By Gregory Hale
Three operators and one shift supervisor scrambled to figure out what happened and what to do after a hydrogen cloud formed in work area when two incompatible chemicals mixed which led to a massive blast killing four and injuring another, a safety video showed.
The Chemical Safety Board (CSB) released an alarming safety video Thursday on its investigation into the massive explosion and fire that occurred in May 2019 at the AB Specialty Silicones facility in Waukegan, Illinois. The incident killed four workers, injured one more, destroyed the facility, and caused extensive damage to nearby businesses.
The video includes an animation of the events leading up to the incident, and interviews with the CSB’s Chairperson, Dr. Katherine Lemos, and Lead Investigator, Vonzella Vincent.
The AB Specialty Silicones disaster occurred when two incompatible chemicals ended up mixed during production of an emulsion product. The chemicals reacted and produced flammable hydrogen gas that ignited, causing the fatal explosion.
The incident is just one of other investigations by the CSB during the agency’s history that resulted from inadequate recognition and evaluation of reactive chemical hazards.
Safety Recommendations
In its report, the agency made recommendations to AB Specialty Silicones and reiterated recommendations to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with the goal of addressing the regulatory gap covering reactive chemicals.
“AB Specialty did not have a process safety management program in place at the time of the incident,” Vincent said.
“When chemical reactivity hazards are identified, it is critical for companies to understand if the hazards can be eliminated or reduced,” Lemos said. “If not, these hazards must be managed throughout the operational lifetime of the facility and products to protect workers, property and the environment.”
The fatal blast started to unfold May 2, 2019, when operators at the AB Specialty Silicones manufacturing facility started performing a batch operation that involved manually adding and mixing chemicals in a tank inside the production building, according to the final report issued by the CSB.
As it turns out during the operation, an operator pumped an incorrect chemical into the tank, which was incompatible with another chemical added to the tank.
The incorrect, incompatible chemical was stored in an identical drum to one of the correct chemicals, the only differentiating markings being small labels on the drums, and bung caps. After the incompatible chemicals mixed, the tank contents underwent a chemical reaction, causing a process upset in which the tank contents foamed and overflowed from the tank’s top opening. A fog also formed. The CSB determined the process upset produced hydrogen gas, which released inside the manufacturing facility’s production building.
Reduce Risk of Human Error
“In a process that rely on operators to gather and mix chemicals, it is critical that companies reduce the risk of human error by making it easy to do the job right and hard to do the job wrong,” Vincent said. “In this case, that could have been as simple as having written procedures that specify storing incompatible chemicals in separate areas and in different color containers.
Soon after the hydrogen gas release started, it ignited, causing a massive explosion and fire. The explosion fatally injured four employees, Byron Biehn, Jeffrey Cummings, Daniel Nicklas, Allen Stevens. It also destroyed the facility’s production building, and forced the company to cease some and relocate other operations until the company could rebuild the production building.

Post-explosion photo of the AB Specialty facility in Waukegan, Illinois, where four workers died in a blast fueled by hydrogen.Source: CSB
The following is a timeline of the events CSB investigators laid out as AB Specialty scheduled the making of two back-to-back batches of EM 652 starting May 2 in the Low Bay emulsions area.
During the first shift on May 2, operators obtained the first printed process batch ticket from the production office detailing the operation steps for the first of two batches.
The first shift operators then staged the required chemical ingredients – including XL 10, TD 6/12 Blend, and other chemicals – near the tanks in the emulsions area of the production building. The EM 652 batch operation required the use of eight XL 10 drums. The first shift operators then performed the batch operation, which occurred without incident. At 2 p.m., the second shift operations personnel arrived.
Over the span of the second and third shifts, the operators delivered two sequential product samples to the QC department. The QC department found the pH of both samples to be too low, and in both cases required the operators to increase the pH of the EM 652 product by adding 10% KOH. The operators brought 10% KOH into the emulsions area and added the specified amounts of 10% KOH to the EM 652 product.
After 4:30 p.m. on May 3, the QC department confirmed the EM 652 product was within the required specification and approved its packaging, which a second shift operator (Operator 1) performed after 6:30 p.m.
Second Batch
The CSB determined, in preparation for the second EM 652 batch, operators likely left partial containers of leftover ingredients from the first batch – including XL 10, TD 6/12 Blend, and 10% KOH – in the emulsions area of the production building for use in the second batch.
During the evening of May 3, nine employees were in the AB Specialty production building, four of whom this report identified as Operator 1, Operator 2, Operator 3, and Shift Supervisor 1.
Before 8 p.m., Operator 1 likely obtained the printed batch ticket for the second EM 652 batch. This batch also required the use of eight XL 10 drums. The CSB determined there were likely also two or three drums containing 10% KOH in the production area, possibly leftover from the previous EM 652 batch operation. As a result, there were up to eleven nearly identical drums containing incompatible chemicals (XL 10 and 10% KOH) in the immediate process area at the start of the second batch.
Operator 1 then started the batch. Operator 1 charged XL 10 and TD 6/12 Blend, the first two ingredients of the EM 652 process, to the tank. At some point, while completing these initial process steps, Operator 1 also likely misidentified the 10% KOH drum(s) that remained in the emulsions area after the first batch for XL 10 and added 10% KOH into the tank.
Aqueous KOH is highly reactive with compounds containing SiH bonds, such as XL 10. The reaction of these chemicals produces hydrogen gas. Shortly after the XL 10, 10% KOH, and TD 6/12 Blend were mixed, the batch tank contents started to foam and overflow from the batch tank top opening, and a fog also formed and spread through the Low Bay. The CSB determined that the process upset produced hydrogen gas.
Hazy Fog
Operator 1 started yelling. Shift Supervisor 1 and Operator 2 ran to the emulsions area in response.
The supervisor and operator saw the hazy fog and the foam overflowing from the tank’s top lid onto the floor. Shift Supervisor 1 and Operator 2 asked Operator 1 what was happening. Operator 1 said “it’s mixing XL 10 and TD 6/12” – the first two ingredients of the EM 652 batch manufacturing process.
While Shift Supervisor 1, Operator 1, and Operator 2 were talking, Operator 3 said he observed the tank making a “very strange sound” and the tank was “erupt[ing]” material onto the floor. Operator 2 said he observed material “foaming out the tank and it was really smoky, hazy.” Operator 2 stated he felt the area get hotter. The workers interviewed by the CSB did not realize that material releasing during the upset was hazardous. There were no flammable gas detectors or hydrogen gas detectors to warn workers of the released hydrogen. The workers did not evacuate the building.
Shift Supervisor 1 directed workers to take action to ventilate the hazy vapor from the building. He asked Operator 2 to open a garage door near the locker room. Shift Supervisor 1 also told Operator 3 to go to the maintenance area and turn on the switch for the fans. This switch would turn on the exhaust fans located in the High Bay, which did not run continuously. Before Operator 2 could fully open the garage door and before Operator 3 turned on the fan switch, at about 9:35 p.m., the hydrogen gas ignited, causing a massive explosion and fire.
The building ended up destroyed by the explosion. Debris extended for several hundred feet from the building, and nearby business properties were also damaged. Four AB Specialty employees (Operator 1, Shift Supervisor 1, a shift supervisor for a separate shift, and a QC chemist) were fatally injured by the explosion, and Operator 3 was injured.
The CSB investigation evaluated the following safety issues:
Mixing of Incompatible Materials. An AB Specialty operator pumped an incorrect chemical into a tank, which was incompatible with another chemical that was added to the tank. The chemicals reacted to produce hydrogen gas, which found an ignition source and ignited to cause the explosion.
Hazard Analysis Program. AB Specialty assessed proposed product manufacturing operations through what it called technical service requests (TSRs), which evaluated a mix of business and safety risks. AB Specialty’s TSR process did not and was not intended to assess the hazards of performing a process operation or establish safeguards to reduce risk.
Storage and Handling of Incompatible Materials. AB Specialty did not have a written procedure requiring employees to segregate incompatible chemical drums in the production building’s manufacturing area or remove ingredient containers after use. The incompatible chemicals that were mixed were stored in similar 55-gallon blue plastic drums. The similar appearance of the drums likely contributed to the operator adding the incorrect chemical to the tank.
Batch Equipment and Ventilation System Design. As a result of the tanks used in the EM 652 batch process having an open hatch-type lid and no vent pipe to direct gases to a safe location, the hydrogen gas produced during the incident released directly into the production building, where workers were located. The ventilation system, including an air mover – designed to introduce outside air to the building and which was positioned near the location where the batch operation was being performed – may have helped distribute the hydrogen in the production building and mix it with air, creating a large and explosive gas cloud.
Gas Detection and Alarm System. The AB Specialty production building did not have a hydrogen gas or flammable gas detection and alarm system to warn employees of a hazardous atmosphere. The lack of a system to detect hydrogen gas and automatically activate an alarm contributed to personnel remaining inside the production building between the start of the hydrogen release and the time of ignition.
Emergency Preparedness. During the incident, workers recognized that a process upset had occurred when the tank contents foamed, overflowed the tank, and a fog formed. However, despite recognizing the process upset, the workers did not recognize the immediate hydrogen hazard created by the upset. Hydrogen is a colorless and odorless gas indistinguishable from air without the use of additional technology, such as gas detectors. Without gas detectors and alarms alerting of the hazardous conditions, or effective training, the workers did not realize the necessity to evacuate.
Double Initial Procedure Program. AB Specialty developed a double initial procedure practice in 2014 in an effort to prevent employees from charging the wrong materials to batch processes, which was proceduralized in 2019. The occurrence of the May 3 incident indicates AB Specialty’s double initial procedure program did not prevent a wrong material from being added to the tank.
Process Safety Culture. In the years leading up to the incident, AB Specialty exhibited characteristics of a weak process safety culture, including the lack of engineering controls to mitigate employee exposure to known hydrogen gas risks and heavy reliance on procedural controls as primary safeguards, among others. In addition, the company did not require incompatible chemicals to be visibly differentiated or perform a thorough hazard analysis of the EM 652 batch process after a 2014 drum explosion.
Safety Management System that Addresses Process Safety. AB Specialty did not have a safety management system that addressed process safety in place at the time of the incident. Industry best practice publications provide guidance on establishing process safety management systems for facilities with known or potential reactive chemical hazards.
Regulatory Coverage of Reactive Hazards. While AB Specialty processed chemicals capable of undergoing a highly hazardous chemical reaction that resulted in a large explosion and four fatalities, the chemicals used at the AB Specialty facility are not listed for coverage in either the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) Standard or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Risk Management Plan (RMP) Rule. As such, AB Specialty was not required to implement baseline process safety management system elements to manage the safety of its processes under these regulations.
Cause of the Incident
The CSB determined the cause of the incident were deficiencies in AB Specialty’s operations, policies, and practices including its hazard analysis program, methods used to store and handle incompatible materials, its double initial procedure program, process safety culture weaknesses, and the lack of a safety management system addressing process safety.
These deficiencies led to an operator mixing incompatible chemicals, causing a reaction that produced hydrogen gas, which released and ignited in the AB Specialty production building. Contributing to the severity of the incident were AB Specialty’s batch equipment and ventilation system design, the lack of a gas detection and alarm system, and ineffective emergency preparedness.
As a result of this investigation, CSB made recommendations to various organizations affiliated with safety related to this incident.
For the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA):
- Amend the Process Safety Management Standard (PSM), 29 CFR 1910.119, to achieve more comprehensive control of reactive hazards that could have catastrophic consequences.
- Broaden the application to cover reactive hazards resulting from process-specific conditions and combinations of chemicals.
- In the compilation of process safety information, require that multiple sources of information be sufficiently consulted to understand and control potential reactive hazards.
For the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA):
- Revise the Accidental Release Prevention Requirements, 40 CFR 68, to explicitly cover catastrophic reactive hazards that have the potential to seriously impact the public, including those resulting from self-reactive chemicals and combinations of chemicals and process-specific conditions. Take into account the recommendations of this report to OSHA on reactive hazard coverage. Seek congressional authority if necessary to amend the regulation.
For AB Specialty Silicones:
- Ensure hydrogen gas detection and alarm systems are properly installed, maintained, and configured based on the facility’s application and environment, manufacturer specifications, current codes, standards, and industry good practice guidance.
- Establish a safety management system that addresses process safety at the AB Specialty Waukegan, Illinois facility.
- Incorporate into operations and activities at AB Specialty the specific elements recommended in CCPS’s Essential Practices for Managing
- Chemical Reactivity Hazards, which are:
— Put into place a system to manage chemical reactivity hazards
— Collect reactivity hazard information
— Identify chemical reactivity hazards
— Test for chemical reactivity
— Assess chemical reactivity risks
— Identify and implement process controls and risk management options
— Document chemical reactivity risks and management decisions
— Communicate and train on chemical reactivity hazards
— Investigate chemical reactivity incidents
— Review, audit, manage change in, and improve hazard management practices and programs
“It is past time for regulators to fully recognize the hazards presented by reactive chemicals,” Lemos said. “We call on OSHA and EPA to update their regulatory standards to include better coverage of reactive chemicals. Closing the regulatory gap will prevent further tragic incidents and save lives. Together, we can impact safety for our chemical industries, our workers, our community, and our environment.”
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