm”. This file in turn executes “item3.xml”, which creates a reverse shell connecting to “redacted[.]redacted[.]com” over port 443.
Based on the content of the lure message, an aerospace company in the United States was the intended target for both campaigns.
The development of this threat group’s toolkit indicates the operator has been active for at least one year, the researchers said. Exactly who is behind these two campaigns remains unknown.
Given the relatively sophisticated technical capabilities this threat actor deployed and the victim’s timelines, the researchers concluded with a high degree of confidence this was a commercial cyberespionage campaign. Its purpose was most likely to gain visibility over the internal resources of its target in order to weigh its susceptibility to a future ransom demand.
“Based on the threat actor’s operations timelines – September 2022 and then July 2023 – we can surmise that this shows the group’s interest in the target remained consistent between the first and second campaign, as evidenced by the increased complexity of the second campaign compared to the first,” the researchers said in a post. “During the time that elapsed between the two campaigns we observed, the threat actor put considerable effort into developing additional resources to ensure they could secure access to the sought-after information, and that they could exfiltrate it successfully.”
Click here for more on the Blackberry report.

