During the incident response, CISA uncovered that likely multiple APT groups compromised the organization’s network, and some APT actors had long-term access to the environment.
APT actors used an open-source toolkit called Impacket to gain their foothold within the environment and further compromise the network, and also used a custom data exfiltration tool, CovalentStealer, to steal the victim’s sensitive data.
In a joint Cybersecurity Advisory from CISA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Security Agency (NSA), officials want to show the APT actors tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IoCs) identified during the incident response activities by CISA and a third-party incident response organization.
The advisory includes detection and mitigation actions to help organizations detect and prevent related APT activity.
Identified APT Attack
During the CISA response, the victim organization also engaged a third-party incident response organization for assistance. During incident response activities, CISA and the trusted–third-party identified APT activity on the victim’s network, according to the advisory.
“The joint Cybersecurity Advisory published today provides actionable details for defenders to protect against APT actors along with many other adversaries. While many people think that state-sponsored actors always use advanced techniques, this report demonstrates that many of the tools and techniques these actors use are known to defenders and can be detected,” said Katie Nickels, director of intelligence at Red Canary. “One of these tools is Impacket, which is a collection of Python libraries that plug into applications like vulnerability scanners, allowing them to work with Windows network protocols. Impacket is a “dual use” tool in that it is used by legitimate tools as well as by adversaries during intrusions. Adversaries favor Impacket because it allows them to conduct various actions like retrieving credentials, issuing commands, moving laterally, and delivering additional malware onto systems.”
Some APT actors gained initial access to the organization’s Microsoft Exchange Server as early as mid-January 2021. The initial access vector is unknown. Based on log analysis, the actors gathered information about the exchange environment and performed mailbox searches within a four-hour period after gaining access.
In the same period, these actors used a compromised administrator account (“Admin 1”) to access the EWS Application Programming Interface (API). In early February 2021, the actors returned to the network and used Admin 1 to access EWS API again. In both instances, the actors used a virtual private network (VPN).
Four days later, the APT actors used Windows Command Shell over a three-day period to interact with the victim’s network. The actors used Command Shell to learn about the organization’s environment and to collect sensitive data, including sensitive contract-related information from shared drives, for eventual exfiltration. The actors manually collected files using the command-line tool, WinRAR. These files were split into approximately 3MB chunks located on the Microsoft Exchange server within the CU2\he\debug directory. See Appendix: Windows Command Shell Activity for additional information, including specific commands used.
Implanted Impacket
During the same period, APT actors implanted Impacket, a Python toolkit for programmatically constructing and manipulating network protocols, on another system. The actors used Impacket to attempt to move laterally to another system.
“The good news is that Impacket can be detected with endpoint and network visibility,” Nickels said. “However, while Impacket is fairly easy to detect, it can be challenging to determine if the activity is malicious or benign without additional context and understanding of what is normal in an environment. Approximately one third of the Impacket detections we saw in 2021 were from confirmed testing.”
In early March 2021, APT actors exploited CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 to install 17 China Chopper webshells on the Exchange Server. Later in March, APT actors installed HyperBro on the Exchange Server and two other systems.
In April 2021, APT actors used Impacket for network exploitation activities. From late July through mid-October 2021, APT actors employed a custom exfiltration tool, CovalentStealer, to exfiltrate the remaining sensitive files.
APT actors maintained access through mid-January 2022, likely by relying on legitimate credentials.
Two Impacket Tools Used
CISA discovered activity indicating the use of two Impacket tools: wmiexec.py and smbexec.py. These tools use Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and Server Message Block (SMB) protocol, respectively, for creating a semi-interactive shell with the target device. Through the Command Shell, an Impacket user with credentials can run commands on the remote device using the Windows management protocols required to support an enterprise network.
The APT cyber actors used existing, compromised credentials with Impacket to access a higher privileged service account used by the organization’s multifunctional devices. The threat actors first used the service account to remotely access the organization’s Microsoft Exchange server via Outlook Web Access (OWA) from multiple external IP addresses; shortly afterwards, the actors assigned the Application Impersonation role to the service account by running a PowerShell command for managing Exchange.
This command gave the service account the ability to access other users’ mailboxes.
Click here for more on the joint advisory.

