Even after a fatal disaster struck the Yenkin-Majestic/OPC Polymers Columbus, Ohio resin plant in April 2021, company officials are still not applying any of the safety recommendations passed along by the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB).

In the CSB’s final report, the safety organization issued five safety recommendations issued by the CSB stemming from the agency’s investigation of the explosion and fire.

The CSB made the safety recommendations to Yenkin-Majestic/OPC Polymers in November 2023, as a part of the agency’s final report on the massive explosion and fire.

One employee, Wendell Light, died from burns and smoke inhalation due to the April 8, 2021 explosion and fire. Eight others ended up transported to area hospitals for injuries suffered during the explosion, fire, and building collapse, including third-degree burns and limb fractures, with one employee requiring a leg amputation after being crushed under collapsed debris.

CSB determined the cause of the catastrophic incident was the installation of a reactor manway cover on an operating kettle that was not properly designed, constructed, or tested and the company’s failure to adhere to basic pressure vessel integrity quality assurance practices.

Schneider Bold
Vapor Cloud Explodes

A mixture of flammable naphtha solvent vapors and resin liquid had become pressurized and released through the seal of the manway, forming a flammable vapor cloud that found an ignition source, resulting in the explosion and fire.

Additionally, the company did not have an adequate emergency preparedness plan, and its emergency training was deficient.

Additionally, employees were not given adequate notice to evacuate the facility due to the lack of audible and visual alarms, and the company did not require employees to wear flame-resistant uniforms that would protect them from fire hazards.

Vapor cloud just before the explosion.
Source: Yenkin-Majestic

As a result of its investigation, the CSB issued five recommendations to Yenkin-Majestic/OPC Polymers to address these serious issues and help prevent future incidents at the facility.

Recommendations

The recommendations included:

  • Update mechanical integrity procedures for all process vessels in highly hazardous chemicals service, including pressure vessels not exceeding 15 psig, to adopt alteration guidance in API 510 Pressure Vessel Inspection Code or Part 3 of the National Board Inspection Code.
  • Assess and document applicable design, construction, and alteration standards for all pressure vessels in highly hazardous chemicals service in new resin plant designs, including pressure vessels not exceeding 15 psig.
  • Demonstrate the use of prevention through design using the hierarchy of controls in future resin plant designs. Specifically, prioritize inherently safer design and engineering controls to prevent process safety events.
  • Identify and document all equipment that could release flammable materials and install LEL detectors in accordance with sources and guidance. Ensure detection of hazardous conditions automatically triggers visual and audible alarms to alert plant personnel of the hazard. Develop and implement employee training on actions to take, such as prompt evacuation, when such alarms activate.
  • Develop and implement requirements for personnel to wear flame-resistant uniforms in all operating areas that process flammable chemicals. Update employee training material to include the requirement for and purpose of PPE use.

To date, however, the CSB has not received any response from the company about the recommendations, despite numerous efforts made by the CSB to communicate with the company.

The CSB initially transmitted the safety recommendations to the company in a letter dated December 4, 2023, to Andrew O. Smith, the company’s president and chief executive at the time.

Reaching Out to Yenkin

At the time of the incident, the company had three divisions at its Columbus facility: Majic Paints, Yenkin-Majestic Industrial Coatings, and OPC Polymers. The explosion and fire occurred in the OPC Polymers facility. In addition to being a division of Yenkin-Majestic, OPC Polymers is also a stand-alone company, which often referred to itself as Yenkin-Majestic/OPC Polymers. Smith became the executive chairman of OPC Polymers LLC in early 2023.

After the CSB’s several attempts to communicate with Yenkin-Majestic/OPC Polymers ended up met with silence for more than two years, the CSB’s Director of Recommendations sent another letter dated February 5, 2026, to Smith to once again urge implementation of the recommendations. The company still did not respond.

On September 1, 2026, Yenkin-Majestic pleaded guilty to violating the negligent endangerment provision of the Clean Air Act for an explosion that killed one employee and injured eight others.

Soon thereafter, on September 10, 2026, the CSB’s Executive Director of Investigations and Recommendations, Stephen Klejst, sent yet another letter urging the company to communicate with the CSB and implement the five safety recommendations. The company never responded.

“Yenkin-Majestic/OPC Polymers’ continued unresponsiveness and failure to implement the CSB’s safety recommendations seems to demonstrate a serious disregard for the safety of the company’s workers and is especially disturbing in light of the company’s recent guilty plea,” said executive director Stephen Klejst.

“This deadly incident should never have happened, and the safety recommendations are intended to help prevent a catastrophic event like this from happening again,” said CSB Chairperson Steve Owens. “Unlike Yenkin-Majestic/OPC Polymers, most companies willingly implement the safety recommendations from the CSB’s investigations.”

Click here to view the final report.

Pin It on Pinterest

Share This