Since January 2020, affiliates using LockBit have attacked organizations of varying sizes across an array of critical infrastructure sectors, including financial services, food and agriculture, education, energy, government and emergency services, healthcare, manufacturing, and transportation.
LockBit ransomware operation functions as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model where affiliates are recruited to conduct ransomware attacks using LockBit ransomware tools and infrastructure.
Due to the large number of unconnected affiliates in the operation, LockBit ransomware attacks vary significantly in observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). This variance in observed ransomware TTPs presents a notable challenge for organizations working to maintain network security and protect against a ransomware threat.
Reporting Agencies
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK), National Cybersecurity Agency of France (ANSSI), Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), New Zealand’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT NZ) and National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC NZ) released this Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) detailing observed activity in LockBit ransomware incidents.
The agencies look to provide recommended mitigations to enable defenders to proactively improve their organization’s defenses against this ransomware operation.
Last year, LockBit was the most active global ransomware group and RaaS provider in terms of the number of victims claimed on their data leak site. A RaaS cybercrime group maintains the functionality of a particular ransomware variant, sells access to that ransomware variant to individuals or groups of operators (often referred to as “affiliates”), and supports affiliates’ deployment of their ransomware in exchange for upfront payment, subscription fees, a cut of profits, or a combination of upfront payment, subscription fees, and a cut of profits.
Some of the methods LockBit has used to successfully attract affiliates include:
- Assuring payment by allowing affiliates to receive ransom payments before sending a cut to the core group; this practice stands in stark contrast to other RaaS groups who pay themselves first and then disburse the affiliates’ cut.
- Disparaging other RaaS groups in online forums.
- Engaging in publicity-generating activities stunts, such as paying people to get LockBit tattoos and putting a $1 million bounty on information related to the real-world identity of LockBit’s lead who goes by the persona “LockBitSupp.”
- Developing and maintaining a simplified, point-and-click interface for its ransomware, making it accessible to those with a lower degree of technical skill.
Innovative Ransomware
LockBit has been successful through innovation and ongoing development of the group’s administrative panel and the RaaS supporting functions. In parallel, affiliates that work with LockBit and other notable variants are constantly revising the TTPs used for deploying and executing ransomware.
During their intrusions, LockBit affiliates have been observed using various freeware and open-source tools that are intended for legal use.
When repurposed by LockBit, these tools are then used for a range of malicious cyber activity, such as network reconnaissance, remote access and tunneling, credential dumping, and file exfiltration. Use of PowerShell and batch scripts are observed across most intrusions, which focus on system discovery, reconnaissance, password/credential hunting, and privilege escalation. Artifacts of professional penetration-testing tools such as Metasploit and Cobalt Strike have also been observed.
Secondary Extortion
When LockBit affiliates target an organization responsible for managing other organizations’ networks, CERT NZ has observed LockBit affiliates attempt secondary ransomware extortion after detonation of the LockBit variant on the primary target.
Once the primary target is hit, LockBit affiliates then attempt to extort the companies that are customers of the primary target. This extortion is in the form of secondary ransomware that locks down services those customers consume. Additionally, the primary target’s customers may be extorted by LockBit affiliates threatening to release those customers’ sensitive information.
The authoring organizations do not encourage paying ransom, as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the authoring organizations urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to your country’s respective authorities.
Click here for more on this joint cybersecurity advisory.

