That was the outcome of an update from the Chemical Safety Board’s (CSB) investigation into the January 24, 2020, incident at the Watson Grinding.
Shortly before 4:30 a.m. on January 24, 2020, an explosion killed two workers and a resident and injured two other employees at the Watson Grinding and Manufacturing Co. (“Watson Grinding”) facility in Houston, Texas. The resident died a week later, reportedly from injuries caused by the explosion. The explosion also injured other local residents and damaged hundreds of nearby structures, including homes and several businesses.
Watson Grinding began as a small specialty grinding shop in 1960 and the company expanded its facilities by adding a full-scale machine shop and offered specialty thermal spray coatings to customers, particularly using a High Velocity Oxygen Fuel (HVOF) coating process.
HVOF Process
The High Velocity Oxygen Fuel (HVOF) coating process is one of the different thermal spray coating processes provided by Watson Grinding, according to the CSB update. HVOF applies carbides and metal or alloy coatings at high temperatures. HVOF coatings can improve corrosion protection and wear resistance in specific applications. In the HVOF coating process, the material being applied as a coating and a fuel are fed into a “spray gun.”
Watson Grinding conducted thermal spray coating operations in separate coating booths situated inside the coating building. A coating operator ran each coating booth. Watson Grinding performed the HVOF coating manually and by using industrial robotic arms programmed by the booth operator.
Watson Grinding had ten coating booths, with eight located in the coating building. The first two booths, Coating Booths 1 and 2, were not equipped for HVOF spray coating; instead, they were equipped for “Plasma Spray” coating. The other six coating booths in the coating building (Booth 3 through Booth 8) were equipped for HVOF spraying. In addition to the eight booths in the coating building, Watson Grinding had two additional HVOF booths located in separate, standalone buildings.
Watson Grinding used propylene gas as the fuel for the HVOF coating process.
Propylene (C3H6) is an extremely flammable, colorless gas sometimes characterized as having a faint petroleum odor. Under specific temperature and pressure conditions, propylene can be a liquid. Propylene gas is heavier than air and tends to accumulate near the floor of rooms or buildings.

Propylene system inside Booth 6. This post-incident photo shows the location of the propylene piping after entering the top of Booth 6, flowing through the booth’s propylene pressure control system and continuing to the robotic arm.
Source: Watson Grinding with annotations by CSB
Propylene Flow
The company stored propylene in a 2000-gallon bulk tank (propylene storage tank). Propylene flowed from the propylene storage tank and into the propylene supply piping, which ran along the buildings’ exteriors to the branched “tee” takeoffs into each of the eight HVOF coating booths. At each booth, the propylene takeoff piping entered near the top, about fifteen feet above ground level. The piping ran downward near ground level and connected to the booth’s control equipment and the robotic arm. Each robotic arm was equipped with a spray gun to apply the HVOF coating.
The propylene in the supply piping was controlled through a series of valves and regulators. At the propylene storage tank, the propylene flowed from the tank through an isolation valve8 and a regulator. Next, the propylene flowed through three more isolation valves (these valves were located at ground level and on the side of the tank).a The propylene then flowed into the propylene supply piping and routed to the coating booths.
The propylene piping pressure and flow in each booth were individually controlled. Once entering each coating booth, the propylene flowed through the key components of the booth’s pressure piping system in the following order:
- A manual isolation valve
- An adjustable pressure regulator
- An automated isolation valve
Watson Grinding designed the HVOF coating process with a safety system that included the following elements:
- Daily manual leak checking of some propylene piping components inside each booth
- Automated controls to start and stop propylene flow during the coating application
- Multiple buttons, located at each of the three exit doors inside of the coating building, to allow employees to remotely shutoff (isolate) the supply of propylene and other gases from entering the coating building, whenever propylene was not being used or upon notification of a leak or suspected leak
- Every HVOF coating booth was designed to include fixed atmospheric monitoring equipment, with reported design features including, that upon detection of a propylene gas leak above a predetermined threshold, which automatically isolating the propylene supply to the coating building, and automatically initiatinga an audible alarm and visible flashing lights
Workers Arrive
On Friday morning, January 24, 2020, at about 3:37 a.m., Employee One arrived at Watson Grinding to use the exercise equipment at the Watson Gym (which was located in the Watson Valve building). At around 3:55 a.m., Employee Two arrived at the Watson Gym and detected a chemical odor while outside the building. Upon entering the Watson Gym, Employee Two asked Employee One if he also smelled the chemical odor. Although Employee One replied that he did not, Employee Two insisted they go together to investigate the source of the odor.
At about 4 a.m., the two employees left the Watson Gym and walked to the coating building (located next door). While standing outside of the coating building, they smelled a “strong” propylene odor and heard a “really loud hissing” noise coming from inside the coating building. Employees later stated the propylene leak sounded like it was originating about three to four feet above ground level. After smelling and hearing the leaking propylene, both employees returned to the Watson Gym and resumed exercising. Shortly after, Employee Two stopped exercising, contacted two Watson Grinding supervisors, and informed them of the suspect propylene leak. Neither supervisor reported directing Employee Two to evacuate himself and others from the facility immediately. After alerting these supervisors, Employee Two left the Watson Gym to investigate the propylene leak further.
At about 4:23 a.m., Employee Three arrived at Watson Grinding and parked his car just outside the door on the west side of the coating building (the side facing Steffani Lane). Employee Three, a coating operator, had a key to the coating building and, in his supervisor’s absence, would open up the coating building and start work.
One minute later, at 4:24 a.m., Employee Four arrived at the facility. As he stopped and prepared to park his truck, he noticed Employee Three’s car was parked just outside of the coating building and saw Employee Three enter the coating building’s open west door. As Employee Four backed his truck into a parking space, there was an explosion inside the coating building. The explosion fatally injured Employees Two and Three, and injured Employees One and Four.
Click here for more information from the CSB.


I didn’t see an excess flow check valve mentioned. These permit normal volumes of gas to flow but will shut during a high flow as would happen in broken pipe or significant leak. There should be ones placed at various points of the distribution system and sized accordingly.
These would act analogously to fuses in an electrical circuit.