When there is a patch available, if it is at all possible apply it because attackers are jumping at the chance to attack any system with unpatched vulnerabilities. Take Log4J for example.

In one confirmed compromise, APT actors were able to leverage an unpatched Log4J vulnerability get in an move laterally inside the network, gain access to a disaster recovery network, and collect and exfiltrate sensitive data, according to an updated the joint CISA-United States Coast Guard Cyber Command (CGCYBER) Cybersecurity Advisory.

That just shows attackers, including state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) actors, continue to exploit Log4Shell in VMware Horizon and Unified Access Gateway (UAG) servers to obtain initial access to organizations that did not apply available patches or workarounds.

Since December 2021, multiple threat actor groups exploited Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) on unpatched, public-facing VMware Horizon and UAG servers. As part of this attack, attackers implanted loader malware on compromised systems with embedded executables enabling remote command and control (C2).

Update After Incidents
This updated advisory provides the suspected APT actors’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), information on the loader malware, and indicators of compromise (IoCs). The information is derived from two related incident response engagements and malware analysis of samples discovered on the victims’ networks.

Schneider Bold

CISA and CGCYBER recommend all organizations with affected systems that did not immediately apply available patches or workarounds to assume compromise and initiate threat hunting activities using the IoCs provided in this advisory, Malware Analysis Report MAR-10382580-1, and MAR-10382254-1.

This latest Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) has been updated with additional Malware Analysis Report MAR-10382580-2, which provides additional indicators of compromise (IOCs).

The following are two incidents involving Log4J discovered by CISA and CGCYBER:

First Victim
CGCYBER conducted a proactive threat-hunting engagement at an organization compromised by actors exploiting Log4Shell in VMware Horizon. After obtaining access, threat actors uploaded malware, hmsvc.exe, to a compromised system. During malware installation, connections to IP address 104.223.34[.]198 were observed.

CISA and CGCYBER analyzed a sample of hmsvc.exe from the confirmed compromise. hmsvc.exe masquerades as a legitimate Microsoft Windows service (SysInternals LogonSessions software) and appears to be a modified version of SysInternals LogonSessions software embedded with malicious packed code. When discovered, the analyzed sample of hmsvc.exe was running as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, the highest privilege level on a Windows system. It is unknown how the actors elevated privileges.

As it turns out hmsvc.exe is a Windows loader containing an embedded executable, 658_dump_64.exe. The embedded executable is a remote access tool that provides an array of C2 capabilities, including the ability to log keystrokes, upload and execute additional payloads, and provide graphical user interface (GUI) access over a target Windows system’s desktop. The malware can function as a C2 tunneling proxy, allowing a remote operator to pivot to other systems and move further into a network.

When first executed, hmsvc.exe creates the Scheduled Task, C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Local Session Updater, which executes malware every hour. When executed, two randomly named *.tmp files are written to the disk at the location C:\Users\\AppData\Local\Temp\ and the embedded executable attempts to connect to hard-coded C2 server 192.95.20[.]8 over port 4443, a non-standard port. The executable’s inbound and outbound communications are encrypted with a 128-bit key.

Second Victim
From late April through May this year, CISA conducted an onsite incident response engagement at an organization where CISA observed bi-directional traffic between the organization and suspected APT IP address 104.223.34[.]198. During incident response, CISA determined the organization suffered compromise by multiple threat actor groups.

The threat actors using IP 104.223.34[.]198 gained initial access to the production environment in late January 2022, or earlier. These actors likely obtained access by exploiting Log4Shell in an unpatched VMware Horizon server. On or around January 30, likely shortly after the threat actors gained access, CISA observed the actors using PowerShell scripts to callout to 109.248.150[.]13 via Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) to retrieve additional PowerShell scripts. Around the same period, CISA observed the actors attempt to download and execute a malicious file from 109.248.150[.]13. The activity started from IP address 104.155.149[.]103, which appears to be part of the actors’ C2 infrastructure.

After gaining initial access to the VMware Horizon server, the threat actors moved laterally via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to multiple other hosts in the production environment, including a security management server, a certificate server, a database containing sensitive law enforcement data, and a mail relay server. The threat actors also moved laterally via RDP to the organization’s disaster recovery network. The threat actors gained credentials for multiple accounts, including administrator accounts. It is unknown how these credentials were acquired.

After moving laterally to other production environment hosts and servers, the actors implanted loader malware on compromised servers containing executables enabling remote C2. The threat actors used compromised administrator accounts to run the loader malware.

The loader malware appears to be modified versions of SysInternals LogonSessions, Du, or PsPing software. The embedded executables belong to the same malware family, are similar in design and functionality to 658_dump_64.exe, and provide C2 capabilities to a remote operator. These C2 capabilities include the ability to remotely monitor a system’s desktop, gain reverse shell access, exfiltrate data, and upload and execute additional payloads. The embedded executables can also function as a proxy.

Click here for more on the advisory.

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