The fatal incident occurred August 23, 2020, when a Pacific Drilling Services, Inc. (Pacific) rig crewmember was assisting his team in breaking out bolts and pulling riser joints to the surface, according to a report from the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). The incident occurred on the Pacific Khamsin drillship under contract with Total E&P USA, Inc., which was conducting well operations at Garden Banks Block 1003 in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM).
Preliminary Tasks Completed
On August 22, preliminary tasks, such as installing and function testing the spider gimbal deck, were completed in preparation for the next tour. On the morning of August 23, the rig floor crew (RFC) inspected the first joint of the riser, commonly known as the Telescopic Joint (TJ), as it arrived onto the rig floor. The TJ was secured on the spider gimbal deck to be disconnected and stored on the drillship riser rack.
There were eight riser bolts on the TJ flange that needed to be removed to successfully lay down the joint. These bolts were removed by using two tandem Hydraulic Torque Wrenches (HTWs) on the forward and rear sides of the riser joint. The adequate height for the HTWs to efficiently remove the bolts was set by using a Hydraulic Utility Winch (HUW). The steel cable of the HUW attached the top of the HTW to a zero-gravity compensator that assisted the RFC in manually controlling the immense weight of the HTW.
The RFC required to complete this operation consisted of six workers. A team of two floorhands was assigned to the forward side of the riser joint (referred to as the Forward Team) and a team of two floorhands was assigned to the rear side of the riser joint. On each team, one floorhand was the HTW Operator, whereas the other floorhand was the HTW Assistant. The HTW Assistant oversaw the progress and helped the HTW Operator by using a fork tool to ensure the bolts were retained in the upper flange once they were nearly backed out. Additionally, one floorhand was designated as the HUW Operator, whose responsibility was to adjust the height of the HTWs by using an electronic remote that controlled the HUW. Furthermore, the Assistant Driller acted in the role of Drill Floor Observer (DFO), who monitored the rig floor red zone to identify any unsafe practices or hazardous equipment in motion.
After the appropriate height of the HTWs was set, both floorhand teams began to utilize the HTWs to extract the bolts from the TJ flange. As the Forward Team began to remove one of the interior bolts, the HTW socket suddenly became stuck between the bolt head and the tapered edge of the TJ. After failing to manually dislodge the HTW using physical exertion, the Forward Team flagged the HUW Operator to supply an upward force from the HUW line to free the tool.

Location of personnel during fatal incident aboard the Pacific Khamsin Drillship in the Gulf of Mexico.
Source: BSEE
Operator Lifted Into Air
A few seconds after a pulling motion was provided from the HUW, the HTW abruptly shot vertically into the air and hit the Forward HTW Operator. The force of the HTW lifted the Forward HTW Operator into the air.
He then struck a riser clamp approximately six feet above the elevated work deck, fell onto the handrails of the spider gimbal deck, and ultimately came to rest on the rig floor 17 feet away.
The floorhands immediately stopped the job to render aid to the Forward HTW Operator as the Rear HTW Operator stayed on the spider gimbal deck to control the forward HTW which was still in motion. Once the Rig Medic arrived at the scene, the Forward HTW Operator was transferred onto a stretcher and moved to the drillship’s hospital where he became unresponsive. Despite continuous lifesaving efforts the Forward HTW Operator did not regain consciousness and through consultation with onshore medical personnel, the direction was given to cease resuscitation procedures. Shortly afterward, he pronounced dead.
The BSEE panel developed the following conclusions and recommendations:
Probable causes:
- Failure to recognize the potential of the HTW getting hung up on the TJ’s beveled edge
- Failure to comprehensively understand the Task Risk Assessments associated with the riser pull
- Failure to share information regarding similar hazards encountered during previous riser pull operations
- Lack of formalized training for the utilization of the HTW and HUW
- Adverse designs of the HTW and the HUW
- Failure to consider alternative remediation options for the stuck HTW
Recommendations:
- Ensure the Job Safety Analysis (JSA) captures the limitations of using the HTW
- Verify all employees engaged in the job understand the JSA and have been trained formally on operating the HTW and HUW
- Emphasize the initiation of SWO if an imminent danger is observed
- Expand the DFO responsibilities to monitor all aspects of jobs occurring on the rig floor
- Consider utilizing an HTW with a compatible design that corresponds to the beveled edge of the TJ
- Explore options for employing a load indicator or a similar design mechanism onto the HUW package
- Ensure pre-job assessments promote the sharing of insights, such as hazards observed, from previous riser pull operations
- Develop and implement a formalized riser pull training that must be completed by applicable personnel prior to utilizing the HTW or HUW
- Verify personnel competency for the riser pull operation via periodic on-the-job assessments, hands-on demonstrations, and computer-based refresher trainings

