Deficiencies in a St. Louis, Missouri, box making business’ operations, policies, and process safety practices failed to prevent or mitigate chronic corrosion in its Semi-Closed Receiver (SCR) pressure vessel were among the issues that led to an explosion over five years ago that killed four people, including three workers from a neighboring business, federal officials said in a newly released report.

Contributing to the incident at Loy-Lange Box Company was Kickham Boiler and Engineering’s performance of an inadequate repair to the SCR in 2012 that left damaged material in place, the City of St. Louis’ missed opportunities to identify and ensure the inspection of the SCR, Arise’s acceptance of and failure to detect Kickham’s inadequate repair, and gaps in Arise’s and the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors’ repair inspection requirements, said officials at the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) in their final report in the fatal blast.

Just over five years ago on April 3, 2017, an explosion occurred at Loy-Lange. The incident occurred when the bottom head of a pressure vessel called a Semi-Closed Receiver, which was used in Loy-Lange’s steam system, catastrophically failed.

The pressure vessel failure caused a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) which fatally injured the Loy-Lange employee working nearby and launched the pressure vessel from the Loy-Lange building into the air.

The power of the jet of water rapidly turning to steam broke the vessel loose from its piping attachments and fastenings, propelling it through the internal structure and roof of the building. The downward force of the steam launched the 3,000-pound vessel with a speed of about 120 mph, about 425 feet into the air and about 515 feet from its starting point. The SCR remained airborne for over 10 seconds.

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The vessel eventually crashed through the roof of the Faultless Linen business over 500 feet away, fatally injuring three brand-new hires filling out paperwork.

The CSB’s investigation identified the following safety issues:
Pressure Vessel Corrosion. Oxygen pitting corrosion and generalized corrosion thinned the pressure vessel bottom head until it could no longer contain the pressure inside the vessel. Aspects of Loy-Lange’s operation directly caused or failed to prevent the corrosion: Loy-Lange’s startup practices likely introduced oxygenated water into the SCR daily, and its inadequate water treatment failed to eliminate dissolved oxygen from the water.

Pressure Vessel Inspection and Regulation. Pressure vessels are used across nearly all manufacturing sectors. Industry codes, guidance, and regulations provide methods to inspect and maintain pressure vessels safely, as pressure vessel failures can be catastrophic, as demonstrated by this incident. Loy-Lange was aware of corrosion in the SCR as early as 2004. Loy-Lange, however, had no mechanical integrity or inspection program, as recommended within industry guidance documents, to monitor or mitigate corrosion in the SCR. The city of St. Louis was the regulatory authority responsible for inspecting pressure vessels. However, due to manpower limitations and Loy-Lange’s deficient regulatory compliance, the city never inspected the SCR.

Surveillance video still capturing explosion with the semi-closed receiver pressure vessel airborne.
Source: Kranz Body Co., via CSB

Pressure Vessel Repair. A repair made to the SCR in 2012 by Kickham Boiler and Engineering, a National Board “R” Certificate holding company, did not adhere to applicable National Board Inspection Code requirements because Kickham likely left material in place that was thinner than the SCR’s required minimum thickness. Only a portion of the corroded pressure vessel bottom head was replaced, leaving the compromised remaining portion of the head in place to continue corroding. This remaining portion of original steel failed on April 3, 2017, initiating the explosion. Arise, the authorized inspection agency for Kickham’s repair, did not detect Kickham’s inadequate repair. When repairing a pressure vessel, it is essential to remove all unacceptably damaged material. Repair companies and inspectors must ensure such material is fully removed.

Process Safety Management Systems. Loy-Lange did not establish a strong process safety culture and did not have programs that could have identified the hazards or analyzed and mitigated the risks of its operations. Such programs could have enabled Loy-Lange to learn from its operational experience. Loy-Lange, however, did not employ sound process safety management principles in addressing the risks associated with corrosion in its steam process. It is essential facilities with hazardous processes have an effective process safety management system to help ensure major incidents such as the Loy- Lange incident are prevented.

The CSB offered a series of recommendations to all organizations involved in the incident:

To Loy-Lange Box Company:
Develop and implement a comprehensive safety management system. Include in that system process safety elements recommended in industry guidance publications, such as the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) publication Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety.
Engage a qualified third-party to conduct a comprehensive review or audit of Loy-Lange’s regulatory compliance practices and current compliance status.
Implement an electronic records and data management system that preserves all critical company records, safety policies and procedures, and operational data. Ensure such records are stored and can be accessed remotely in the event of a catastrophic incident.

To the St. Louis Board of Aldermen:
Revise the City of St. Louis Mechanical Code to adopt a national consensus standard such as NBIC Part 2 to govern the requirements for in-service inspection of boilers and pressure vessels.
Revise the City of St. Louis Mechanical Code to require pressure vessel inspections be performed by an NBBI in-service (IS) commissioned inspector.

To the mayor of the City of St. Louis:
Distribute and communicate the findings of this report to all licensed stationary engineers and all registered boiler and pressure vessel owning/operating entities in the City of St. Louis.

To Arise:
Update company policies and/or procedures by including prescriptive elements in the boiler and pressure vessel repair and alteration inspection and acceptance process that would prevent the acceptance of a non-conforming repair or alteration.

To the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors:
Update NB-263 Rules for Commissioned Inspectors to include prescriptive elements in the boiler and pressure vessel repair and alteration inspection and acceptance process that would prevent the acceptance of a non- conforming repair or alteration.

As an overall lessons learned message, the CSB urged companies to review the following key points for application at their facilities:

  1. Pressure relief devices are typically the last line of defense protecting a vessel from overpressure. Companies must ensure the pressure relief devices protecting their pressure vessels are properly designed, installed, and maintained, and must ensure all pressure relief devices are set at the proper pressure. A pressure relief device with a set pressure greater than its vessel’s maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) cannot adequately protect the vessel from high pressure process upsets. Both American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors (NBBI) Code state that a pressure vessel’s relief device shall not be set at a pressure higher than the vessel’s MAWP.
  2. Leaking pressure vessels can be dangerous and should be evaluated for continued fitness for service. When a pressure vessel leaks, its pressure retention ability may be compromised. The leak should be investigated, the cause(s) should be determined, the leak should be appropriately repaired prior to returning the vessel to service, and the cause(s) of the leak should be addressed to prevent recurrence.
  3. Pressure vessels storing liquid at temperatures greater than its atmospheric boiling point can explode upon failure when the contents are suddenly exposed to atmospheric pressure. The explosion results from the rapid volume expansion that occurs when a liquid suddenly vaporizes. This type of explosion is known as a BLEVE. BLEVEs and other pressure vessel failures can be catastrophic and can cause injury, fatality, and significant property damage.
  4. Ensure damage mechanisms, such as corrosion, in pressure vessels and steam generation systems are adequately understood and controlled. Companies should understand the damage mechanisms to which their steam systems and pressure vessels are vulnerable, the conditions that cause such mechanisms, and the means of preventing or otherwise controlling these damage mechanisms.
  5. Pressure vessels must be regularly inspected, per regulatory requirements and per industry guidance, by appropriately credentialed inspectors.
  6. Companies can hire contractors to perform pressure vessel inspections to supplement any local or state regulatory inspections. Many companies exist that employ inspectors with ASME, API, NBBI, and American Society for Nondestructive Testing certifications.
  7. Ensure an effective process safety management system is in place to identify equipment hazards that can lead to injury or fatality. Investigate incidents and near misses in which those hazards were not adequately controlled. Ensure that incident investigations are driven to uncover underlying process safety management system gaps, and that those gaps are appropriately addressed.

Click here to view the full report.

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