This all started back in December when Fortinet issued an advisory related to two FortiCloud single sign-on (SSO) bypass vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-59718 and CVE-2025-59719) the Fortinet product security team had internally discovered during a code audit.
The vulnerabilities described in the advisory allowed for unauthenticated bypass of SSO login authentication via crafted SAML sent to FortiOS, FortiWeb, FortiProxy, and FortiSwitch Manager devices when the FortiCloud SSO feature ended up enabled.
Even though there was a fix, login activity occurred on users’ devices, which appeared very similar to the previous issue. As it turns out, Fortinet identified a number of cases where the exploit was to a device that had been fully upgraded to the latest release at the time of the attack, which suggested a new attack path.
Which led researchers to suggest recommendations. They also offered indicators of compromise (IOCs) so users can to check their systems for malicious activity.
The threat actor has been logging in with the following user accounts.
- cloud-noc@mail.io
- cloud-init@mail.io
Fortinet researchers said they feel these addresses may change in the future as action as these accounts ended up neutralized.
More IOCs
Additionally, the threat actor has been logging in via multiple IP addresses and appear to have switched to use Cloudflare protected IPs:
- 104[.]28.244.115
- 104[.]28.212.114
On top of that, there are more IPs observed by a third party other than Fortinet:
- 37[.]1.209.19
- 217[.]119.139.50
Following authentication via SSO, the threat actor creates a local admin account with one of the following names. This has changed, though, so Fortinet said it recommends reviewing all admin accounts to look for any unexpected entries:
- audit
- backup
- itadmin
- secadmin
- support
Recommended mitigation actions include:
It is best practice to not allow unrestricted administration of any edge network device via the Internet, with best practice being out of band access. If this is not possible, it is highly recommended to apply a local-in policy to restrict the IP addresses that are able to access the administrative interface.
As an additional workaround, Fortinet researchers recommend disabling the FortiCloud SSO feature. This will prevent abuse via that method but not a third-party SSO system, so this is recommended only in conjunction with the local-in policy.
If you end up identifying IOCs in the system, Fortinet recommends treating the system and configuration as compromised and taking the following cleanup actions:
- Ensure your device is running the latest firmware version. It is recommended to run the latest release (7.6) where possible to take advantage of the latest security features.
- Restore your configuration with a known clean version or audit for any unauthorized changes. Pay particular attention to unexpected administrators or VPN configuration or accounts.
- Treat configuration as compromised and follow guidance to rotate credentials, including any LDAP/AD accounts that may connect to the FortiGate devices.
Click here for more on this Fortnet PSIRT blog.

