Compromise of private communications has had an impact on a number of individuals primarily involved in government or political activity.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), in partnership with the National Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Australian Signals Directorate’s (ASD’s) Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), and New Zealand’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ) released joint guidance entitled, “Enhanced Visibility and Hardening Guidance for Communications Infrastructure.”
If they don’t already, network defenders and engineers of communications infrastructure, and other critical infrastructure organizations with on-premises enterprise equipment, should review and apply the provided best practices, including patching vulnerable devices and services, to reduce opportunities for intrusion.
In the context of this guide, visibility refers to organizations’ abilities to monitor, detect, and understand activity within their networks. High visibility means having detailed insight into network traffic, user activity, and data flow, allowing network defenders to quickly identify threats, anomalous behavior, and vulnerabilities.
Visibility is critical for network engineers and defenders, particularly when identifying and responding to incidents.
In terms of monitoring, network engineers should closely scrutinize and investigate any configuration modifications or alterations to network devices such as switches, routers, and firewalls outside of the change management process.
They should implement comprehensive alerting mechanisms to detect unauthorized changes to the network, including unusual route updates, enabled weak protocols, and configuration changes (i.e., changes to users and Access Control Lists [ACLs]). Do not allow devices to be the trusted source of truth for their configuration. Monitor configuration and, if feasible, test and override on a frequent basis.
In addition, they should implement a strong network flow monitoring solution. This solution should allow for network flow data exporters and the associated collectors to strategically center around key ingress and egress locations that provide visibility into inter-customer traffic.
If feasible, they should limit exposure of management traffic to the Internet. Only allow management via a limited and enforced network path, ideally only directly from dedicated administrative workstations.
Additionally, they should monitor user and service account logins for anomalies that could indicate potential malicious activity. Validate all accounts and disable inactive accounts to reduce the attack surface. Monitor logins occurring internally and externally from the management environment.
When monitoring, network defenders should implement a monitoring and network management capability that, at a minimum, enforces configuration management, automates routine administrative functions, and alerts on changes detected within the environment, such as connections and user and account activity.
They also need to establish and understanding of the architecture of infrastructure and production enclaves, as well as where the two environments meet or segregate. Map and understand boundary and ingress/egress points of the network management enclave.
Click here for more information on the hardening guidance for communications infrastructure.

