A blast and resulting fire at Husky Energy’s Superior Refining Company LLC refinery, which left 36 workers injured and over 2,500 residents forced to evacuate, occurred during the shutdown of the fluid catalytic cracking (FCC) unit when air inadvertently ended up directed inside the regenerator through the reactor, and the main column, and then into the gas concentration unit.

As the air continued flowing into the gas concentration unit, oxygen accumulated and formed a flammable mixture inside the primary and sponge absorbers, according to a final report from the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) on the April 26, 2018, explosion. The oxygen also reacted with existing pyrophoric material inside this equipment, creating the ignition source for the explosion.

The failure to control the air flow during the shutdown was the result of Husky Superior Refinery’s deficiencies in FCC unit process knowledge about critical FCC unit transient operation safeguards that could have prevented the inadvertent mixing of air and hydrocarbons during a shutdown, according to the report. These safeguards include establishing a reactor steam barrier to separate the air from the rest of the hydrocarbon-filled equipment and purging the main column to the flare system with a non-condensable gas to prevent oxygen accumulation.

Vital Safeguards
These vital FCC unit safeguards are generally known and broadly applied within the refining industry. Not applying these safeguards allowed oxygen to enter and accumulate in process equipment containing flammable material, which ignited and exploded. The Superior, Wisconsin, Husky Superior Refinery also failed to ensure the integrity of its FCC unit slide valves for use during transient operation, according to the report. A severely eroded slide valve contributed to the incident by allowing more air to pass from the regenerator into the reactor.

On top of that, Husky Superior Refinery did not effectively implement process safety management systems, which also contributed to the incident, according to the report. These ineffective management systems included Husky Superior Refinery’s process safety information which did not include the FCC technology licensor’s operating manual, process hazard analyses that did not effectively identify or control hazards inherent in FCC unit transient operation, operating procedures that omitted key steps, lacked clear instructions, and were not technically evaluated, and an operator training program that did not effectively prepare the operators to shut down the FCC unit safely.

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The process vessels that exploded were constructed from a grade of steel that was susceptible to brittle fracture, contributing to the severity of the incident, according to the report. The force of the explosion shattered these steel vessels and sent large metal fragments throughout the refinery, one of which struck and punctured the nearby asphalt tank. Had the process vessels been made of a more ductile steel, the explosion would more likely have torn open (fish mouthed) the vessels with fewer, if any, dangerous metal projectiles. Also contributing to the severity of the incident was the fire that resulted from the refinery’s inability to contain and control the hot, ignitable asphalt spill.

The incident occurred April 26, 2018, at 9:58 a.m., when an explosion and fire occurred at the Husky Energy refinery during a planned maintenance with 800-900 workers on site, including employees and contractors. As a result of the explosion and fire, 36 refinery and contract workers suffered injuries. In addition, the disaster caused $550 million in property damage. Husky Superior Refinery reported it released 39,000 pounds of a flammable hydrocarbon vapor mixture during the event.

Asphalt pours out of a tank after it was struck by fragments of the initial blast at the Husky Superior Refinery. About 17,000 barrels of hot asphalt flowed outside of the tank’s containment area and ignited causing fires to erupt at multiple operating areas of the refinery.
Source: Duluth News Tribune

Vessels Exploded
The explosion occurred while the refinery was shutting down its FCC unit for the turnaround. Two FCC unit vessels, the primary absorber and the sponge absorber, exploded at 9:58 a.m., shaking buildings up to a mile away and propelling over 100 metal fragments, some several feet long, up to 1,200 feet from their original location into the surrounding operating areas.

Explosion debris punctured a nearby asphalt tank at the refinery, spilling hot asphalt that flowed outside of the tank’s containment area. Approximately 17,000 barrels of hot asphalt spread through the refinery and ignited at noon, causing fires to erupt at multiple operating areas of the refinery. Superior city officials evacuated 2,507 residents within two miles north, 3 miles to the east and west, and 10 miles south of the refinery. To protect its residents, the city of Duluth, Minnesota, issued a shelter-in-place advisory at 8 p.m. The fires were out before midnight. The shelter-in-place and evacuation orders lifted at 6 a.m. the next day.

In addition to concerns about smoke from the fires at the refinery, the Superior city evacuation was based on the potential risk of a release of highly toxic hydrofluoric acid (“HF”), which was stored at Husky Superior Refinery and used in the refinery’s HF alkylation unit. Although the HF storage tank was not damaged by debris from the explosion and no release of HF occurred, the asphalt tank punctured by the explosion debris was located farther away from the point of the explosion than the refinery’s HF storage tank. Debris from the explosion could have punctured the HF storage tank, given its closer proximity to the point of explosion.

CSB’s investigation identified the following safety issues:

Transient operation safeguards: At the time of the incident, Husky Superior Refinery was shutting down the FCC unit, a transient operation mode. Transient operations are a grouping of operating modes, such as shutdowns, startups, standby, and emergencies, where a process is changing over and is not in its normal operation mode. Transient operations can pose unique hazards that may not occur during normal process operations.

During an FCC unit shutdown, it is critical to separate air from hydrocarbons to prevent an explosive mixture, because unlike most refinery operations, an FCC unit processes air and flammable hydrocarbons inside interconnected process equipment, increasing the likelihood of an explosion. This separation is typically achieved using FCC technology-specific safeguards. Most of these safeguards were either not implemented or not effective at Husky Superior Refinery.

The CSB report discussed Husky’s lack of safeguards:

  • Reactor steam barrier: Husky Superior Refinery did not establish or maintain a reactor steam barrier between air and hydrocarbons during the shutdown. By controlling the steam flow into the reactor during a shutdown, the FCC reactor can be maintained at a higher pressure than both the air side and the hydrocarbon side of the process and keep the air and hydrocarbons separated. In doing so, the reactor can serve as a “steam barrier” to help prevent the dangerous mixing of air with flammable hydrocarbons.
  • Main column gas purge: Husky Superior Refinery did not properly purge the main column overhead receiver during the shutdown to remove oxygen from the system. By adding a continual supply of non-condensable gas to the main column, this safeguard helps sweep air out of the system to prevent the potential hazard of accumulating flammable concentrations of oxygen within this hydrocarbon-filled equipment.
  • Catalyst slide valves: Husky Superior Refinery relied entirely on catalyst slide valves to keep the air and hydrocarbon systems separated during the shutdown. FCC catalyst slide valves are known in most of the refining industry as insufficient safeguards to stop all flow between the air and hydrocarbon systems, because they are not designed to act as positive isolation devices. In addition, despite their ample physical size and the robust thickness of their metal components, one of the slide valves between the regenerator and the reactor at Husky Superior Refinery had worn from five years of operation. As a result, even though refinery operators properly closed this valve, the valve had eroded and provided an open path that allowed a large flow of air to enter the reactor and migrate into the hydrocarbon-filled equipment. The refinery’s process hazard assessments and layer of protection analysis study did not identify the slide valves alone were not adequate safeguards to prevent an incident of this magnitude.

Had Husky Superior Refinery implemented the safeguards above, the incident could have been prevented, according to the CSB report. All the safeguards discussed would have required adequately trained operators following a technically accurate written operating procedure to shut down the FCC unit.

Process knowledge: Husky Superior Refinery’s FCC technology-specific process knowledge was not sufficient to safely shut down the FCC unit for a turnaround. The refinery’s employees did not adequately understand or know how to effectively control the FCC unit’s transient operation hazards. As a result, Husky Superior Refinery was not aware its FCC unit shutdown procedure was not aligned with the technology licensor’s guidance that had been in place and provided to the refinery since the unit was designed in 1960.

Process safety management systems: The Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) Standard and the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Risk Management Plan (RMP) Rule require facilities like Husky Superior Refinery to implement process safety management systems to identify, evaluate, and control their process hazards. This report discusses the following elements of Husky Superior Refinery’s process safety management systems that contributed to the incident:

  • Process safety information: Husky Superior Refinery did not maintain some of the FCC licensor’s critical safety technology as part of its process safety information (PSI) package. Essential information describing how to shut down an FCC unit safely was not incorporated into the refinery’s operating procedures, process hazard analysis (PHA), and operator training material.
  • Operating procedures: Husky Superior Refinery’s FCC unit shutdown procedure did not provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities consistent with the PSI. In addition, Husky Superior Refinery did not identify that recent changes to the operating procedure designed to minimize venting to the atmosphere during this shutdown, along with the absence of steps to purge oxygen out of the system, made it even more likely that oxygen would accumulate in the FCC unit.
  • Process hazard analysis: Husky Superior Refinery’s FCC unit PHA teams did not specifically evaluate the hazards of following the refinery’s most recent shutdown procedure or otherwise use a methodology that enhanced identification of transient operations hazards. As a result, the refinery did not identify, analyze, and control transient operation hazards that led to the explosion.
    Operator training: Husky Superior Refinery’s operator training program did not prepare the FCC operators to shut down the unit safely or respond to abnormal situations properly.

Industry knowledge and guidance: Husky Superior Refinery incident occurred less than one year after the CSB released its investigation of another FCC unit transient operation explosion in California. In 2015, an explosion occurred in the ExxonMobil Torrance, California refinery while workers were attempting to isolate equipment for unscheduled maintenance while the FCC unit was in an idled mode of operation. Preparations for the maintenance activity caused a pressure deviation that disturbed the reactor steam barrier, allowing flammable hydrocarbon to backflow from the main column through the regenerator, and into the electrostatic precipitator (“ESP”), a pollution control device, where it ignited and exploded.

Brittle fracture during extreme events: The primary absorber and sponge absorber vessels in the Husky Superior Refinery FCC unit failed by brittle fracture (shattering like breaking glass), which sent more than a hundred pieces of metal debris throughout the refinery, striking workers and operating equipment. These vessels were constructed of the American Society of Testing and Methods A-212 and A-201 grade steels, which are no longer recommended for new equipment. Had the vessels been constructed of a newer grade of steel with better toughness properties, they should have ruptured by ductile fracture (tearing open like a zipper or fish mouth) with a reduced impact on the surrounding area.

Emergency preparedness: The explosion debris struck an upper portion of an asphalt tank, which caused asphalt to spill outside the containment area and into the refinery. The likely ignition source ignited the asphalt was pyrophoric material inside the storage tank that smoldered when exposed to the air that entered through the punctured tank wall. Husky Superior Refinery could not prevent the hot asphalt from igniting due to the unexpected extent of the spill, competing priorities of responding to the FCC unit explosion, and uncertainty by refinery employees about how to properly mitigate a large area of spilled hot, ignitable asphalt.

CSB’s report issued 16 safety recommendations to several entities including the company, OSHA, EPA, and the American Petroleum Institute (API). In particular, the CSB outlined actions the company should take to improve the refinery’s operations and is calling on the EPA to develop a program that prioritizes inspections of FCC units in refineries that operate HF alkylation units. Part of this program will verify FCC safeguards that prevent explosions during transient operations.

“These safety issues seek to address incident causes,” said CSB Board Member Sylvia Johnson. “We call on refineries, trade groups, and regulators to examine our final report and apply the key lessons to help ensure safe operations at facilities throughout the country and to develop and adopt effective emergency response practices.”

Click here for the full report.

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